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I. INTRODUCTION 
The new Iowa Criminal Code (Criminal Code) went into effect on Janu-
ary 1, 1978, having been finally passed in 19761 following three years of leg-
islative process. The Criminal Code is the first complete revision since the 
passage of Iowa's first criminal code in 1851. The lengthy interim period saw 
many patchwork changes through "the process of ad hoc, piecemeal 
amendment. "2 
A. Legislative History8 
With the impetus of pioneer work undertaken a decade earlier by a 
1. S.F. 85, 1976 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1245 (66th G.A.). 
2. Schantz, Objectives of Criminal Code Revision: Guidelines to Evaluation, 60 IOWA L. 
REV. 430 (1975). 
3. Unfortunately, few meaningful documents on legislative history of the new Criminal 
Code exist, so that the researcher must pore through individual legislative journals and multi-
tudinous proffered amendments during a three year legislative period to determine the legisla-
tive intent. This tedious task must be done without the benefit of any explanatory comments 
either on the bill as proposed by the Criminal Code Review Study Committee or on the pro-
posed Criminal Code as ultimately passed by the legislature. For an example of helpful illustra-
tive comments on criminal code revision in another jurisdiction, see Proposed Criminal Code 
for the State of Missouri 8 (West pamphlet 1973). The one piece of official Iowa legislative 
history of any substance appears in the section-by-section commentary in Substantive Crim. 
Law Subcomm. of the Crim. Code Review Study Comm., (Tent. Draft No.4, 1974) [hereinafter 
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committee of the Iowa State Bar Association, the general assembly estab-
lished a Criminal Code Review Study Committee in 1969. This committee 
completed its task in December of 1972, and transmitted its final report in 
the form of a proposed new criminal code to the general assembly near the 
start of the legislative session in 1973. Extensive review of this report was 
completed by a special legislative subcommittee in 1973. Early in the 1974 
legislative session, a bill (S.F. 1150) drafted by that subcommittee was intro-
duced, reflecting the work of that subcommittee on the study committee's 
report and on other proposals. Some action was taken in the Senate, but 
none at all was taken in the House during the 1974 session. The bill had to 
be reintroduced (as S.F. 85) with the convening of a new General Assembly 
in 1975. That bill was passed by the Senate in 1975 and by the House in 
1976, and signed into law by Governor Rayon June 28, 1976. 
The effective date for its general implementation was January 1, 1978.· 
Three provisions, however, went into effect on July 1, 1976: (1) amendment 
of the accommodation provision in the controlled substances law,1I (2) repeal 
of the requirement that motorcyclists wear helmets,8 and (3) provision for 
the Iowa Supreme Court to propose changes in the new Iowa Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure to the. General Assembly for the 1977 session.7 
Myriad corrective, as well as substantive, amendments were passed in 
1977. Several additional changes were made during the 1978 and 1979 legis-
lative sessions.s 
B. Contents of the Criminal Code 
The entire revised Criminal Code is comprised of the Iowa Criminal 
Code, the Iowa Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Iowa Corrections Code. 
This Article is an analysis of the Iowa Criminal Code only. This part of the 
Criminal Code contains general principles relating to substantive criminal 
law, the law of complicity of the various parties to crime and the individual 
crimes and defenses (both general and specific) to crimes. The latter topic is 
included herein only as to specific defenses peculiar to particular crimes. 
cited as STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT]. Unfortunately, this document related to the proposed code 
in 1974 rather than to how it was submitted to the general assembly as S.F. 85 in 1975-76. 
Moreover, this document is not generally available, but can be examined in the office of the 
Iowa Legislative Service Bureau in Des Moines. An excellent unofficial source of legislative his-
tory can be found in J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, IOWA CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON]. Professors John Yeager and Ronald Carlson 
served as the reporters for the STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT. 
4. S.F. 85, 1976 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1245, § 529 (66th G.A.). 
5. [d. § 231, amending IOWA CODE § 204.410 (1975). 
6. [d. § 527, repealing 1975 Iowa Acts 1st Sess. ch. 183 (66th G.A.). 
7. [d. § 530. 
8. See 1977 Iowa Acts 1st Sess. (67th G.A.); 1978 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. (67th G.A.); 1979 
Iowa Acts 1st Sess. (68th G.A.) (supplementing IOWA CODE §§ 701.1-732.6 (1978». 
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1. Substantive Content of the Criminal Code 
Practically every crime was changed to some extent in the revision pro-
cess which culminated in the new Criminal Code. Numerous crimes were 
eliminated completely and several were added to the Iowa Criminal Code for 
the first time. In addition to these substantive changes, a whole new legisla-
tive lexicon was created because many changes in terminology were made.· 
a. Inclusivity of the Criminal Code. All crimes in Iowa are statutory,10 
nevertheless the new Criminal Code surprisingly does not contain all of the 
serious crimes included in the Iowa Code. The major omission is the Uni-
form Controlled Substances Act, which despite containing several felonies, 
was left in chapter 204 of the Iowa Code.ll Numerous other felonies lll (either 
Class C or D), as well as many aggravated misdemeanor offenses,18 were also 
not transferred into the new Criminal Code. Similarly, nearly one hundred 
serious misdemeanors,14 as well as hundreds of simple misdemeanors, re-
main scattered throughout other chapters of the Iowa Code instead of being 
incorporated into the new Criminal Code itself. Coordinating amendments llJ 
in the Criminal Code Revision Act conform the penalty provisions for the 
above regulatory offenses to the systematic penalty schedules in the new 
Criminal Code. Additionally, another approximately sixty-three criminal of-
fenses remaining outside the Criminal Code have been declared to be fraud-
ulent practices and thus punishable under the penalty schedules for that 
major offense,18 which is a part of the Criminal Code. 
In contrast, a number of minor offenses were surprisingly left in the 
new Criminal Code.17 These include a series of unrepealed pre-revised of-
9. For a discussion of archaic phraseology in the pre-revised code, see Schantz, supra note 
2, at 434-35.-Regarding the retention of the term "tumultuous" in the revised statute defining 
riot (now IOWA CODE § 723.1 (1979», Professor Schantz states: "Such language gives little gui-
dance to the public or to the police who must enforce it, and, touching as it does upon rights of 
expression and assembly, it is open to serious objection on policy grounds and to possible con-
stitutional challenge." [d. at 435. 
10. IOWA CODE § 701.2 (1979). See State v. Brighi, 232 Iowa 1087, 7 N.W.2d 9 (1942). 
Thus, no uncodified common law offenses are punishable in Iowa. Regarding over-inclusivity 
and under-inclusivity of the punishable conduct in the then proposed new Criminal Code, see 
generally Schantz, supra note 2, at 440-46. 
11. As Professor Schantz pointed out in analyzing the proposed criminal code (then S.F. 
1150), it was not necessary to include the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the revised 
Criminal Code in toto. The central criminal provisions could have been "abstracted out and the 
classification scheme incorporated by reference." Schantz, supra note 2, at 443. 
12. See, e.g., IOWA CODE §§ 321.281 (OMVUI-third offense); 422.25(8), 422.58(3) (tax eva-
sion) (1977). 
13. See, e.g., IOWA CODE §§ 321.281 (OMVUI-second offense); 657.3 (Nuisance) (1977). 
14. See, e.g., IOWA CODE §§ 99B.6(4) (Gambling offense); 155.26 (Unauthorized Possession 
of Prescription Drugs) (1977); 321.281 (OMVUI-first offense) (1979). 
15. See 1976 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1245, pt. 4, §§ 1-531 (66th G.A.). 
16. IOWA CODE §§ 714.8-.13 (1979). 
17. See Schantz, supra note 2, at 444. Professor Schantz states: 
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fenses relating to health, safety, and welfare,t8 infringement of civil rights,t' 
blacklisting employees,lI0 labor union membership,l1 labor boycotts and 
strikes,lIlI political activities,l8 weapons permits,lI. and advertising and selling 
courses of instruction. lilt However, several other unrepealed pre-revised 
crimes of a minor nature were transferred outside of the new Criminal Code. 
These were offenses relating to storage batteries,lI8 professional boxing and 
wrestlingll7 and door-to-door sales.1I8 
The fact that the new Criminal Code is not all inclusive has been clari-
fied by the Iowa Supreme Court. In State v. Rauhauser,1I1 the court held 
that public intoxicationSO was still a punishable criminal offense in Iowa 
even though it was not included in the new Criminal Code itself. The crux of 
the holding was that this offense, which was outside the main chapters of 
the pre-revised criminal code (in a chapter on liquor control),81 was not re-
pealed as part of the revision process. The court pointed out that the revised 
statute contained "a rather exhaustive listing of statutes repealed by the 
new Criminal Code,"si with no mention made of the statute on public intox-
ication. The court stated that "[h]ad the legislature intended to repeal said 
statutes, it is only reasonable to expect an indication of such intent where 
other repealed statutes are enumerated. "S8 Having thus concluded that 
there was no express repeal, the court also refused to find an implied repeal. 
Invoking an established presumption against the implied repeal of statutes, 
the court noted that "[s]uch repeals are not favored by the courts and will 
not be sustained unless legislative intent to repeal is clear in the language 
[i]n sum, the [then proposed] Code's relocation or elimination of the "regulatory" 
statutes located in our present criminal Code seems rather thorough. However, one 
might well take exception to nearly all of [the chapter on health, safety, and welfare 
offenses]. Regulation of fireworks, x-rays and abandoned refrigerators, if needed at 
all, surely belongs outside the criminal code. [d. 
18. See IOWA CODE §§ 727.1-.10 (1979). 
19. See id. §§ 729.1-.4. 
20. [d. §§ 730.1-.3. 
21. [d. §§ 731.1-.8. 
22. [d. §§ 732.1-.6. 
23. [d. §§ 721.3-.7. 
24. See id. §§ 724.5, .10, .15, .16, .21, .22. 
25." [d. §§ 714.17-.22. 
26. IOWA CODE §§ 715.1-.5 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
27. [d. §§ 99C.1-.9 (1979). 
28. [d. §§ 82.1-.6. Additionally, the crime of maintaining pay toilets in public places was 
transferred to § 135.21 pursuant to 1978 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 147, § 136 (67th G.A.), after 
originally being part of the new Criminal Code at § 727.11. 
29. 272 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa 1978). 
30. IOWA CODE §§ 123.46, .91 (1979). 
31. IOWA CODE ch. 123 (1977). 
32. State v. Rauhauser, 272 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Iowa 1978). 
33. [d. 
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used and such a holding is absolutely necessary."84 Another intriguing factor 
in this implied repeal matter is that the public intoxication provisions were 
not included in the coordinating amendments sections in the Criminal Code 
Revision Act.811 
b. Decriminalization. Several pre-revised crimes were completely 
eliminated from the new Criminal Code, in order to better reflect a modern 
legal code of conduct. Among them were Treason86 and Misprision of Trea-
son,87 totally unused and unnecessary state crimes presumably better left to 
federal enforcement, since both crimes related only to treason against the 
United States.8S Dueling,S9 an archaic crime, was eliminated. In addition, 
changing moral and sexual standards resulted in decriminalization of Adul-
tery,40 Forcible Marriage and Defilement,41 and Seduction!a A growing rec-
ognition of constitutional rights to privacy explains the failure of the legisla-
ture to criminalize any private sexual activity among consenting adults in 
the new Criminal Code,48 and the elimination of consensual sodomy between 
adults in the revised crime of Sexual Abuse.44 Serious federal constitutional 
problems prompted decriminalization of four additional crimes:411 Criminal 
Syndicalism,4e Libel,47 Profanity:e and Vagrancy.49 Finally, the crime of De-
struction of Food ProductsliO was also decriminalized. 
c. Expanded Criminalization. As Professor Schantz has pointed out, 
"[t]he converse of the decriminalization issue is whether the criminal law 
34. [d. at 434. 
35. See 1976 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1245, pt. 4 (66th G.A.). 
36. IOWA CODE § 689.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
37. [d. § 689.3. 
38. Insurrection, which essentially consists of physical violence toward or disruption of 
state government or any subdivision thereof, is a more appropriate offense. 
39. IOWA CODE §§ 692.1-.4 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
40. [d. § 702.1. 
41. [d. § 699.1. 
42. [d. §§ 700.1-.3. 
43. J. YEAGER, IOWA CRIMINAL CODE TRAINING MANUAL 51 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 
TRAINING MANUAL). 
44. IOWA CODE §§ 709.1-.10 (1979). 
45. Professor Schantz has stated that "[a)t least a few provisions of the [then) current 
Code are rather clearly unconstitutional, at least as drafted." Schantz, supra note 2, at 444. 
46. IOWA CODE §§ 689.10-.12 (1977) (repealed 1978). See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444 (1969). 
47. IOWA CODE §§ 737.1-.7 (1977) (repealed 1978). See Ashton v .. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 
(1966). 
48. IOWA CODE § 728.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
49. IOWA CODE §§ 746.1-.25 (1977) (repealed 1978). See Papachristou v. City of Jackson-
ville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
50. IOWA CODE §§ 734.1-.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). Professor Schantz states "[g)one, too, 
but not forgotten, are chapters 733 and 734, which prohibit the sale of diseased plants and the 
waste of food products to increase the price." Schantz, supra note 2, at 444. 
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should be expanded to cover new areas."111 He concluded that systematic 
consideration was not given by the drafters of the new Criminal Code to 
even such timely penal concerns as expanding measures on consumer pro-
tection and environmental contropll However, several new offenses have 
been included in the new Criminal Code, including but not limited to the 
following: Indecent Exposure,lIs Public Indecent Exposure,M and the Sale of 
Hard Pornography.1I11 The moral overtones of these new crimes indicate that 
morality was a significant concern of the drafters of the Criminal Code. 
The new Criminal Code has also given special protection to particularly 
vulnerable classes of victims through the addition of such new crimes as 
Feticide and related offenses,lIs Sexual Exploitation of Children,1I1 and Wan-
ton Neglect of a Resident of a Health Care Facility.lls Similarly, the new 
Code has focused attention on the special problem of weapons by adding a 
new offense of Possession of Firearms by a Felon,1I11 and by expanding the 
scope of the pre-revised offense of Carrying Concealed Weapons.eo Another 
noteworthy development in the new Criminal Code was the criminalization 
of three types of tortious conduct which heretofore had been left to civil 
remedies: False Imprisonment,81 Malicious Prosecution,8l1 and Setting 
Spring Guns.8S Finally, the addition of the following new crimes has broad-
ened extensively the general parameters of the criminal law: Solicitation," 
which criminalizes unsuccessful inchoate activity, and Accessory Mter the 
Fact811 complicity, which criminalizes the rendering of assistance to an of-
fender after a crime has been committed. 
2. Classification of Crimes 
Practically all of the crimes in the new Criminal Code are categorized 
51. Schantz, supra note 2, at 448. 
52. [d. One commentator states that "Ii]f one were to identify important new concerns of 
the penal system in America, they would be consumer protection and environmental control." 
Dash, Means and Methods Employed in Penal Law, 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 571, 579 (1974) (foot-
notes omitted). See IOWA CODE § 714.16 (1979) which was transferred, without change, from 
IOWA CODE § 713.24 (1977). 
53. IOWA CODE § 709.9 (1979). 
54. [d. § 728.5. 
55. [d. § 728.4. 
56. [d. §§ 707.7-.10. 
57. 1978 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1188 (67th G.A.). 
58. IOWA CODE § 726.7 (1979). 
59. [d. § 724.26. 
60. Compare IOWA CODE § 724.4 (1979) with IOWA CODE § 695.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
61. IOWA CODE § 710.7 (1979). 
62. [d. § 720.6. 
63. [d. § 708.9. 
64. [d. § 705.1. 
65. [d. § 703.3. 
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into various classifications88 of felonies and misdemeanors,8? with each clas-
sification carrying a uniform maximum penalty.88 There are four classes of 
felonies and three classes of misdemeanors. 
Ameliorative sentencing alternatives to confinement are available for 
most felony offenses and for all of the misdemeanor offenses. These alterna-
tives include a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, or a suspended 
sentence.89 
a. Felonies. (1) Confinement. Class A felonies?O are punishable by a 
mandatory sentence for life imprisonment without probation or parole. In-
determinate71 terms of imprisonment are prescribed for the other three clas-
ses of felonies,72 as follows: (1) a 25 year term for class B felonies, (2) a 10 
year term for class C felonies, and (3) a 5 year term for class D felonies. 
Whether or not a sentence of confinement is mandatory depends upon the 
availability of ameliorative sentencing alternatives as well as upon the scope 
of a new statutory provision?8 permitting a fine-only sanction on some felo-
66. The only unclassified crimes in the Criminal Code are those left unrepealed and 
transferred into the Criminal Code. See IOWA CODE cbs. 729-32 (1979). 
67. Under IOWA CODE § 701.7 (1979), a "public offense" is a felony when so declared by 
the statute defining the crime. Coupled with IOWA CODE § 701.8 (1979), which defines misde-
meanors as [a]ll public offenses which are not felonies," section 701.7 means that a public of-
fense is to be considered a misdemeanor, indeed a simple misdemeanor, when the penalty 
clause is silent as to whether the crime is a felony or a misdemeanor. Contrastingly, under the 
pre-revised code, a felony was any public offense potentially punishable by imprisonment in 
the penitentiary or adult reformatory, even though such imprisonment was not actually im-
posed. See IOWA CODE § 687.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). See also State v. Rauhauser, 272 N.W.2d 
432 (Iowa 1978). 
68. Professor Yeager states that "[t]he purpose of this system is to provide a more ra-
tional system of sentencing than is permitted under our present law [then the 1973 Code]." 
Yeager, Crimes Against the Person: Homicide, Assault, Sexual Abuse and Kidnapping in the 
Proposed Iowa Criminal Code, 60 IOWA L. REv. 503, 504 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Yeager 
Note]. 
69. IOWA CODE § 907.3 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 1724-26. 
70. IOWA CODE § 902.1 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 1622. 
71. Id. § 902.3. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 1624. Iowa's indeterminate 
sentencing statute "requires that the sentence, if it imposes a penitentiary term, shall not be 
fixed by the court. The term is imposed by law." State v. Kulish, 260 Iowa 138, 145, 148 
N.W.2d 428, 433 (1967). This means that a sentencing judge is limited (in his judicial discre-
tion, if any) to determining whether or not to impose (and then whether or not to suspend) a 
sentence of confinement. The judgment and sentence on any indeterminate term must be in the 
statutory terminology ("not to exceed" the statutorily-prescribed term of years), with the re-
sponsibility for determining the actual length of the prison sentence, within the maximum set 
by law, reposed in the board of parole. See State v. Peckenschneider, 236 N.W.2d 344, 347 
(Iowa 1975). However, since the indeterminate sentencing law does not apply to misdemeanors, 
a jail sentence for a misdemeanor offense "must specify a definite term. Otherwise it is uncer-
tain and void." State v. Welfort, 238 N.W.2d 781, 782 (Iowa 1976). 
72. IOWA CODE § 902.9 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 1630. 
73. Id. § 909.1. 
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nies, all of which is discussed below.74 
(2) Fines. No fines are authorized on either class A or B felonies,70 with 
the sole punishment instead being mandatory confinement. The maximum 
level of fines possible on class C and D felonies is $5,000 and $1,000,78 re-
spectively, with the exact amount, if any, a matter of judicial discretion for 
the sentencing court. These fines apparently can be in lieu of a sentence of 
confinement (or a suspended sentence) for non-"forcible felonies," but only 
as an additional penalty for "forcible felonies"77 which apparently are all 
punishable by mandatory imprisonment.78 
All of the ameliorative sentencing alternatives are unavailable, however, 
for certain felonies:78 (a) all class A felonies,80 (b) certain class B, C, or D 
felonies of a violent-prone nature which are specially categorized as "forcible 
felonies,"81 and (c) several of the major controlled substances offenses.sl Ad-
ditionally, a deferred judgment and a deferred sentence (but not a sus-
pended sentence) are precluded for an aggravated form of the crime of Las-
civious Acts With a Child.sS 
Statutory unavailability of any of these ameliorative alternatives for a 
particular crime means that the prescribed term of imprisonment is 
mandatory. All class A and B felonies clearly are punishable by mandatory 
confinement ("A" felonies by ameliorative alternatives being expressly pro-
hibited and "B" felonies by all being categorized as "forcible felonies"). 
Whether or not mandatory confinement is applicable to class C and D felo-
nies depends upon the meaning of Iowa Code section 909.1, which is new to 
Iowa law. Section 909.1 provides that upon conviction "of any public offense 
for which a fine is authorized, the court may impose a fine instead of any 
other sentence where it appears that the fine will be adequate to deter the 
defendant and to discourage others from similar criminal activity." 
Considered in isolation, section 909.1 clearly seems to authorize a judge 
to impose a fine (instead of the more onerous sanctions of either a sus-
pended sentence or a sentence of confinement) as the only punishment for 
any crimes (class C and D felonies, as well as all three misdemeanor classifi-
cations) for which fines are authorized. Indeed, Professor Yeager states un-
equivocally that in pronouncing sentence for class C and D felonies, the 
co~rt "may impose a fine, within the limits provided, without imposing 8 
74. See generally text accompanying notes 84-102 infra. 
75. IOWA CODE §§ 902.1, 902.9(1) (1979). 
76. [d. §§ 902.9(3), (4). 
77. [d. § 702.11. See text accompanying notes 1SO-203 infra. 
78. See text accompanying notes 79-102 infra. 
79. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 1724-26. 
SO. IOWA CODE § 902.1 (1979). 
81. [d. § 907.3. 
82. [d. § 907.3. These offenses are Delivery, Possession With Intent, and Manufacturing. 
[d. § 204.410. 
83. [d. §§ 907.3(1)(a), 709.8. 
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sentence of imprisonment."84 
Reading section 909.1, in pari materia, with the felony penalty provi-
sions in section 902.9, however, raises questions as to the "reach" of section 
909.1. The applicable provisions read that "[a] class 'C' felon ... shall be 
confined for no more than ten years, and in addition may be sentenced to a 
fine of not more than five thousand dollars,"811 with the same approach 
taken in the class D felony schedule.86 
The language of these penalty schedule provisions, read in isolation, 
suggests that the prescribed indeterminate term of confinement must be im-
posed ("shall be confined"), subject, of course, to the availability of a sus-
pended sentence.87 In other words, confinement would be the primary, albeit 
mandatory, sanction. Additionally, a secondary sanction of a fine could also 
be imposed (together with the sentence of confinement), but not in lieu of 
the prescribed confinement. The secondary nature of the sanction of a fine 
is evident from the phrase "and in addition may be sentenced to a fine 
" 
By comparison, the terminology in the penalty schedules for all classes 
of misdemeanors clearly permits a fine as an alternative sanction in lieu of 
imprisonment. For the two indictable misdemeanors,88 the prescribed pen-
alty is imprisonment or a fine or both, in addition to the three ameliorative 
alternatives. Similarly, the prescribed penalty for a simple misdemeanorse is 
imprisonment or a fine (but not both), in addition to the three ameliorative 
alternatives. 
The comparative penalty schedule provisions for class C and D felonies 
and for misdemeanors read in pari materia suggest different approaches to 
the question of a fine as an alternative sanction to mandatory imprisonment. 
However, if section 902.9 is read as precluding a fine, then section 909.1 is 
totally unnecessary, in light of a fine already being expressly authorized as 
the sole sanction for misdemeanors in section 903.1. Because of the general 
principle that every statutory provision is to be given effect90 with at least 
84. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 1772. 
85. IOWA CODE § 902.9(3) (1979) (emphasis added). But see note 87 infra. 
86. [d. § 902.9(4). • 
87. The Iowa Supreme Court has made it clear that the statutory provisions defining the 
substantive offense and providing for ameliorative sentencing alternatives 
[T)ogether comprise a legislative plan for the sentencing of those convicted of [a) 
crime . . . . As used in this context, the word 'shall' does not require the trial court 
to sentence defendant to a penitentiary term. It means only that if the court's discre-
tionary power to defer sentence or grant probation is not exercised, defendant must 
then be sentenced to the penitentiary. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that 
all our sentencing statutes are couched in 'shall' language. 
State v. Robbins, 257 N.W.2d 63, 69 (Iowa 1977). 
88. IOWA CODE §§ 903.1(1),(2) (1979) (aggravated misdemeanors and serious misdemean-
ors, respectively). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 1642. 
89. IOWA CODE § 903.1(3) (1979). See text accompanying notes 103-11 infra. 
90. City of Des Moines v. Elliott, 267 N.W.2d 44 (Iowa 1978). 
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an implied presumption against any provision being meaningless, there must 
be some intended application of section 909.1. 
The conflict between sections 909.1 and 902.9 must be reconciled in or-
der to resolve this matter. The usual approach to resolving irreconcilable 
statutory conflicts is for the specific provision to control over the general 
provision.91 The problem here is in determining which is the specific 
provision. 
A reasonable approach would be to afford section 909.1 the status of the 
specific provision only when there are no other specific provisions requiring 
a contrary result. Accordingly, section 909.1 would apply to a class C or D 
felony which is not a "forcible felony," since there is no other specific stat-
ute (other than section 909.1). In this circumstance, the penalty schedule 
provision in section 902.9 is a general statute. On the other hand, the spe-
cific statute precluding ameliorative alternatives for a "forcible felony" 
should control against the correlative specific provision in section 909.1. The 
legislative intent clearly was to make sentences of confinement mandatory 
for violence-prone offenses constituting "forcible felonies." It would cer-
tainly be ludicrous on "forcible felonies" to preclude a deferred judgment, a 
deferred sentence, and a suspended sentence, and yet permit a fine instead 
of a sentence of confinement. In other words, a sentencing judge, required to 
enter a judgment of conviction and to impose sentence, could decide that a 
fine was an adequate sentence. However, if he decided that a fine was not 
adequate, then he would be left only with a sentence of confinement, since a 
suspended sentence for "forcible felonies" is expressly precluded in section 
907.3. 
The fact that section 909.1 should not be interpreted as overriding the 
provision for mandatory confinement under section 902.7 for use or posses-
sion of a "firearm" during the commission of any "forcible felony" is clear 
on the face of section 902.7 itself.92 The latter provides that under such cir-
cumstances "the convicted person shall serve a minimum of five years of the 
sentence imposed by law." A fine-only sanction under section 909.1 would 
render this provision useless,9B since the defendant cannot serve "a mini-
mum of five years of the sentence" by merely paying a fine. Moreover, the 
phrase "the sentence imposed by law" should be read as "the sentenced re-
quired by law," since the language "imposed by law" implies that no judicial 
discretion is intended in a particular case. Otherwise, the terminology 
should be "the sentence imposed." 
There is a contrary view, however. Professor Yeager, without detailed 
analysis of canons of statutory construction, states: "[i]t is not clear whether 
91. See, e.g., State v. Bousman, 278 N.W.2d 15 (Iowa 1979) (specific savings provision in 
new Criminal Code, § 801.5(2)(b)(2), prevails over general savings provision, § 4.13, in the Code 
generally) . 
92. But see text accompanying notes 94-96.3 infra. 
93. See note 90 supra. 
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the court can avoid the minimum sentence provision of section 902.7 by im-
posing a fine only, but there appears to be no reason why the restrictions on 
probation in section 907.3 will affect the court's exercise of this option, and 
clearly the limitations on parole in section 906.5 do not."1H Addressing the 
critical question, Professor Yeager recognizes that "the imposition of a fine 
without imprisonment in such cases will seldom be indicated, and would vio-
late the intent of those provisions."95 
. This matter obviously awaits judicial interpretation in which the matter 
is squarely presented in the context of a sentencing judge taking the posi-
tion that he has no discretion merely to impose a fine on a "forcible felony." 
The Iowa Supreme Court has already labelled section 902.7 as a mandatory 
minimum sentencing provision in three cases,96 but the effect of section 
909.1 was not argued or discussed in any of them. Nevertheless, the court 
has made some fairly definitive statements, as evidenced by this observation 
in State v. Holmes:96•1 "We, therefore, hold that imposition of the statutory 
five-year minimim mandatory sentence for involvement of a firearm in com-
mission of a felony does not inflict cruel and unusual punishment."66.1 Addi-
tionally, the court said in State v. Powers:9 6.S "Here, the obvious legislative 
purpose of section 902.7 is to deter the use of firearms by imposition of 
mandatory minimum penalties .... "97 
The crucial point, of course, is that a sentencing judge must exercise his 
judicial discretion in imposing sentence. If a fine-only sanction is permissi-
ble for "forcible felonies," then a sentencing judge would commit reversible 
error in taking the approach that confinement is mandatory.98 Instead, he 
would have to recognize his authority to use the fine as an alternative pen-
alty but refuse to do so in this specific case because of the particular sur-
rounding circumstances of either the commission of the crime itself or the 
prior background of the offender.99 
Sound public policy arguments support the aforementioned differential 
approach to section 909.1, depending upon whether or not a "forcible fel-
ony" offense is involved. The typical non-forcible class C or D felony does 
not involve violence. loo Contrastingly, all of the class C or D felonies which 
94. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 1772. 
95. [d. 
96. State v. Sanders, 280 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1979); State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 
1979); State v. Holmes, 276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979). 
96.1. 276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979). 
96.2. [d. at 829. 
96 .. 3. 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1979). 
97. [d. at 28. 
98. "The trial court's failure to exercise the discretion the statute vests in him requires a 
reversal for resentencing." State v. Robbins, 257 N.W.2d 63, 70 (Iowa 1977). 
99. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 22(3)(d); State v. Luedtke, 279 N.W.2d 7 (Iowa 1979). 
100. The class C felonies which are not "forcible felonies" are: IOWA CODE §§ 706.3 (Con-
spiracy); 709.7 (Detention in a Brothel); 710.5 (Child Stealing); 712.3 (Arson (2d»; 712.6 (Pos-
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are "forcible felonies" require violence.101 Certainly, it seems logical to focus 
upon violence in establishing mandatory sentences of confinement. This fo-
cus is exacerbated by tying to "forcible felonies" the collateral five-year 
mandatory minimum sentence for use or possession of firearms.102 
b. Misdemeanors. A second level of indictable misdemeanor lOS was ad-
ded to the new Criminal Code. This aggravated misdemeanor is punishable 
by a definite terml04 of imprisonment not exceeding two years or a max-
imum fine of $5,000, or both. loa Many less serious pre-revised felonies carry-
ing a maximum definite term of one or two years of imprisonment were 
downgraded into this new classification, as well as some more serious pre-
revised felonies. l06 The other class of indictable misdemeanor is the serious 
misdemeanor, which is punishable by a definite jail term not exceeding one 
session of Explosive or Incendiary Devices); 713.3 (Burglary (2d»; 713.4 (Possession of Burglary 
Tools); 714.2(1) (Theft (1st»; 714.9 (Fraud Practice (1st»; 715.6 (False Use of a Financial In-
strument); 716.3 (Mischief (1st»; 718.1 (Insurrection); 719.5 (Assisting Prisoner to Escape); 
722.2 (Accepting Bribe); 726.3 (Abandonment of a Dependent Person); 728.12 (Sexual Exploita-
tion of Children) (1979). 
The class D felonies, which are not "forcible felonies," include: IOWA CODE §§ 705.1 (Solici-
tation); 708.5 (Administering Harmful Substances); 708.8 (Going Armed with Intent); 709.8 
(Lascivious Acts); 710.6 (Violating Custodial Order); 711.4 (Extortion); 712.7 (False Reports 
Regarding Explosive or Incendiary Devices); 712.8 (Threats to Place Incendiary or Explosive 
Devices); 714.2(2) (Theft (2d»; 714.10 (Fraudulent Practice (2d»; 716.4 (Mischief (2d»; 721.1 
(Felonious Misconduct in Office); 718.5 (Falsifying Public Documents); 719.4 (Escape); 719.5 
(Permitting Prisoner to Escape); 719.6 (Assisting Prisoner to Escape); 719.8 (Furnishing Con-
trolled Substance to Inmates); 720.2 (Perjury); 720.3 (Suborning Perjury); 722.1 (Bribery); 
722.10 (Commercial Bribery); 724.3 (Possession of Offensive Weapons); 725.3 (Pimping); 725.3 
(Pandering); 726.2 (Incest); 726.5 (Nonsupport) (1979). 
The one atypical "non-forcible" class D felony which involves violence is Involuntary Man-
slaughter Code § 707.5(1). This crime does not appear to be a "felonious assault." Nevertheless, 
while a death must result, the nature of the offender's act is the unintentional causing of death 
and thus is not necessarily a crime of violence. 
101. The class C felonies, which are "forcible felonies," are: IOWA CODE §§ 707.4 (Volun-
tary Manslaughter); 707.7 (Feticide); 707.8 (Nonconsensual Termination); 707.11 (Attempted 
Murder); 708.3 (Assault while Participating in a Felony); 708.4 (Willful Injury); 709.4 (Sex 
Abuse (3d»; 710.4 (Kidnapping (3d»; 711.3 (Robbery (3d» (1979). 
The class D felonies, which are "forcible felonies," are: IOWA CODE §§ 707.7 (Attempted 
Feticide); 708.3 (Assault while Participating in a Felony); 708.6 (Terrorism) (1979). 
102. IOWA CODE § 902.7 (1979). See text accompanying notes 94-96.3 supra. 
103. An indictable public offense under the new Code, as under the pre-revised law, is any 
offense more serious than a simple misdemeanor. See IOWA R. CRIM. P. 4(1), (2). 
104. Since the indeterminate sentencing law is not applicable to misdemeanor offenses, a 
sentence to jail on a misdemeanor offense "mlll!t specify a definite term. Otherwise it is uncer-
tain and void." State v. Welfort, 238 N.W.2d 781, 782 (Iowa 1976) (misdemeanant's sentence to 
jail for a period "not to exceed six months" is indefinite and thus void). 
105. IOWA CODE § 903.1(1) (1979). 
106. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 694.6 (1977) (repealed 1978) (Assault With Intent to InBict 
Bodily Injury), replaced by IOWA CODE § 708.2(1) (1979) (Assault With Intent to Do Serious 
Injury); IOWA CODE § 321.76 (1977) (repealed 1978) (Operating Vehicle Without Owner's Con-
sent) (replaced by IOWA CODE § 714.7 (1) (1979». 
HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 252 1979-1980
252 Drake Law Review [Vol. 29 
year or a maximum fine of $1,000, or both.lo7 The lowest classification of 
crime is the simple misdemeanor,lo8 which remains unchanged from pre-re-
vised law. This crime remains punishable by a jail term not exceeding thirty 
days or a maximum fine of $100, but not both. lOB All three of the ameliora-
tive sentencing alternatives are available for every misdemeanor offensellO in 
the Criminal Code.lll 
C. Construction of the Criminal Code 
In its first interpretations of the new Criminal Code, lllI the Iowa Su-
preme Court has indicated its unwillingness to declare a change from the 
pre-revised lawll8 unless the legislative intent to make a sweeping change is 
clear from the new statute on its face. ll4 In Emery v. Fenton, llI! the court 
reiterated normal rules of statutory construction, stating that 
[c]hanges made by revision of a statute will not be construed as altering 
the law unless the legislature's intent to accomplish a change in its mean-
ing is clear and unmistakable. An intent to make a change does not exist 
when the revised statute is merely susceptible to two constructions.He 
Similarly, the court specifically characterized the new Criminal Code as 
"primarily a restatement" of prior law,1l7 and quoted Professor Yeager1l8 
107. E.g., the penalty for the crime of Bribery in Sports was reduced from an indetermi-
nate (felony) term of not exceeding ten years of imprisonment under IOWA CODE § 739.12 (1977) 
(repealed 1978) to a definite (aggravated misdemeanor) term of up to two years under IOWA 
CODE § 722.3 (1979). 
108. IOWA CODE § 903.1(2) (1979). 
109. [d. § 903.1(3). 
110. IOWA CODE ch. 907 (1979) is applicable to misdemeanors. See id. § 907.1 (probation 
applicable to "a public offense," which includes misdemeanors). Section 907.3 does not include 
any misdemeanors within its provision precluding a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence or a 
suspended sentence. 
111. At least one simple misdemeanor outside the Criminal Code - Driving While Li-
cense Revoked or Under Suspension - is punishable by a mandatory sentence, however. IOWA 
CODE § 321.218 (1979). See State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Iowa 1979). 
112. See generally IOWA CODE § 4.2 (1979) (statutory abrogation of common law presump-
tion of strict construction of statute in derogation of common law). 
113. See also State v. Wilson, 287 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Iowa 1980) (presumption of legisla-
tive intent that language used in statute have usual meaning ascribed by courts "unless the 
context shows otherwise"). 
114. See also State v. Rauhauser, 272 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Iowa 1978) (presumption against 
implied repeal of unrevised criminal statutes left outside the revised new Criminal Code), 
which is discussed further in text accompanying notes 29-35 supra. 
115. 266 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1978). 
116. [d. at 10 (emphasis added) (citing Kelly v. Brewer, 239 N.W.2d 109, 114 (Iowa 
1976». 
117. [d. at 8. 
118. Professor John Yeager of the Drake University School of Law, as reporter for the 
STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, wrote the early drafts of the new Criminal Code. 
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approvingly, stating that 
lilt was not the purpose of this committee in drafting the code, to scrap 
the existing criminal law, and, starting from scratch, to create new law 
and new concepts. For the most part, the existing law was retained, clari-
fied where clarification was needed by adapting statutory language to in-
corporate existing case law, and changed only where change was felt de-
sirable. To the casual observer, it will appear that the criminal law has 
been completely rewritten. However, the Criminal Code is primarily a 
restatement of prior law, and most responsible studies of the code recog-
nize this. 118 . 
1. Elemental Changes 
253 
It is, of course, axiomatic that the elements of a crime are determined 
and changed by statute. IIO Thus, legislative elimination of the pre-revised 
element of a taking in the crime of Robberylll means that the prosecution 
no longer has to prove this element even though the common law name of 
the crime was maintained. This is because it is within the legislative peroga-
tive to define a crime, subject only to substantive due process requirements 
of the United States and Iowa Constitutions. This principle was made clear 
by the supreme court in State v. Pierce,122 a Robbery prosecution under the 
new Criminal Code. The defendant unsuccessfully contended in Pierce that 
the new statutory definition of Robbery was unconstitutionally vague be-
cause of a lack of fair notice to a person that the revised crime, by not re-
quiring a taking,1I8 included "conduct which was not robbery at common 
law or under prior [Iowa] statuteS."II. This argument was dismissed out of 
hand by the court. "The argument that a definition of crime which is other-
wise clear is somehow made unclear because it departs from common law 
and prior statutes is novel and without support either in reason or author-
ity."ulI Continuing, the court wrote that "[d]ue process does not require the 
legislature to give crimes the same elements they had at common law or 
under prior statutes. "116 Concluding on a legislative lexiconical note, the 
court noted that due process does not "bar a crime from being called rob-
bery merely because the perpetrator does not succeed. It was not irrational 
119. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 43, at 1-2. 
120. McAdams v. State, 226 Ind. 403, 81 N.E.2d 671 (1948). But see Virgin Islands v. 
Williams, 424 F.2d 526 (3rd Cir. 1970) (legislative intent for abrogation of common law element 
of specific intent must have been "clear"). 
121. IOWA CODE §§ 711.1-.3 (1979). 
122. 287 N. W.2d 570 (Iowa 1980). 
123. The statute itself certainly is clear on its face, providing, in pertinent part: "[ilt is 
immaterial to the question of guilt or innocence of robbery that property was or was not actu-
ally stolen." IOWA CODE § 711.1 (1979). 
124. 287 N.W.2d at 573. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
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for the legislature to make a person as culpable for a bungled robbery as for 
a successful one."127 
2. General Definitional Clauses 
a. Overview. The inclusion of a separate chapter of several general def-
initional clausesl28 in the new Criminal Code, as a change from the pre-re-
vised code, means that the courts must apply these statutory definitions in 
place of prior common law definitions that had been developed by the courts 
in the absence of statutory definitional clauses. Nevertheless, courts may use 
common law doctrine as to the background and origin of a word or phrase if 
the statute imprecisely defines the way a particular word is to be inter-
preted, creating doubt as to its meaning.uB The following twenty terms are 
included in the chapter of general definitional clauses: act, animal, brothel, 
child, controlled substance, dangerous weapon, death, deception, dwelling, 
forcible felony, incendiary device, occupied structure, participating in a pub-
lic offense, property, prostitute, reckless, serious injury, sex act, steal, and 
viability. ISO 
The general definitional clauses, unfortunately, are not uniformly ap-
plied throughout the Criminal Code itself. By the express terms of Iowa 
Code section 702.1, these do noJ apply whenever a special definition of that 
term is included in a particular provision. lSI "Child"l82 and "sex act"188 are 
two major examples of terms with both general and special definitional 
clauses. Moreover, three slightly different definitions of the otherwise gen-
eral terms "animal"l84 and "sex act"ISIi are used within the individual chap-
ters on animal and obscenity offenses, respectively. 
Several of the general definitional clauses appear only once in the Crim-
inal Code. These include the terms dwellingl88 and viability.187 Indeed, one 
127. Id. 
128. IOWA CODE ch. 702 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 21-47. 
129. 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 268 (4th ed. 1973). 
130. IOWA CODE §§ 702.2-.21 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 21-47. 
131. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 22. 
132. IOWA CODE § 702.5 (1979). See text accompanying notes 144-155 infra. 
133. Id. § 702.17. See text accompanying notes 296·310.2 infra. 
134. Id. § 702.3. 
135. Id. § 702.17. See text accompanying notes 296-310.2 infra. 
136. Id. § 702.10. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 37. Unlike the pre-revised 
law which followed the common law closely in this respect, the new Criminal Code does not 
single out a dwelling house for particular treatment. For example, the degrees of the revised 
offenses of Burglary and Arson do not depend upon whether a dwelling is involved. Instead, 
more realistically, the focus of attention is upon personal injury or its potential. See IOWA CODE 
§§ 713.2 and 712.2 (1979), respectively. This term is used only in the chapter on defenses. See 
id. th. 704. 
The replacement terms - "occupied structure" and "enclosed space" - are much broader 
in scope. See id., IOWA CODE §§ 702.12 and 713.1 (1979), respectively. See also IOWA STATE BAR 
ASSOCIATION, II IOWA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS ANNOTATED (CRIMINAL) (1978) (hereinafter 
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defined term - steaP88 - does not appear anywhere in the Criminal Code 
except in the definitional section. 
That the chapter of general definitional clauses is not static is ~vi­
denced by the fact that the term "sex act" was amended in 1978189 and that 
two new terms, ("incendiary device"Ho and "viability"Hl) were added in 
1978. Moreover, the Iowa Supreme Court has, in effect, added a new general 
definitional clause for "felonious assault"142 by judicial interpretation of a 
statutorily-undefined term.148 
b. "Child." The general term "child"H4 refers to "any person under 
the age of fourteen."144.l Essentially, this involves a reduction from the basic 
age of under sixteen in the pre-revised Code. 14D Of course, the focus is upon 
a "child" as the victim of a crime. He An entirely separate Juvenile Code,147 
also recently revised, focuses upon juveniles as the perpetrators of criminal 
activity. 
A special definition of "child" is included in the Sexual Abuse chapter 
to provide different penalties for sexual assaults on children under fourteen 
(Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree)148 and on children under twelve (Sexual 
Abuse in the Second Degree).149 On the other hand, the upper age of an 
adolescent victim is raised to fifteen for two other types of non-forcible Sex-
ual Abuse in the Third Degree. One type occurs when the defendant is a 
member of the same household or is related to the victim (by blood or affin-
ity) to the fourth degreelDO or has used a position of authority over the vic-
cited as UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS); J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 39, 293. 
137. IOWA CODE § 702.20 (1979). 
138. "Steal" is defined as "to take by theft," yet this term is not even mentioned in the 
chapter on Theft. See IOWA CODE § 702.19 (1979) and J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 
46. 
139. 1978 Iowa Acts, ch. 1029, § 44. 
140. 1978 Iowa Acts, ch. 1183, § 1. 
141. 1978 Iowa Acts, ch. 148, § 1. 
142. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979), in which "forcible felony" is defined as including 
"any felonious assault." See also text accompanying notes 180-183 infra. 
143. See State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1979) and text accompanying notes 326-
331 infra. 
144. IOWA CODE § 702.5 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 26. 
144.1. See IOWA CODE § 702.5 (1979). 
145. See, e.g., IOWA CODE §§ 698.1 & 725.10 (1977) (repealed 1978) (Statutory Rape and 
Lascivious Acts With a Child, respectively). 
146. The general term "child" applies to the following crimes: Abandonment of a Depen-
dent Person, Child Stealing, Lascivious Acts With a Child, Sexual Exploitation of Children, 
and Violating a Custodial Order. See IOWA CODE §§ 726.3, 710.5, 709.8, 728.12, & 710.6 (1979), 
respectively. 
147. IOWA CODE ch. 232 (1979). 
148. [d. § 709.4(3) ("child"). 
149. [d. § 709.3(2) ("under the age of twelve"). 
150. [d. § 709.4(4). 
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tim to coerce submission to the defendant;lIH the other occurs when the de-
fendant is six or more years older than the victim or other participant.1I11 
Each of these instances applies only when the other participant is either 
fourteen or fifteen, and neither requires that the "sex act" be by force or 
against the will of the other participant. 
Four other crimes with adolescent victims or participantsl118 are keyed 
to "minors" instead of children. 111. The upper age limit for these crimes, age 
seventeen, is set forth in a specific definition,!1111 as well as generally set out 
in Iowa Code section 599.1 (outside the Criminal Code itself). 
c. "Controlled Substance." A common sense approach is used in defin-
ing "controlled substance"1118 by incorporating by reference the definition of 
that term in the one major pre-revised chapter of crimes not being included 
in the consolidated Criminal Code.1117 Indeed, the General Assembly took 
essentially a hands-off approach to the entire subject of controlled sub-
stances, having comprehensively dealt with the subject a few years earlier.ll18 
The only changes made in the Uniform Controlled Substances Act were in 
applying the general penalty schedules and in establishing a mandatory 
minimum sentence for certain offenses. IllS Moreover, the new crime of Fur-
nishing Controlled Substances to Inmates180 is the only reference at all in 
the new Criminal Code to controlled substances. 
d. "Dangerous Weapon." (1). Definitional Clause. Two classes of 
"dangerous weapons" are established in Iowa Code section 702.7:181 (1) per 
se dangerous weapons "designed primarily for use in inflicting death or in-
jury upon a human being or animal" and (2) other instruments or devices 
with legitimate uses which nevertheless become dangerous weapons through 
being actually used in par:t;icular circumstances with the intent to inflict 
death or serious injury upon a human being.181 A non-inclusive listing of 
151. [d. 
152. [d. § 709.4(5). 
153. The crimes involving "minors" (under 18 years of age) include Admitting Minors to 
Premises Where Obscene Material is Exhibited, Dissemination and Exhibition of Obscene Ma-
terial to Minors, Nonsupport, and Wanton Neglect of a Minor. See IOWA CODE §§ 728.3, 728.2, 
726.5, & 726.6 (1979), respectively. 
154. One crime involving "minors" - Permitting Minors in Billiard Rooms - was in-
cluded in the new Criminal Code but was repealed in 1979. See IOWA CODE § 725.13 (1978) 
(repealed 1979); 1979 Iowa Acts, ch. 1187, § 1. 
155. See IOWA CODE § 728.1(6) (1979). 
156. IOWA CODE § 702.6 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 27. 
157. See IOWA CODE ch. 204 (1979). 
158. [d. 
159. [d. § 204.413. 
160. [d. § 719.8. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 1916-17; J. 
YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 433. This crime is not discussed in this Article. 
161. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 218; J. YEAGER & R. CARL-
SON, supra note 3, § 28. 
162. Whether or not a particular device or instrument which is not per se a "dangerous 
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eight per se "dangerous weapons" is included in the Code. It is interesting 
that two of these eight, a razor and a knife having a blade longer than three 
inches, also have legitimate uses. The apparent import of including these as 
dangerous weapons per se is to automatically make them "dangerous weap-
ons" whenever used upon a human being with the intent to injure, without 
requiring proof of an intent for "serious injury" or death and without re-
quiring submission of the crime to the factfinder.183 
It is immaterial whether or not a per se "dangerous weapon" is loaded 
or unloaded. In State v. Nichols,l84 the Iowa Supreme Court held that under 
the new Criminal Code, as under the pre-revised law,188 the prosecution "is 
not required to establish that a pistol was loaded at the time of the offense 
to prove its character as a dangerous weapon in a prosecution for robbery in 
the first degree. "188 Thus, it was proper for the trial court to instruct the 
jury that a pistol is a per se "dangerous weapon," notwithstanding any pros-
ecution evidence that the pistol was loaded at the time.187 
Involvement of "dangerous weapons" in certain criminal activity is sig-
nificant in two respects. First, either being armed with188 or discharging189 
"dangerous weapons" is the requisite actus reus for three crimes. Secondly, 
being armed with "dangerous weapons" during the commission of five other 
offenses170 ipso facto constitutes a circumstance for a higher degree of the 
offense. 
weapon" is nevertheless a "dangerous weapon" in the particular circumstances depends upon 
whether it "is actually used in such a way as to indicate the user intended to inflict death or 
serious injury and when so used is capable of inflicting death." UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
supra note 136, at No. 218. This instruction is supported by such cases as State v. Roan, 122 
Iowa 136, 137, 97 N.W. 997, 998 (1904) ("[a] penknife mayor may not be a deadly weapon. If 
the weapon is such that from the manner of ita use it is likely to produce death, it is, of course, 
a deadly weapon.") and Hopper v. Dowling, 191 Iowa 57, 181 N.W. 759 (1921) ("[t]he pitchfork 
was not used as a javelin to pierce the person of plaintiff. It was only used as a club or bludg-
eon, and the strokes delivered with a side motion. The pitchfork used as it was used is not a 
'deadly weapon' per se ... "). 
163. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 218. 
164. 276 N.W.2d 416 (Iowa 1979). 
165. State v. Ashland, 259 Iowa 728, 145 N.W.2d 910 (1966). 
166. 276 N.W.2d at 417. 
167. Similarly, an inoperable firearm has been held sufficient for armed robbery. "When a 
person perpetrates a robbery by brandishing an instrument which appears to be a firearm, or 
other dangerous weapon, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the law will presume 
the instrument to be what his conduct represents it to be - a firearm or other dangerous 
weapon." State v. Thompson, 254 S.E.2d 526, 528 (N.C. 1979). 
168. These crimes are Carrying Weapons and Going Armed With Intent. See IOWA CODE 
§§ 724.4 & 708.8 (1979), respectively. 
169. See id. § 708.6(1) (Terrorism). 
170. These offenses include Burglary, Interference With Official Acts, Kidnapping, Rob-
bery, and Sexual Abuse. See IOWA CODE §§ 713.2, 719.1, 710.3, 711.2, & 709.3 (1979). Actually, 
the similar term "deadly weapon" is used in the sexual abuse provision. See also text accompa-
nying notes 1-171 infra. 
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(2). Undefined Related Terms. The objective of uniform definitions 
throughout the Criminal Code is weakened considerably by the inclusion of 
several related statutorily undefined terms concerning weapons. These terms 
or phrases include: "deadly weapon,"I71 "firearm,"172 "pistol or revolver,"178 
"revolver, pistol, or pocket billy,"17. "rifle or shotgun,"1711 "spring gun,"17. 
and "weapon."177 These all seem to have generally-accepted meanings in 
common parlance, however. The only other related term with its own defini-
tional clause, "offensive weapon,"178 appears in only two crimes.178 
e. "Forcible Felony." The key statutory term "forcible felony"180 is de-
fined in the form of an exhaustive enumeration of specific crimes181 which 
automatically constitute "forcible felonies" in all circumstances. lSI This cat-
egory encompasses a large group of felonies involving personal violence, 
namely "any felonious assault,"188 Murder (in either degree), Sexual Abuse 
171. See IOWA CODE § 709.3 (1979) (Sexual Abuse in Second Degree). This raises the 
question of whether the legislative intent was to refer to some different type of weapon since 
different language was used than in the general term "dangerous weapon." While, of course, 
this is a standard canon of statutory construction, nevertheless there certainly does not appear 
to be any public policy reason to differentiate between being armed with a "dangerous weapon" 
during a robbery or kidnapping and a "deadly weapon" during a sexual abuse. See IOWA CODE 
§ 711.2, 710.3, 709.3(1) (1979), respectively. In the absence of a statutory definition, the com-
mon law definition applies. According to Professor Yeager, this term "has an established mean-
ing in the law, which is synonomous with 'dangerous weapon.''' J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra 
note 3, § 209. This conclusion is borne out generally in 11 WORDS AND PHRASES 129-41 ("Dan-
gerous Weapon") and 11 WORDS AND PHRASES 207·30 ("Deadly Weapon"). 
172. The term "firearm" is used in the definition of the following crimes: Assault, Carry-
ing Weapons, Interference With Official Acts, and Possession of Firearms by Felons. See IOWA 
CODE §§ 708.1(3), 724.4, 719.1, 724.26 (1979). See also UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCI'lONS, supra note 
136, at Nos. 220·22 ("firearm"). 
173. See id. § 724.4 (Carrying Weapons). See also id. §§ 724.16, .17, .21 (diverse weapons 
permits offenses). 
174. See id. § 724.5 (failure while armed to have weapons permit in immediate 
possession). 
175. See id. § 724.22 (Sale of rifle or shotgun to minors). 
176. See id. § 708.9. 
177. See id. § 719.6 (Assisting Prisoner to Escape). 
178. See id. § 724.1. 
179. These two crimes are Possession of Offensive Weapons and Possession of Firearms 
and Destructive Devices by Felons. See IOWA CODE §§ 724.1, 724.26 (1979). 
180. IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 38. 
181. One generic term, "felonious assault," requires interpretation to determine which 
particular crimes are included within its rubic. However, the Iowa Supreme Court already has 
established a definitive interpretational standard for determining which particular crime8 are 
included. See text accompanying notes 326·31 infra. 
182. Whether or not a particular crime i8 a "forcible felony" is strictly a legal question to 
be decided on the face of the statute itself. If a particular felony offense necessarily includes an 
"assault" as an element, then that crime is ipso facto a "forcible felony," without benefit of the 
factual circumstances of the particular incident. See State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 
1979) and text accompanying notes 328·31 infra. 
183. See notes 326·31 supra. 
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(in all three degrees), Kidnapping (in all three degrees), Robbery (in both 
degrees), Arson (only in the first degree) and Burglary (only in the first de-
gree). The apparent reason for limiting the inclusion of the latter two crimes 
to the highest degree only is that these are essentially property crimes, with 
the higher degree reserved in part to arsons or burglaries involving personal 
violence or at least to the reasonable probability thereof. The fact that an 
offense is a "forcible felony" is significant in many ways. 
(1). Mandatory Sentence of Confinement. The key significance of a 
crime being included in this classification is that the ameliorative sentencing 
options of a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a suspended sen-
tence are foreclosed altogether for "forcible felonies."I84 This has the effect 
of mandatory confinement for apparently all "forcible felony" offenses, with 
no judicial discretion left to the sentencing judge in a particular case. Never-
theless, whether or not confinement is mandatory for class C and D "forcible 
felonies" depends upon whether or not the special fines-only alternative 
sanction in Iowa Code section 909.1 is determined to be applicable to these 
crimes, as discussed above.18& Only two other types of non-forcible felony 
crimes carry a mandatory term of imprisonment. 188 
(2). Parole Ineligibility. In addition to its mandatory confinement as-
pect, the "forcible felony" classification has potential follow-through conse-
quences of establishing a minimum term of parole ineligibility in two limited 
circumstances (but not ipso facto in all cases). With the exception of certain 
major controlled substances offenses,187 there is no other statutorily-pre-
scribed term of parole ineligibility. That is, a person imprisoned for any 
other felony is immediately eligible for parole. 188 
First, there is a five-year mandatory minimuml89 term of imprisonment 
for any "forcible felony" crime involving use, possession, or representation 
of possession of a "firearm."19o Thus, a "forcible felony," by itself, does not 
carry any mandatory minimum sentence. Moreover, possession of a firearm 
during the commission of a crime which is not a "forcible felony" (such as 
Going Armed With Intentl91 or Burglary in the Second Degreel91) is not in-
cluded within the purview of the mandatory minimum, or even mandatory, 
184. IOWA CODE § 907.3 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 1724-27. 
185. See text accompanying notes 84-102 supra. 
186. These crimes are Lascivious Acts With a Child Under Twelve and the controlled 
substances offenses of Delivery, Possession With Intent, and Manufacturing. See IOWA CODE §§ 
907.3, 709.8, 204.401 (1979)'. 
187. IOWA CODE § 204.413 (1979). 
188. See id. § 906.4, .5. See also J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 1696-1700. 
189. But see text accompanying notes 84-lO2 supra. 
190. IOWA CODE § 902.7 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 
220-22 and J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 1628. For the definition of "firearm," see 
text accompanying notes 94-96.3 supra. 
191. IOWA CODE § 708.8 (1979). 
192. [d. § 713.3. 
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provision. 
Secondly, a recidivist's prior conviction for a "forcible felony" makes 
him subject to ineligibility for parole until he has served one-half of the 
maximum term of imprisonment imposed.19s Specifically, a person presently 
imprisoned for any felony who has a previous conviction for a "forcible fel-
ony" must serve at least one-half of his sentence. Strangely, this mandatory 
minimum term does not apply, on its face, to the situation where defendant 
is presently imprisoned for a "forcible felony" and he has a previous convic-
tion for a non-forcible felony. This latter circumstance seems more pertinent 
for imposing a mandatory minimum sentence, since the emphasis should be 
upon the severity of the current offense. A better legislative compromise ap-
proach would have been to apply the parole-ineligibility term when either of 
the felonies is a "forcible felony." 
(3). Definitions and Grading of Crimes. The concept of a "forcible fel-
ony" is also involved in either the definition of or grading of a few crimes. 
For example, threats to commit any "forcible felony" constitute one of many 
alternative ways to commit the offenses of Robbery in the Second DegreellN 
and Terrorism.19O Moreover, the highest of three grades of Conspiracyl86 oc-
curs when the target crime of the conspiracy is a "forcible felony." 
(4). Felony Murder Rule. The new "forcible felony" classification has 
affected the application of the felony murder rule in several ways. All mur-
der is Murder In the First Degree (a class A felony) when the killing occurs 
during participation in a "forcible felony."I9'1 On the other hand, an uninten-
tional killing during participation in a criminal offense, whether a felony or 
misdemeanor, other than a "forcible felony" constitutes the much less se-
vere class D felony offense of Involuntary Mansiaughter.llls By implication 
this makes an intentional killing during the commission of an offense other 
than a "forcible felony" Murder in the Second Degree. l " 
Tying the felony murder rule doctrine to a general classification of of-
fenses constituting "forcible felonies" as the includible requisite underlying. 
felonies has broadened the scope of the first-degree felony murder rule in 
some ways and narrowed it in others. A smaller number of crimes, Arson, 
Burglary, Mayhem, Rape, and Robbery, were included under the pre-revised 
first-degree felony murder rule. IOO All of these crimes are included in the 
"forcible felony" classification, although two, Arson and Burglary, are no 
longer all-inclusive, since only the first-degree grades of these offenses are 
193. [d. § 906.5. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 1698. 
194. IOWA CODE § 711.3 (1979). 
195. [d. § 708.6(2). 
196. [d. § 706.3. 
197. [d. § 707.2(2). 
198. [d. § 707.5(1). 
199. [d. § 707.3 (1979). 
200. See IOWA CODE § 690.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
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"forcible felonies."201 Additionally, the term "forcible felony" includes the 
three kidnapping offenses and the "felonious assault" crime of Terrorism.loa 
Moreover, the revised offense of Sexual Abuse is considerably broader than 
the pre-revised offense of Rapel08 (including a killing during non-consensual 
sodomy). 
f. "Property." The broadest possible definition of "property"ICH is in-
cluded in the new Criminal Code, namely "anything of value,IOII whether 
publicly or privately owned." The scope of the Theft1Ge provisions is particu-
larly broader than under the pre-revised forerunner provisions in light of 
the express inclusion of labor and services as "property." 
g. "Serious Injury. ''107 Whether or not a defendant caused or at-
tempted to infiict208 a "serious injury" upon another person is one of the 
pervasive concepts in. definingl09 and gradingllO a majority of the personal 
violence crimes in the new Criminal Code. That is, this Code focuses major 
attention upon criminal activity involving violence or potential violence. III 
(1) General Definition. A "serious injury" is defined as either (1) "dis-
abling mental illness," (2) bodily injury which creates "a substantial risk of 
death," (3) bodily injury which causes "serious permanent disfigurement" or 
(4) bodily injury which causes "protracted loss or impairment of the func-
tion of any bodily memeber or organ."1lI So restrictively defined, a "serious 
201. IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 38. 
202. See id. §§ nO.1-A, 708.6, respectively. 
203. [d. 
204. IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 
1441; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 41. 
205. A broad definition of the phrase "thing of value" appears in State v. Knutson, 220 
N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 1974) ("we hold a jury could reasonably find as a matter of fact that 
satisfaction of sexual demands constitutes a thing of value"). 
206. IOWA CODE §§ 714.1-.6 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 41. 
207. [d. § 702.18. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 45. 
208. Strangely, a whole array of terminology is used in the various statutes which refer to 
"serious injury" being either "inflicted," "suffered," or "caused," either as an element of the 
crime itself or as a factor in grading the offense for punishment purposes. 
209. A "serious injury" is a necessary element of the crime of Willful Injury. IOWA CODE § 
708.4 (1979). An intended "serious injury" merely is required for the crime of Assault With 
Intent to Inflict a Serious Injury. [d. § 708.2(1). 
210. Although not an element of the crimes, a "serious injury" inflicted, suffered or 
caused during three other crimes constitutes an aggravating circumstance that raises these to 
the highest grades of the respective crimes. These include Assault While Participating in a 
Felony, Kidnapping in the First Degree, and Sexual Abuse in the First Degree. IOWA CODE §§ 
708.3,710.2,709.2, respectively. Similarly, either purposeful infliction or attempted infliction of 
"serious injury" during the commission of the crimes of Interference With Official Acts and 
Robbery raises these crimes to their highest degrees. [d. § 719.1, 711.2, respectively. 
211. Strangely, "serious injury" only needs to be attempted for a robbery to be considered 
in the first degree, whereas it must be "caused" or "suffered" for Sexual Abuse and Kidnapping 
to be considered in the first degree. [d. §§ 711.2, 709.2, 710.2, respectively. The latter two of-
fenses are class A felonies, whereas first-degree robbery is only a class B felony. 
212. [d. § 702.18 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 219; J. 
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injury" clearly amounts to "a great deal more than mere physical injury,"lI18 
thus not including a black eye or a bloody nose. This broad definition does 
encompass mental injury, being limited, however, to a "disabling mental ill-
ness" which would seem to rule out mere anxiety reactions.lI14 
(2) Bodily Injury Creating "a Substantial Risk of Death." This type 
of "serious injury" is defined restrictively in the Uniform Jury Instructions 
as. "an injury which causes or is likely to cause a real hazard or danger of 
death."2u Thus limited, the mere use of a "dangerous weapon"218 does not 
automatically create "a substantial risk of death." Instead, it would depend 
upon the exact use made of the weapon.lIl7 A "firearem"218 used as a club 
probably would not meet this standard, unless the victim is pistol whipped 
on the head in a particularly vital spot. Even shooting a victim would not 
always meet this standard, if, for example, the victim is shot in the foot or 
leg. 
Texas is one state with a "serious injury" statutell19 similar to Iowa's. A 
review of the Texas caselaw interpreting the crime of aggravated assault 
based upon creating a substantial risk of death reveals that stab wounds 
have been the basis for several successful prosecutions. These have included 
stab wounds that "penetrated to the cartilage of the rib cage,"1I110 that "cut 
from the front of her neck around to the back of her head" and "severed the 
superficial jugular vein,,,m and that cut the victim's stomach requiring 
twenty stitches. m On the other hand, another aggravated assault conviction 
was reversed where the victim merely "sustained two stab wounds in the 
back and a cut on the thigh. "IllS 
Interestingly, the appellate courts in each of these cases also noted col-
lateral facts such as the degree and duration of medical attention as well as 
the subsequent return of the victim to his normal routine. For example, in 
cases affirming the convictions, the courts noted that the victim "was hys-
terical and was placed, for a time, in the 'trauma' room;"1I114 that the victim 
"stayed overnight in the hospital" and that "the laceration was too large for 
surgery in the emergency room and surgery had to be performed in the op-
YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 45. 
213. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 45. 
214. See text accompanying notes 277-95 infra. 
215. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 219. 
216. IOWA CODE § 702.7 (1979). See text accompanying notes 161-70 supra. 
217. See generally Hopper v. Dowling, 191 Iowa 57, 181 N.W. 759 (1921); State v. Roan, 
122 Iowa 113, 97 N.W. 997 (1904); UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 218. 
218. See text accompanying notes 346-50 infra. 
219. TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02 (Vernon 1974). 
220. McElroy v. State, 528 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). 
221. Boney v. State, 572 S.W.2d 529, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). 
222. Hart v. State, 581 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). 
223. Gonzales v. State, 146 Tex. Crim. 108, 172 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1943). 
224. 581 S.W.2d at 677. 
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erating room" (with twenty-three stitches required).22G Contrastingly, in an-
other case228 in which the conviction was reversed for lack of evidence of a 
"serious injury" it was noted that the victim's two and one-half day stay in 
the hospital was not prompted solely by the seriousness of his injuries but 
rather for observation for complications or infection, neither of which mate-
rialized.228.1 An injured party in another casell27 was noted to have gone 
downtown the following morning after being released from the hospital fol-
lowing only an hour of treatment. 
(3) Bodily Injury Causing "Serious Permanent Disfigurement." 
Under section 702.18 of the Iowa Code, "serious injury" can consist of a 
bodily injury which causes "serious permanent disfigurement."118 None of 
these three words is defined in the Iowa Code, thus leaving the matter of 
their meaning to "the usual meaning ascribed by the COurts."1II11 None of 
these three words has necessarily taken on a technical meaning in the law, 
and thus each generally has been defined judicially in its ordinary sense as 
discussed below.1I30 This phrase is defined overly restrictively in the Uniform 
Jury Instructions as "a deforming or mutilated condition of a person."1Sl 
The logical starting point in determining if a "serious permanent disfig-
urement" has been caused or produced is to determine if the injured party 
has been "disfigured." If so, then the second requirement of "permancy" 
must be met, thus disregarding temporary scars. Finally, even a "disfigure-
ment" which is "permanent" must additionally be "serious" in nature, thus 
disregarding minor scar tissue anywhere as well as more pronounced scars in 
normally non-visible parts of the body. 
(A) "Disfigurement." In the absence of either a statutory definition or 
relevant caselaw interpretation of the term "disfigurement" in Iowa law,1811 it 
225. 572 S.W.2d at 530-31. 
226. Gonzales v. State, 146 Tex. Crim. 108, 172 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1943). 
226.1. [d. at _, 172 S.W.2d at 99. 
227. Garrett v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 275, 298 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957). 
228. The term "disfigurement" appears in only two other provisions of the IOWA CODE 
(1979). In section 717.1 of the Criminal Code, the offense of Injury to Animals can be commit-
ted, inter alia, by "disfiguring" any animal of another. But see note 232 infra. More relevant to 
injury to persons, the workmen's compensation statute was amended to include a schedule of 
recoverj for "permanent disfigurement of the face or head .... " IOWA CODE § 85.34(2)(t) 
(1979). This term has not yet been interpreted by the Iowa Supreme Court. 
229. State v. Wilson, 287 N.W.2d 587 (Iowa 1980). 
230. See also In re Requests of Governor and Senate, 389 Mich. 411, _, 208 N.W.2d 469, 
482 (1973), in which the court held that the phrase "permanent serious disfigurement" is com-
prised "of no less commonly used or understood words of the English language, nor is the 
language . . . less precise than that which has been adopted to express other standards for 
determining tort liability. The phrases are within the province of the trier of facts and are 
sufficient for legal interpretation." 
231. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 219. 
232. In the context of the crime of Injury to Animals through an act causing maiming or 
disfiguring, an early Iowa Supreme Court case took a broad view of "disfiguring" by suggesting 
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is nef!essary to look to other jurisdictions for acceptable definitions. Several 
courts233 have stated that this word has "no technical meaning and should 
be considered in the ordinary sense."284 A common general dictionary defini-
tion of "disfigurement" adopted in workmen's compensation cases in several 
jurisdictions285 has been "[t]hat which impairs or injures the beauty, sym-
metry or appearance of a person or thing, that which renders unsightly, mis-
shapen or imperfect or deforms in some manner."286 Other less common or-
dinary definitions of "disfigurement" followed in criminal or workmen's 
compensation cases have been "a change of external form to the worse;" "a 
deformity [that] render[s] one grotesque, unsightly, obnoxious, even repul-
sive to others;"287 and "mar[ring] the figure and ... render[ing] [one] less 
perfect or beautiful in appearance."Z88 
(B) "Permanent." A "serious disfigurement" must also be "perma-
nent"289 in order to constitute "serious injury" under Iowa law. This term 
apparently has no technical meaning, and thus should be interpreted in its 
ordinary dictionary sense essentially as follows: "[f]ixed, continuing, lasting, 
stable, enduring, abiding, not subject to change."z4o It is generally the oppo-
site of "temporarY,"241 although not necessarily to be equated with "perpet-
ually."242 Indeed, evidence of permanency need only appear with reasonable 
that a "very slight" injury was sufficient so long as the injury "tend[ed] to destroy the beauty 
or symmetry of the animal." State v. Harris, 11 Iowa 414, 415 (1861). The precedential value of 
this case is diluted somewhat in light of the applicable statute referring both to the maiming 
and disfiguring animals, and the court's observation that 
[t]o maim as applied to domestic animals, implies some permanent injury; but to 
disfigure is a lower grade of the same offense, and the disfiguring need not be of a 
permanent character to make the offense complete. Thus to shave a horse's mane or 
tail is a disfiguring of the horse, but the injury is not of a permanent character. 
Id. at 415. 
233. E.g., State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 312, 422 P.2d 353 (1966); State v. Nieuhaus, 217 Mo. 
332,117 S.W. 73 (1909). 
234. For "general" definitions 'of the word "disfigurement," see BALLENTINE'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 355 (3d ed. 1969); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 554 (4th ed. 1968). 
235. E.g., Dombrowski v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 148 Conn. 87, _, 167 A.2d 458, 462 (1961); 
Superior Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 309 Ill. 339, _, 141 N.E. 165, 166 (1923); Duncan 
v. Beck, 553 S.W. 2d 476, 478 (Ky. 1977); Vukelich v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Utah 486, _, 220 
P. 1073, 1075 (1923). See BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 355 (3d ed. 1969); BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 420 (5th ed. 1979). 
236. Mitchum v. Inman Mills, 209 S.C. 307, _, 40 S.E.2d 38, 39 (1946) (workmen's com-
pensation). See BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 355 (3d ed. 1969). 
237. Mitchum v. Inman Mills, 209 S.C. 307, _, 40 S.E.2d 38, 39 (1946) (workmen's 
compensation). 
238. State v. Nieuhaus, 217 Mo. 332, _, 117 S.W. 73, 78 (1909) (criminal). 
239. The singular term "disfigure" in Virginia mayhem statute has been interpreted to 
mean "a permanent and not merely a temporary and inconsequential disfigurement." Lee v. 
Commonwealth, 135 Va. 572, _, 115 S.E. 671, 673 (1923). 
240. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1025 (5th ed. 1979). 
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
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medical probability. For example, medical testimony was used in an Iowa 
tort case in determining that plaintiff's injuries were "permanent" through 
the physician's expert testimony was that the injuries involved were perma-
nent "unless there is some unexpected radical change."243 Or, as stated in an 
Ohio workmen's compensation case,2 •• a "permanent" disability is an injury 
which, with reasonable probability, will continue for an indefinite period of 
time without any present indication of recovery. 
(C)· "Serious." Under the express statutory terms, a "permanent dis-
figurement" must also be of a "serious" nature2• D in order to constitute "se-
rious injury." However, this limiting factor of "seriousness" is not included 
in the only other two provisions on "disfigurement" in the Iowa Code. I.e 
Accordingly, the term "serious" in this section should be interpreted liber-
ally to exclude marginally "serious" disfigurements. 
One court has made the observation, in a criminal case, that the word 
"serious" has "no technical meaning and shall be considered in the ordinary 
sense."an Accordingly, a "serious" injury in its general context must be 
"grave" or "momentous" in nature, as opposed to "trivial" or 
"superficial. "2.8 
More specifically, the term "serious" commonly has been defined in 
workmen's compensation cases as requiring that the disfigurement be "of 
such a character that it substantially detracts from the appearance of the 
person disfigured."2.e Under such a standard, the location of the injured 
party's scars is of great importance, although it is not necessarily decisive. 
At first blush, any permanent blemish or scar on an injured person's 
face would appear to constitute "disfigurement" in light of the generally ac-
cepted definition of "disfigurement," which is to render one less perfect in 
appearance. liDO However, the limiting factor of "seriousness," with its gener-
243. Knudsen v. Merle Hay Plaza, 160 N.W.2d 279, 286 (Iowa 1968). 
244. Logsdon v. Industrial Comm'n, 143 Ohio St. 508, _, 57 N.E.2d 75, 78 (1944). 
245. Judicial gloss has resulted in reading a requirement of "seriousness" into a Kentucky 
tort recovery statute relating on its face only to "permanent disfigurement." See Duncan v. 
Beck, 553 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1977). In this automobile accident case, the injured party had "some 
small scars upon his right knee" which could "only be seen upon close examination of the 
knee." Id. at 478. The court determined that such minor marks did not constitute "disfigure-
ment" within the general dictionary definition of that term. See note 234 supra. In actuality, it 
appears that the court was saying that a scar or other mutilation, although permanent in na-
ture, has to be "serious" in order to be legally compensable as "permanent disfigurement." 
246. See note 228 supra. 
247. State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 312, _, 422 P.2d 353, 355 (1966). 
248. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 51, 323 S.W.2d 422, (Tex. Crim. App. 
1959); McKee v. State, 93 Tex. Crim. 217, 246 S.W. 1035 (Tex. Crim. App. 1923); Ward v. 
State, 70 Tex. Crim. 393, 159 S.W. 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 1913). See generally BALLENTINE'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1163 (3d ed. 1969); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1226 (5th ed. 1979). 
249. E.g., Mitchum v. Inman Mills, 209 S.C. 307, _, 40 S.E.2d 38, 39 (1946); Dombrow-
ski v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 148 Conn. 87, _, 167 A.2d 458, 462 (1960) (emphasis added). 
250. See note 234 supra. 
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ally-accepted definition of substantially detracting from the appearance of 
the so-called "disfigured" person,lOI has been interpreted in several work-
men's compensation cases to exclude "minor" blemishes or scars. Stating 
that "[a]ll facial injuries which result in scars are not ipso facto compensa-
ble,,,m a New York court determined that "a one and one-half inch scar on 
[the] left anterior scalp at the hair line" was not "serious."2Os Similarly, 
other courts have determined that relatively short, narrow scars on more 
prominent parts of the face do not qualify as "serious." In one case,lM the 
court observed that the scars were not distinguishable at a distance beyond 
eight feet. In another,2OO the court adroitly observed: "[w]e can think of no 
form of activity, social, political, or economic, in which plaintiff might in-
dulge, and be subject to any embarrassment by the presence of this small 
scar."I66 
Of course, "disfigurement" is not limited to bodily areas normally visi-
ble to others.II07 Perhaps the preferable approach in these situations would 
be to require a stricter standard of substantiality. This is because a scar on 
the face obviously detracts more from the injured person's appearance than 
exactly the same scar on the buttocks, chest, legs, arms, or hands. 
A Missouri casEi208 involving aggravated assault is an example where the 
"disfigurement" occurred on an area of the body generally not visible to 
others. These included the chest, abdomen, shoulders, back, thighs, stomach 
and legs. The multiple whip wounds and burns (inflicted by a hot stove-lid 
lifter) had penetrated "entirely through the skin upon [the] body and to 
[the victim's] flesh,"II09leaving numerous sizeable permanent scars. The only 
analysis of "disfigurement" in the opinion was the condusory statement that 
these injuries constituted "disfigurement" as that non-technical term is con-
sidered; to wit, "to mar the figure and to render less perfect or beautiful in 
appearance. "1180 
251. For "general" definitions of the word "seriousness," see note 234 supra. 
252. Hildreth v. Ford Motor Co., 14 App. Div. 2d 953, _, 221 N.Y.S.2d 16, 18 (3d Dep't 
1961). 
253. [d. at _,221 N.Y.S.2d at 17. 
254. Mitchum v. Inman Mills, 209 S.C. 307, 40 S.E.2d 38 (1946). 
255. Chisholm v. Jahncke Dry Docks, Inc., 10 La. App. 323, 121 So. 684 (1929). 
256. [d. at _, 121 So. at 684. 
257. The Iowa "disfigurement" provision in IOWA CODE § 702.18 (1979) is not limited to 
any bodily areas. This compares to the Delaware workmen's compensation statute which re-
quires the "serious and permanent disfigurement" to be "visible and offensive when the body is 
clothed normally .... " DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2326(0 (1975). Judicial gloss on this restric-
tive language has resulted in the "clothed normally" provision to include "clothing normally 
worn by the employee-claimant when involved in any of his or her regular activities, including 
recreational, vocational, and avocational activities," rather than being limited to being clothed 
"in his daily routine of life." Beam v. Chrysler Corp., 332 A.2d 143, 145 (Del. 1975). 
258. State v. Nieuhaus, 217 Mo. 332, 117 S.W. 73 (1909). 
259. [d. at _, 117 S.W. at 78. 
260. [d. 
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Similarly, a criminal conviction for aggravated battery in New Mexico 
has been upheld281 under a statute defining "great bodily injury" as causing 
"serious disfigurement." The prosecution was based upon the forcible tat-
tooing of the victim with a needle and India ink. The tattoo apparently was 
partially visible even when the victim was fully clothed, extending from the 
back of his neck to his waist. A doctor testified that "it would take 'strenu-
ous and extensive' skin grafting to remove the tattoo."28lI Refusing to reverse 
the conviction for insufficient evidence, the court said that these circum-
stances presented a question of fact "as to whether or not the injuries sus-
tained were sufficiently substantial to come within the definition of the stat-
ute."283 The court observed that the word "serious" and "disfigurement" 
have "no technical meaning and should be considered in the ordinary 
sense. "284 
On the other hand, an injury resulting in permanent scars on the in-
jured party's hands has been interpreted in a Connecticut workmen's com-
pensation case28G to not satisfy the statutory requirement that the disfigure-
ment be "serious." These fine-line scars were visible only when the hand was 
opened and the palm exposed. 
(4) Bodily Injury Causing "Protracted" Loss of Bodily Function or 
Organ. Another type of physical injury can constitute "serious injury" al-
though it neither involves "a substantial risk of death" nor results in "seri-
ous permanent disfigurement." This is bodily injury resulting in "pro-
tracted" loss of any bodily function or organ. Unfortunately, the term 
"protracted" is not defined in the Criminal Code, and it does not appear to 
be a term with particular legal significance.l88 Thus, the word should be 
given its usual meaning in common parlance. The general dictionary mean-
ing is: "To draw out or lengthen in time; prolong."287 The words "prolong", 
"protract," and "extend" are synonyms. They mean "to lengthen in time or 
space. Prolong implies an increase in duration (time) beyond normal limits. 
Protract adds to prolong the idea of lengthening indefinitely or unnecessa-
rily. Extend can refer to mere lengthening in time or space, or to increase in 
range or scope of activities or influence. "288 Slightly more elucidation can be 
garnered from the Uniform Jury Instructions, which state that "[aJ bodily 
injury which causes a protracted loss or impairment is such injury as would 
prolong or extend the loss or use of a member or organ, or which would 
261. State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 312, 422 P.2d 353 (1966). 
262. [d. at _,422 P.2d at 355. 
263. [d. (citing State v. Edwards, 28 N.J. 292, 146 A.2d 209 (1958». 
264. 217 Mo. at _, 117 S.W. at 78. 
265. Dombrowski v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 148 Conn. 87, 167 A.2d 458 (1961). 
266. Indeed, this term is not even included in the standard legal dictionaries - BALLEN-
TINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1969) and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). 
267. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1052 (4th ed. 1976). 
268. [d. at 1046. 
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weaken, damage or reduce the use of a member or organ of a person."S8e 
Whether or not a broken limb can be considered "protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member ... " and thus constitute 
"serious injury" remains for judicial interpretation, with the question for 
decision being the meaning of "protracted." Because of the restrictive lan-
guage in the Uniform Jury Instructions, a reasonable interpretation would 
be that the ordinary six weeks or so in a cast for a broken leg would not be a 
"protracted" period. On the other hand, complications could arise causing 
the broken limb to not mend entirely for a prolonged or extended period of 
six months or so. Arguably, this would fall within the definition of "pro-
tracted," even though the initial injury itself was more or less routine in 
nature. Of course, it is possible (although not desirable) that the Iowa courts 
would interpret "protracted" as being merely a more prolonged, rather than 
a mere temporary, disuse of a bodily function. Mter all, an assault victim 
can suffer a wide range of injuries - from (1) merely momentary pain to (2) 
a bruise which will disappear in a few days to (3) incapitation of a leg for a 
few days while the victim is on crutches to (4) an ordinary broken leg neces-
sitating a cast for approximately six weeks or so to (5) an extended period of 
incapitation due to unusual complications surrounding a broken leg to (6) 
indefinite (if not permanent) loss of a bodily function or organ (e.g., a leg 
that needs to be amputated or a collapsed lung). The question becomes at 
which point in this wide spectrum does an injury become "protracted" in 
nature. Obviously, the final point of indefiniteness or permanency is unnec-
essary, in light of reading, in pari materia, this phrase of protracted loss 
with the accompanying phrase of serious permanent disfigurement in an-
other clause of this same sentence in the Code. On the other hand, "pro-
tracted" should be read restrictively to not include an ordinary broken leg in 
light of the three other types of "serious injury" in section 702.18 requiring 
injuries of a grave nature. These include disabling mental illness, as well as 
physical injuries either creating a substantial risk of death or causing serious 
permanent disfigurement. 
Temporary amnesia has been held insufficient by itself under a similar 
Texas statute to show "protracted loss or impairment of any bodily member 
or organ."no Moreover, this same victim's "multiple superficial abrasions 
and contusions of head and body"nl were not considered to be "serious inju-
ries," presumably because of their temporary nature. 
Protracted impairment of a victim's eye has been considered a "serious 
physical injury" under a similar New York law.1n The victim had been 
kicked in the face ten or twelve times by the defendant, who was wearing 
heavy leather boots. Even after surgery, his "eye level had not returned to 
269. UNIPORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 219. 
270. Sanchez v. State, 543 S.W.2d 132 (TeL Crim. App. 1976). 
271. [d. at 134. 
272. See People v. Rumaner, 45 App. Div. 2d 290, 357 N.Y.S.2d 735 (3d Dep't 1974). 
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normal and [his] left eyelid was lower than the right."178 Similarly, another 
New York case27• essentially has held that a "serious injury" was not in-
flicted when the victim was struck in the back of the head with a stone 
which was roughly 2- Y2" in diameter. The injury merely had caused him to 
feel dizzy and to be unable to walk, and he was taken to the hospital where 
three sutures were taken in the head wound.lI711 In contrast, there was no 
doubt that a "serious injury" was suffered in another New York caseJ78 in 
which the victim's left ear was bitten off. 
(5) "Disabling" Mental Illness. A fourth alternative category of "seri-
ous injury" under section 702.18 of the Code - a "disabling" mental illness 
- does not focus upon physical injury at all. Once again the General Assem-
bly failed to define these terms. This means that judicial interpretations 
must be based upon existing legal interpretations for technical definitions, 
or, if none, then to common parlance. 
A "disabling mental illness" is defined in the Uniform Jury Instructions 
as "an illness or condition which cripples, incapitates, weakens or destroys a 
person's normal and usual mental functions."lI77 This essentially follows the 
general definition of "disability" used by the Iowa Supreme COurtll7S and in 
common parlance.278 
The use of the unqualified singular term "disabling" raises many major 
questions. Must the disability be total or is a partial disability sufficient? 
Must the disability be permanent or is a temporary disability sufficient? 
What effect must this disability have on the injured party's ordinary way of 
life? Or, more fundamentally, what exactly is a disability? 
That a "disabling mental illness" was intended to include both perma-
nent and temporary disabilities is evident from its non-qualified language in 
comparison with the expressly limited language of "serious permanent dis-
figurement" in the same statute. Similarly, Iowa's workers' compensation 
statute280 contains separate provisions for temporary and permanent 
disabilities. 
273. [d. at 293, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 736-37. 
274. In re Taylor, 62 Misc.2d 529, 309 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1970). 
275. [d. at _,309 N.Y.S.2d at 371. 
276. People v. Dingley, 50 App. Div.2d 361, 378 N.Y.S.2d 90 (3d Dep't 1976) rev'd, 42 
N.Y.2d 888, 366 N.E.2d 877, 397 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1977). 
277. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCl'IONS, supra note 136, at No. 219. 
278. See Hill v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 146 Iowa 168, 124 N.W.898 (1910), in which the court 
used the following general dictionary meaning of "disability": "a want of competent power, 
strength, or physical ability; we$ess; incapacity; impotence." Accord State v. Chatterson, 259 
N.W.2d 766, 770 (Iowa 1977) ("disabled" means "incapacitated by ... injury, or wounds: 
crippled"). 
279. See generally BALLENTINE'S LAW DICl'IONARY 351 (3rd ed. 1969); BLACK'S LAw DIC-
TIONARY 415 (5th ed. 1979) (ordinarily, to take away the ability of, to render incapable of proper 
and effective action). 
280. IOWA CODE § 85.34 (1979). 
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It appears also that the legislative intent was to include both total and 
partial mental disabilities in section 702.18 in the absence of any qualifying 
language. Contrastingly, Iowa's workers' compensation statuteS81 contains 
separate sections on permanent partial disabilities and permanent total 
disabilities. 
The phrase "mental illness" suggests a defect more serious in nature 
than a mental condition (although the two terms are equated in the Uni-
form Jury Instructions).181 That is, one could have a mental condition 
which, unlike a mental illness, nevertheless would not render the person in-
capacitated. Examples of a mental condition would be temporary amnesialsa 
or an anxiety reaction/'a. as opposed to mental illnesses such as psychosis or 
severe psychoneurosis.s811 Mental illness seemingly involves a lowering of in-
tellectual capacity, although obviously not to the extent of insanity. Indeed, 
a mentally-ill person normally is thought of as being unable to pursue an 
ordinary life pattern (e.g., to care for oneself or to carry on regular employ-
ment). Indeed, for purposes of the Federal Social Security Actl88 the "disa-
bility" must cause inability to work (because of a medically determinable 
physical or mental impairment).187 
Judicial interpretations of the "disability" provision in the Social Secur-
ity Act also give some guidance as to the meaning of a mental disability. 
The parameters generally have been set as follows: on the one hand, the 
term "disability" has been interpreted as not meaning completely helpless 
or bedridden,l88 and, on the other hand the term has been interpreted as 
being required to be of long-continued and indefinite duration.o • 
In terms of the type of mental condition that qualifies as a "disability" 
281. Id. 
282. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 219. This type of "serious in-
jury" is defined therein as "an illness or a person's normal and usual mental functions." Re-
jecting defendant's claim that the terms "normal" and "usual" are vague, the supreme court 
has said: "[R]elative to words which are of ordinary usage and generally understood, further 
instructional definition is not required." State v. Holmes, N.W.2d (Iowa 1979). 
283. See generally Sanchez v. State, 543 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (temporary 
amnesia not a serious injury involving protracted loss of bodily function). 
284. See Alvarado v. Weinberger, 511 F.2d 1046, 1049 (1st Cir. 1975) (interpretation of 
"disability" under Social Security Act). 
285. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a) (1979); Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 1034, 1047 (1969). See also 
Rosay v. Gardner, 247 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Cal. 1965) (psychoneurosis is a mental disorder com-
pensable under Social Security Act). . 
286. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1976). 
287. See Teeter v. Fleming, 270 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1959). See generally Annot., 77 
A.L.R.2d 641 (1961). See also Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 1034 (1969) (pain as "disability" under S0-
cial Security Act); Ozark Mut. Life Assoc. v. Winchester, 116 Okla. 116,243 P. 735 (1926) (term 
"disability" in accident insurance policy means disability from performing occupation insured 
was following at time of accident and not some vocation which he might be able to follow after 
the accident). 
288. Celebrezze v. Warren, 339 F.2d 833, 837 (10th Cir. 1964). 
289. Mims v. Celebrezze, 217 F. Supp. 581, 585 (D.Colo. 1963). 
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under the Social Security Act, the courts similarly have been restrictive. For 
example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals1llo has summarily held that 
"[t]he mere existence of a psychoneurosis or an anxiety reaction does not 
constitute a disability."11I1 Without noting the cause of the claimant's mental 
condition, the opinion stated that the claimant complained of "numbness in 
her head, insomnia, inability to work in the home, lack of appetite, waking 
up screaming and walking back and forth, a frightened feeling in her heart, 
crying spells, and an impulse to scream."lIIl1 Her condition was diagnosed 
variously as "involutional psychotic depressive reaction" and as "a chronic 
depressive neurosis in almost total remission of symptoms."1118 
In conclusion, either an anxiety reaction or a slight neurosis should not 
qualify as "mental illness." For example, a rape victim would not have suf-
fered "serious injury" merely by being afraid to go out alone at night or by 
being "cool" to all men or by being depressed. It would also seem that a 
"disabling mental illness" does not arise merely because a rape victim re-
quires psychiatric or psychological care of an incidental nature. Indeed, 
emotional trauma would be an incidental fallout of most forcible sexual 
abuse attacks. The crux of the matter is that there are three degrees of Sex-
ual Abuse,III' with a forcible rape without more constituting only third-de-
gree Sexual Abuse whereas a "serious injury" is necessary to upgrade the 
"ordinary" forcible rape into Sexual Abuse in the First Degree. 
By again referring to the Social Security Act, the conclusion is fortified 
that incidental counselling for a mentally-disturbed crime victim is not suffi-
cient for purposes of the "serious injury" provision. Under the Code of Fed-
eral RegulationslillD an example is given of a compensable mental "disabil-
ity" as a psychosis or severe psychoneurosis requiring continued 
institutionalization or continued supervision of the affected individual. And 
the Social Security Act is interpreted liberally. By contrast, a criminal stat-
ute should be interpreted narrowly to not include anything beyond that 
clearly within legislative intent. The bottom line should be that a forcible 
rape victim should not be considered to have suffered a "serious injury" if 
she or he is able to carry out ordinary pursuits of life. A person who main-
tains ordinary gainful employment and other everyday activities clearly has 
not suffered a "disabling mental illness" merely because of anxieties over 
being outside after dark or being in the company of strangers of the oppo-
site sex. 
h. "Sex Act." An extremely broad general statutory definition of "sex 
act" is included in Iowa Code section 702.17 as the necessary actus reus for 
290. Alvarado v. Weinberger, 511 F.2d 1046 (1st Cir. 1975). 
291. [d. at 1049. 
292. [d. at 1048 n.1. 
293. [d. at 1048. 
294. See IOWA CODE §§ 709.1-.4 (1979). 
295. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a) (1979). 
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the crimes of Sexual Abuse2s8 and Prostitution,2S? as well as one alternative 
actus reus for the crimes of Indecent Exposure298 and Lascivious Acts With 
a Child.2sS Moreover, the five obscenity offensessoo contain broader, more 
specific definitions of "sex act" which use the general term as their starting 
points. 
A "sex act" is defined in section 702.17 as "any sexual contact between 
two or more persons" in any of the four alternative ways: 
[1] by penetration of the penis into the vagina or anus, [or] [2] by con-
tact between the mouth and genitalia or [3] by contact between the geni-
talia of one person and the genitalia or anus of another person or [4] by 
use of artificial sexual organs or substitutes therefor in contact with the 
genitalia or anus. SOl 
Sexual contact is therefore necessary, whereas penetration is not. This, of 
course, represents a major expansion of the pre-revised unauthorized sex-
related crimes (Rape,S02 Statutory Rape,sos Carnal Knowledge of an Imbe-
cile,s04 Sodomy,SO~ and Prostitution,S08) all of which required penetration by 
a sexual organ. This leaves Incest80? as the only crime requiring sexual inter-
course (i.e., penetration) as an element. 
The broad definition of "sexual contact" thus includes a wide range of 
consummated and attempted heterosexual and homosexual activity, "both 
conventional and deviant, between members of the same or opposite sex,"808 
including the following: intercourse, buggery, cunnilingus, and fellatio. Nev-
ertheless, these activities are punishable only when committed (or at-
tempted) either: by force, with a "child," with a mentally-defective person, 
or with fourteen and fifteen-year olds in certain circumstances. Thus, homo-
sexual "sex acts" and acts of sodomy are not criminalized per se. 
The judicial gloss put on this term has seemingly broadened the con-
cept of a "sex act" even further. In State v. Howard,809 the Iowa Supreme 
Court held that intertwining or rubbing together of the pubic hair of the 
defendant and the intended victim constituted contact of their genital parts 
296. IOWA CODE §§ 709.1·.4 (1979). 
297. [d. § 725.1. 
298. [d. § 709.9 (committing a "sex act" in view of a third person). 
299. [d. § 709.8(3) (soliciting a "child" to engage in a "sex act"). 
300. [d. §§ 728.1-.12. 
301. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 902; J. YEAGER & R. CARL-
SON, supra note 3, §§ 44, 201. 
302. IOWA CODE § 698.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
303. [d. 
304. [d. § 698.3. 
305. [d. § 705.1. 
306. [d. § 724.1. 
307. IOWA CODE § 726.2 (1979). 
308. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 202 at 58. 
309. 284 N.W.2d 201 (Iowa 1979). 
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and thus a "sex act" sufficient to uphold a conviction for Sexual Abuse. It 
was also held in Howard that the trial court correctly took judicial notice of 
the exterior anatomy of genitalia as well as of the location of pubic hair. 
On the other hand, the court demonstrated in State v. Baidwin810 that 
it was unwilling to expand by judicial interpretation the scope of a "sex act" 
in situations where the offensive conduct did not involve parts of the body 
enumerated within the statutory definition. In a prosecution for Lascivious 
Acts With a Childslo.l allegedly committed by solicitation to engage in a "sex 
act," the evidence showed only that the defendant kissed an unwilling young 
girl "on the forehead" and "put his hand down the front of her shirt."810.lI 
Reversing the conviction, the court pointed out that the human breast is not 
one of the specifically-enumerated bodily parts within the statutory defini-
tion of "sex act" and held that the term "genitalia" (being limited only to 
"the reproductive organs")810.8 within the definition of "sex act" does not 
include a human breast. Even though the defendant's conduct constituted 
an assault and had some sex-oriented purpose, there was nothing to indicate 
an intent to achieve a "sex act." As alluded to by the court, the act of fon-
dling children other than in the genitals or otherwise taking indecent physi-
cal liberties with children is a casus omissus in the Iowa law covering the 
serious crime of Lascivious Acts With a Child.81Q.4 
Unauthorized digital manipulation of genitalia does not appear to be 
included as a "sex act" - unless a finger is construed as a substitute for a 
sexual organ, which is highly unlikely.811 Nor does bestiality or two-party 
masturbationsll1 appear to fall within the definition. In interpreting this pro:-
vision, one should keep in mind that this provision basically replaces the 
pre-revised crime of Rape, the gravamen of which was non-consensual sex-
ual intercourse. Whether the new concept of "sexual contact" encompasses 
certain acts such as digital manipulation and masturbation must be clear 
and unmistakeable in the statutory language itself, in light of Emery v. 
Fenton. 8lB 
i. Undefined Terms. The list of general definitional clauses in chapter 
702 is by no means complete. In light of only a limited number of general 
definition clauses in the Criminal Code, the supreme court has had to apply 
general rules or canons of statutory construction to define words or phrases 
left undefined by the General Assembly. One such principle the court has 
applied is the rule that "in enacting a statute, a legislative body is presumed 
310. 291 N.W.2d 337 (Iowa 1980). 
310.1. IOWA CODE § 709.8(3) (1979). 
310.2. 291 N.W.2d at 339. 
310.3. Id. at 340. 
310.4. Id. 
311. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 44, 201-2. 
312. See State ex reI. Clemens v. ToNeCa, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 909 (Iowa 1978). 
313. 266 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1978). See text accompanying notes 112-119 supra. 
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to know the usual meaning ascribed by the courts to show language and to 
intend that meaning unless the context shows otherwise."s14 
Fortunately, many of the undefined terms do have a well-defined com-
mon law meaning (e.g., the homicide-related terms of "malice afore-
thought," "premeditation," and "provocation"). More obscure undefined 
terms (e.g., abandon,slII disfigure,8l8 protracted,Sl7 and tortureS18) enjoy less 
well-defined common law meanings. 
Two other terms - "explosive device"s18 and "minor"sao - appear in 
several provisions without benefit of a general definitional clause in the 
Criminal Code. Nevertheless, both terms are defined in other titles of the 
Iowa Code. au Looking to these statutory definitions, in pari materia, for 
guidance in interpreting these undefined terms in the Criminal Code cer-
tainly seems appropriate, especially in light of State v. Wilson. SIll In Wilson, 
the court took into consideration the statutory definition of the word "aban-
don" in two provisions outside the Criminal Code in interpreting the word 
"abandon" as it appears, undefined, in the newly-constituted crime of Wan-
ton Neglect of a Minor.su 
(1) "Abandonment." The statutorily-undefined term of "abandon-
ment" as used in the newly constituted offense of Wanton Neglect of a Mi-
norm has been defined by the supreme courtsu as requiring permanency, 
therefore, temporary neglect or temporary absence is insufficient. 
(2) "Felonious Assault." One new key term in the Criminal Code, 
which went statutorily undefined is "felonious assault." This term appears 
only once in the Criminal Code - in the definition of a "forcible felony,"S'8 
yet it nevertheless is important even though it does not define a crime itself. 
That is, any crime constituting a "felonious assaulf' is subject to the special 
provisions relating to all "forcible felonies," as discussed above.m 
The Iowa Supreme CourtSJ8 has filled the lexiconical gap by interpret-
ing the term "felonious assault" to mean "any assault the commission of 
314. State v. Wilson, 287 N.W.2d 587, 590 (Iowa 1980). 
315. See IOWA CODE § 726.6(2) (1979) (Wanton Neglect of a Minor) and text accompany-
ing notes 324·25 infra. 
316. See id. § 702.18 ("serious injury") and text accompanying notes 233·38 supra. 
317. See id. § 702.18 ("serious injury") and text accompanying notes 268·71 supra. 
318. See id. § 710.2. 
319. See id. §§ 712.1·.8 (Arson offenses). 
320. See text accompanying notes 153·55 supra. 
321. See text accompanying notes 153·55 supra. 
322. 287 N.W.2d 587 (Iowa 1980). 
323. IOWA QODE § 726.6(2) (1979). 
324. 1d. 
325. State v. Wilson, 287 N.W.2d 587 (Iowa 1980). 
326. IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979). See text accompanying notes 180·83 supra. 
327. See text accompanying notes 184·203 supra. 
328. State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1979). 
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which constitutes a felony."8111 Thus, any felony in either the "Assault" 
chapter or elsewhere (e.g., Attempted Murder)880 "which necessarily in-
clude[s] an assault"881 is a "felonious assault." 
The determination of a felony classification is clear on the face of the 
various statutory provisions. Thus, Assault with Intent to Inflict Serious In-
jurym (an aggravated misdemeanor) is not a "felonious assault." However, 
whether or not an assault88S is "necessarily included" in some of the offenses 
contained in this chapter is far from clear. The determining factor seems to 
be that an assault is It required element of the greater offense charged, as 
determined by the elements on the face of the statute itself, rather than that 
the facts surrounding the commission of the greater offense indicate an as-
sault. SS4 The mere fact that an offense is included in a chapter entitled "As-
sault" is of no significance at all in determining whether that offense is a 
"felonious assault."886 After all, a chapter entitled "Murder" also includes 
Voluntary Manslaughter, Involuntary Manslaughter, and several feticide-re-
lated offenses. S8e 
To date, that court has had occasion only to specifically determine that 
Attempted Murder8s7 is a "felonious assault."888 Other clearly assaultive of-
fenses carrying a felo.ny penalty are Assault While Participating in a Fel-
ony,8SI1 Terrorism,840 and Willful Injury.841 Two other felony offenses in-
cluded in the chapter entitled "Assault" - Administering Harmful 
Substancess41 and Going Armed With Intent848 - do not expressly include 
an assault in their elements and thus must await judicial interpretation to 
determine if they are "felonious assaults." The same circumstances apply 
to Voluntary Manslaughter844 and unlawful act-type Involuntary Man-
329. [d. at 28. 
330. IOWA CODE § 707.11 (1979). See State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1979). 
331. State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Iowa 1979). 
332. IOWA CODE § 708.2(1) (1979). 
333. [d. § 708.1. 
334. The language in the definition of "felonious assault" as "a felony which necessarily 
include[s] an assault" in State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Iowa 1979) (emphasis added) 
suggests that an Assault must be a lesser included offense of the particular greater crime in 
order for the latter to be a "felonious assault." For a detailed discussion of the test for lesser 
included offenses, see text accompanying notes part II D 11-18 infra. 
335. See generally 2A Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.14 (4th 
ed. 1973). 
336. See IOWA CODE ch. 707 (1979). 
337. [d. § 707.11. 
338. State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1979). 
339. IOWA CODE § 708.3 (1979). 
340. [d. § 708.6. 
341. [d. § 708.4. 
342. [d. § 708.5. 
343. [d. § 708.8. 
344. [d. § 707.4. 
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slaughter.84 & 
(3) "Firearm." Next to "forcible felonY,"848 probably the most impor-
tant single term in the Criminal Code is "firearm," in light of a five-year 
minimum sentence being mandatory for use of firearms during the commis-
sion of any "forcible felony" offense.847 In addition, involvement of a "fire-
arm" is a necessary part of four crimes.848 Yet, this important term is not 
defined anywhere in the Iowa Code. Nevertheless, "firearm" has been inter-
preted under the pre-revised law to mean "a small arms weapon from which 
a projectile is fired by gunpowder."s48 The court noted additionally that "a 
firearm must meet two requirements. It must be able to propel a projectile 
and it must do so by explosive force."8I1o 
(4) "Physical Injury." In contrast to the related term of "serious in-
jury,"Slll the term "physical injury" is not defined anywhere in the Criminal 
Code, nor is there any clue as to the extent of the injury required. As Pro-
fessor Yeager ponders: "Does this mean any physical injury, no matter how 
slight?"SIlI This would appear to be the case, especially in light of the very 
restrictive definition of "serious injury." About the only definite point is 
that some injury, however slight, is necessary - thus requiring more than 
mere offensive contact or touching (indeed even shoving). Thus, a bruise, a 
cut, indeed even a scratch may be enough, albeit such injuries are minor in 
nature. 
"physical injury" is a component of two crimes. Burglary is raised to the 
first degreeSII8 whenever a "physical injury" alone is intentionally or reck-
lessly inflicted. (On the other hand, a "serious injury" is necessary for sev-
eral other major crimes to be of the first (highest) degree, including Kidnap-
ping, Robbery, and Sexual Abuse.) One of the eight forms of Extortion81i4 
occurs when the underlying threat is to inflict "physical injury." 
345. [d. § 707.5(1). 
346. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979) and text accompanying notes 180-204 supra. 
347. [d. § 902.7. See State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1979); UNIFORM JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 220-22; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 1628; and text 
accompanying notes 93-96 pupra. 
348. These offenses which expressly include presence of a "firearm" as an alternative 
mode of commission include: Assault, Interference With Official Acts, Carrying Weapons, and 
Possession of Firearms by Felons. See IOWA CODE §§ 708.1(3), 719.1, 724.4, and 724.26 (1979), 
respectively. 
349. State v. Lawr, 263 N.W.2d 747, 749 (Iowa 1978). 
350. [d. at 750. 
351. See IOWA CODE § 702.18 (1979) and text accompanying notes 207-295 supra. 
352. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 295. 
353. IOWA CODE § 713.2 (1979). 
354. IOWA CODE § 711.4(1) (1979). 
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D. Transitional or Savings Provision 
A savings provision in section 801.5 of the Codem permits prosecution 
of criminal conduct committed before the effective date of the new Criminal 
Code, January 1, 1978, notwithstanding the general repeal of the prior law 
as part and parcel of the code revision process. Moreover, any such carry-
over prosecutions "are governed by the prior law, which is continued in ef-
fect for that purpose. . . . "8118 
Certain provisions of the new Criminal Code can apply to carryover 
prosecutions, however, but only at the election of the defendant. These 
clearly include defenses and factors of mitigation. Additionally, there ap-
peared to be a retroactive decriminalization provision, whereby a defendant 
would not be prosecutable now for pre-1978 conduct which was decriminal-
ized in the new Criminal Code,8117 but its impact has been sharply curtailed 
by several restrictive judicial interpretations.8118 
Although there should be few, if any, carryover prosecutions in mid-
1980, nevertheless these transitional principles remain important in light of 
retrials following successful appeals or postconviction relief actions. 
1. Substantive Provisions 
With one limited exception, the new Code provisions defining criminal 
conduct are not applicable to carryover prosecutions. In other words, the 
definition of a crime at the time of its commission controls, notwithstanding 
a subsequent change in the statutory language which is favorable to an of-
fender (provided, of course, that an "applicable offense" is included in the 
revised Code). This provision was applied in State v. Bousman8118 to uphold 
the trial court's refusal in a "carryover" prosecution for Assault With Intent 
to Inflict Great Bodily InjuryBso to instruct the jury on the apparently more 
restrictive successor offense of Assault With Intent to Inflict Serious In-
jury.SSI Noting that this situation was not included in any of the enumerated 
exceptions for applying the new Code, the court held that all that was re-
quired was that the instruction accurately define the applicable law at the 
time of the offense. 
The one exception relating to the definition of a crime is that the new 
Code shall apply when "based upon [its] failure ... to define an applicable 
355. IOWA CODE § 801.5 (1979). 
356. Id. § 801.5(1). For a discussion of several aspects of construction of the new Criminal 
Code, see text accompanying notes 29-35 and 112-127 supra. 
357. IOWA CODE § 801.5(2)(a) (1979). 
358. See text accompanying notes 361-63 infra. 
359. 276 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 1979). 
360. See IOWA CODE § 694.6 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
361. IOWA CODE § 708.2(1) (1979). 
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offense."362 No judicial discretion is accorded, as application of this appar-
ently decriminalization provision is at the defendant's request (with the 
court's approval not required, unlike several other of the sections in the 
transitional provision).863 
On the face of this statute, it appears that a person would not be prose-
cuted for conduct which although criminal at the time of its commission was 
no longer criminal (in the revised Code) at the time of trial. Because the 
new Code failed to define as criminal this particular conduct, the philosophy 
is that a person who has not yet been prosecuted should get the advantage 
of the ameliorative provision. After all, the legislative judgment in the revi-
sion process was to the effect that this type of conduct is no longer serious 
enough to be treated as criminal and thus a person should not be prosecuted 
for an antiquated crime. 
This provision was sharply restricted in the case of State v. Buck8" 
. which presented a showcase example for such an ameliorative provision. 
Buck was convicted under the pre-revised law of five counts of Lascivious 
Acts With a Child.86& Three of his victims were either fourteen or fifteen 
years of age, and the other two were under fourteen. These respective ages 
were crucial in light of the definition of a "child" being lowered from a 
cutoff age of under-16 under the pre-revised law to an under-fourteen cutoff 
under the new law.866 
Thus, all five victims were included as children under the pre-revised 
law, but only two were included under the revised law. 
Buck was prosecuted and convicted in late 1977, but was not sentenced 
until 1978 (i.e., after the new Code took effect). At his request, he was sen-
tenced under the new Code. Nevertheless, he was sentenced - even under 
the new Code - on all five counts, and the supreme court affirmed. 
The supreme court relied solely on the general savings provision867 (to 
the effect that the new Code does not apply to any offenses committed 
before its effective date) without even mentioning the enumerated exception 
of failure of the new Act to define an applicable offense. There is an implica-
tion in the opinion that the latter exception was not argued on behalf of the 
defendant, in light of the court's observation that defendant "seeks to avoid 
the effect of the savings clause by reason of the court's application to be 
sentenced under the [new Code)."868 The court then noted that permission 
for a "carryover" offender to be sentenced under the new Code is granted, 
by express terms of the statute, where it is "applicable to the offense and 
362. [d. § 801.5(2)(a). 
363. [d. §§ 801.5(2)(b)(1), (2). 
364. 275 N.W.2d 194 (Iowa 1979). See also IOWA CODE § 702.5 (1979). 
365. See IOWA CODE § 725.10 (1975) (repealed 1978). 
366. IOWA CODE § 709.8 (1979). 
367. [d. § 801.5(1). 
368. 275 N.W.2d at 196. 
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the offender."s8s Thus, sentencing under the new Code for prior offenses can 
occur only after the sentencing court has found an applicable provision in 
the new Code. Then, and apparently only then, the court can apply the new 
sentence. Thus, this section does not "substitute for old offenses the revi-
sion's definition of the crime."s7o Here, then, the sentencing court correctly 
applied the new Code's lower sentences to all five counts of the pre-revised 
offenses he was convicted of, the supreme court intimated. 
The import of this decision is unclear in light of defendant having al-
ready been prosecuted in 1977, with his only apparent argument being that 
he should be sentenced under the new Code. Perhaps the Buck holding 
means only that the apparent mitigation (i.e., failure of new statute "to de-
fine an applicable offense") applies only to the initial prosecution and not to 
the ultimate sentencing process. Because the defendant apparently limited 
his argument to the sentencing provision, it remains to be seen whether a 
frontal decriminalization attack on a conviction in circumstances similar to 
those in Buck will be successful. Such an argument should prevail, provided 
that the defendant had preserved his record by a timely raising of the issue 
in the trial court. 
In State v. Massey,S71 the supreme court reversed a conviction for keep-
ing a House of III FameS711 under the pre-revised law and remanded it for 
retrial. The court, relying upon section 801.5 of the new Code, summarily 
noted that "[t]he statutes involved in this case were repealed as part of the 
criminal law revision effective January 1, 1978, but this prosecution was un-
affected by that event."S7S Massey had committed his crime in 1977 and had 
been convicted and sentenced also in 1977. 
A related section of the transitional provisionS?4 gives a "carryover" de-
fendant (upon his request and without necessity of court approval) the ben-
efit of any "defense or mitigation" under the new Code. Nevertheless, the 
supreme court essentially has taken this right away. In State v. Hanna,171 
the court rejected defendant's contention that the trial court erred in refus-
ing his request to be tried under the new Code for an offense committed 
under the old Code where the new penalty schedule was particularly amelio-
rative. Specifically, defendant committed an Assault With Intent to In1lict 
Great Bodily Injury (a felony under the pre-revised law) in 1977 and was 
convicted of that offense in 1978. It must be noted that the "comparable" 
crime (if not even more serious in nature) under the new Code is a mere 
aggravated misdemeanor. As the supreme court pointed out, had defen-
369. 275 N.W.2d at 194, 196. See IOWA CODE § B01.5(2)(b)(2) (1979) (emphasis added). 
370. 275 N.W.2d at 196. 
371. 275 N.W.2d 436 (Iowa 1979). 
372. See IOWA CODE § 724.3 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
373. 275 N.W.2d at 437. 
374. IOWA CODE § 801.5(2)(a) (1979). 
375. 277 N.W.2d 605 (Iowa 1979). 
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dant's request been granted, he would not have been subject to being fur-
ther sentenced under the habitual criminal statute which relates only to un-
derlying felony convictions. Regarding whether the statutory change of the 
status of this offense from a felony to a misdemeanor constituted a "mitiga-
tion" under the statute, the opinion observed: 
The matter is troublesome because the statute does not define "miti-
gation." As pointed out in State v. Smith, 324 A.2d 203, 206-07 (Del. 
1974), the term is susceptible of the meaning for which defendant argues. 
Be that as it may, we are controlled here by our Buck and Massey deci-
sions. We therefore hold defendant was properly convicted under § 694.6, 
The Code, 1977.378 
2. Procedural Law 
It appears that a "carryover" defendant has his choice of whether to 
proceed under either the old or the new Code, as far as procedural law is 
concerned. However, the court's approval is required. Moreover, a test for 
the court's approval is set out: "insofar as they [procedural provisions] are 
justly applicable."s77 
A question undoubtedly will arise as to whether the defendant can elect 
application of only some of the new procedural provisions. I submit that it is 
an all-or-nothing proposition. Were it otherwise, the test of applicability of 
the new procedural provisions - "insofar as they are justly applicable" -
would not be met, as far as the State is concerned. There would also be the 
argument that a piecemeal approach would develop, encouraging conflicting 
results. • 
That the transitional provisions on procedure and sentencing are not 
intertwined was decided in State v. Kantaris. 878 Defendant by implication 
had elected to be tried under the new Code's procedural provisions by hav-
ing filed several motions pursuant to the new Code. The judge subsequently 
erred in sua sponte electing to also sentence the defendant under the new 
Code. Defendant quite understandably had not requested to be sentenced 
under the new Code, in light of its harsher penalty. Because the Code clearly 
conditions the application of the new Code's sentencing provisions in carry-
over cases on the defendant's request, the trial court was without authority 
to sentence on its own motion. The State's contention that defendant had 
waived his right of election as to the sentencing provision by his filing of 
new Code procedural motions was rejected. Thus, the transitional provisions 
on procedure and sentencing "are independent of each other" and are not to 
be "yoked in their application. "879 
376. 277 N.W.2d at 60S. 
377. IOWA CODE § S01.5(2)(b)(1) (1979). 
37S. 2S0 N.W.2d 3S9 (Iowa 1979). 
379. ld. at 393. 
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3. Sentencing 
The transitional provision also relates to sentencing in two respects. 
One aspect concerned "carryover" sentencing in instances where the defen-
dant was already convicted under the pre-revised law but was not sentenced 
until January 1, 1978 or after the effective date of the new Code. The other 
relates to inmates serving sentences under the pre-revised law which are less 
severe for the same offense under the new Code, with the pertinent question 
being whether the new Code mandated resentencing. 
a. "Carryover" Sentencing. Under section 801.5(2)(b)(2) of the new 
Code, before a "carryover" defendant may be sentenced under a comparable 
new Code provision for an old Code offense, the following three conditions 
must exist: (1) defendant must request such sentencing, (2) the trial court, 
in its discretion, must so approve, and (3) there must be a provision in the 
new Code which is both "applicable to the offense and the offender."a8o 
The matter of approving or disapproving a defendant's request has 
been interpreted as a matter left "entirely to trial court discretion,"S8I and 
thus a "carryover" defendant has no right to the advantage of any ameliora-
tive sentencing changes. This principle prevails in spite of the general sav-
ings provision in section 4.13 of the Code which requires imposition of an 
applicable reduced penalty in a "carryover" prosecution, because section 
801.5 of the Criminal Code is a specific savings provision.882 
b. Resentencing Inmates. In Cartee v. Brewer,888 the supreme court 
held that the transitional provision in the new Criminal Code did not re-
quire resentencing of inmates serving sentences under the pre-revised Code 
although the comparable sentences under the new Code were less severe. In 
pertinent part, section 801.5(3) provides: "[p]rovisions of this [new Act] gov-
erning the release . . . of prisoners . . . shall apply to persons under sen-
tence for offenses committed before [the effective date of this Act,] except 
that the minimum or maximum period of their detention . . . shall in no 
case be increased . ... "884 
The key factor controlling release is the maximum length of the impris-
onment. This subsection must have a purpose, and the purpose of applying 
new law to old law would be to effect either an increase or a decrease. The 
statutory language expressly prohibits an increase, thus leaving only a de-
crease as a purpose. An accepted rule of statutory construction is that the 
courts will not assume the legislature intended to pass a meaningless provi-
sion, and this subsection would be meaningless if it were not interpreted to 
380. The importance of the third factor is underscored in State v. Buck, 275 N.W.2d 194 
(Iowa 1979), as discussed in text accompanying notes 364-370 supra. 
381. State v. Bousman, 278 N.W.2d 15, 17 (Iowa 1979). 
382. [d. 
383. 265 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1978). 
384. IOWA CODE § 801.5(3) (1979) (emphasis added). 
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require decreasing of sentences where the applicable criminal conduct car-
ries a lesser penalty under the new Criminal Code. 
Nevertheless, the supreme court determined that this provision merely 
makes the new Code's procedures for release or discharge applicable to a 
person under a valid sentence. The opinion seemingly was based upon the 
express declaration therein that nothing in the new Code shall "affect the 
substantive or procedural validity of any judgment of conviction [previ-
ously] entered .... " This reasoning begs the question, however, as validity 
was not the issue. Rather, an ameliorative sentencing equalization scheme 
was intended to lower valid (but excessively harsh) sentences. The most ex-
treme example of reduction in penalty schedules is in the area of Burglary. 
Burglary with Aggravation was punishable under the pre-revised law by con-
finement for any term of years through life, and merely having an aider and 
abettor present was sufficient to constitute Aggravated Burglary. Contrast-
ingly, a two-person burglary without more constitutes mere Burglary in the 
Second Degree, punishable under the new Code by an indeterminate term of 
ten years. Two inmates should not be serving potentially maximum terms of 
life or ten years for the same criminal conduct, especially after the legisla-
tive judgment that the harsh penalty schedule under the pre-revised law 
should be ameliorated. 
c. Combining Procedural and Sentencing Elections. That a defendant 
may still elect sentencing under the old Code, even though he has elected to 
be tried (procedurally) under the new Code in a carryover prosecution, has 
been determined in State v. Kantaris,886 as discussed above.888 
E. Uniform Jury Instructions 
A comprehensive set of revised "Uniform" Jury Instructions on the ma-
jor crimes887 in the new Criminal Code888 has been prepared by the Special 
Committee on Uniform Jury Instructions of the Iowa State Bar Associa-
385. 280 N.W.2d 389 (Iowa 1979). 
386. See text accompanying notes 377 -378 supra. 
387. No instructions have been prepared for any of the following classifications of of-
fenses: IOWA CODE §§ 717.1-.3 (injury to animals); 718.1-.6 (offenses against government); 721.1-
.9 (official misconduct); 722.1-.9 (bribery and corruption offenses); 727.1-.11 (health, safety, and 
welfare offenses); 728.1-.11 (obscenity offenses) (1979). However, chapters have been reserved 
for future Uniform Jury Instructions. Additionally, there is no indication that Uniform Jury 
Instructions will ever be prepared for the following offenses: IOWA CODE §§ 725.5-.16 (gam-
bling); 729.1-.3 (infringement of civil rights); 730.1-.3 (blacklisting employees); 731.1-.8 (labor 
union membership); 732.1-.6 (labor boycotts and strikes) (1979). Moreover, some minor crimes 
are not included in the Uniform Jury Instructions relating to these classes of offenses: assault, 
sexual abuse, obstructing justice, interference with judicial process, and public disorder. 
388. Minimally, the applicable Uniform Jury Instructions, if any, are cited in this Article 
in the discussion of the individual crimes. Additionally, many of the Uniform Jury Instructions 
are discussed extensively in the text. 
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tion. 389 As explained in the foreward to this volume, the use of these instruc-
tions by Iowa courts and attorneys is entirely discretionary,8110 and the Iowa 
Supreme Court has not placed its imprimatur on these instructions. Thus, 
their correctness will continue to be determined in appellate review of actual 
cases. 
Nevertheless, the supreme court has repeatedly indicated that it "disa-
gree[s] with these [uniform] instructions reluctantly"8l1l (and sometimes 
even "very reluctant[ly]"}.392 Indeed, in one of these cases the court noted 
that before it would express disagreement with any instruction proved by "a 
distinguished committee of the Iowa State Bar Association"8118 it would 
make every effort to square the instruction with Iowa caselaw. In that case, 
however, the court was faced "with the alternative of disapproving several 
Iowa decisions . . . or of expressing disagreement with [a] substitute uni-
form instruction ... ,"894 it chose to go along with its own caselaw. 
Although a few sections of the above committee's earlier edition of uni-
form instructions on the pre-revised criminal code were declared unconstitu-
tional by the Iowa Supreme Court,8911 the overall track record for the prede-
cessor uniform instructions has been excellent. Trial judges and counsel 
would be well advised to use them, except in limited instances in which they 
appear defective. Some of these potential defects will be discussed later in 
this Article.398 
The general pattern of the uniform instructions is to merely put the 
statutory language into the format of jury instructions, without changing or 
modifying the Criminal Code. Nevertheless, substantial amplification of gen-
eral statutory language appears in the uniform instructions,S11'7 presumably 
389. See generally. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, note 136 supra. 
390. IOWA STATE BAR ASS'N, I IOWA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS ANNOTATED (CIVIL) 
(1978). See generally State v. McGranahan, 206 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Iowa 1973), in which the court 
stated: "[w)e do not wish to be understood as holding or intimating trial courts are bound by 
any model or form in formulating instructions. We especially do not wish to be understood as 
intimating brief and succinct instructions are in any way discouraged." 
391. State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Iowa 1978); see also Ness v. H. M. litis 
Lumber Co., 256 Iowa 588, 593-94, 128 N.W.2d 237, 240 (1964). 
392. McMaster v. Hutchins, 255 Iowa 39, 45, 120 N.W.2d 509, 512 (1963). 
393. [d. 
394. [d. at 513. 
395. See, e.g., State v. Hansen, 203 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1972) ("conclusive" statutory pre-
sumption of intoxication in OMVUI prosecutions). See also State v. McGranahan, 206 N.W.2d 
88 (Iowa 1973). In McGranahan, the court noted that the uniform instruction given on reasona-
ble doubt was defective due to its failure" [to) limit its reference to the lack or failure of evi-
dence produced by the state." [d. at 92. 
396. See, e.g., text accompanying note 510 infra. 
397. See, e.g., Uniform Jury Instruction No. 1403 which amplifies upon the "intent to 
deprive" element of Theft. See text accompanying notes 1124-29 infra. See also State v. Fluhr, 
287 N.W.2d 857, 867 (Iowa 1980) ("Although there is some uncertainty as to the meaning of 
'intent to deprive' under the new statute, ... [Uniform Instruction) No. 1403 provides some 
guidance which could be shared with defendants offering guilty pleas."), 
HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 284 1979-1980
284 Drake Law Review [Vol. 29 
incorporating existing case law definitions and other general principles. Al-
though these expansive definitions are useful, they generally lack any mean-
ingful annotations explaining the derivation of these amplifications. 
II. GENERAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
A. Parties to Crime 
1. Vicarious Liability Through Joint Criminal Conduct of Individuals 
a. Section 703.1 (Aiding and Abetting). Under section 703.1 of the 
Code,898 all persons concerned in the commission of a public offense are 
punishable as principals whether they directly commit the requisite criminal 
act or whether they merely aid and abet its commission. There should be no 
significance attached to omission from the new Criminal Code of the lead-in 
phrase in the pre-revised statute,8811 which stated that no distinction was to 
be made between an accessory before the fact400 and a principal. Thus, a 
common law accessory before the fact is considered to be aiding and abet-
ting under the new Criminal Code. This is in line with the broad definition 
of aiding and abetting given in State v. Buttolph,4Ol where it is described as 
"lend[ing] countenance or approval, either by active participation in [the 
act] or by some manner encouraging it prior to or at the time of its commis-
sion."40I A similar position is taken in Uniform Jury Instruction No. 205, 
which states that aiding and abetting includes "by some manner knowingly 
398. IOWA CODE § 703.1 (1979); See al80 J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3 §§ 61·66. 
W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW §§ 63,66 (1972); R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON 
CRIMINAL LAW 643-85 (2d ed. 1969). 
399. IOWA CODE § 688.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
400. Some indices for what constitutes an accessory before the fact were noted in State v. 
Young, 211 N.W.2d 352 (Iowa 1973). In Young, the court stated that "[k]nowledge or intent is 
usually inferred from the circumstances. Participation in a crime may be inferred from the 
presence, companionship and conduct before and after the crime is committed." [d. at 354. 
Accord, State v. Lott, 255 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1977). The court in Lott stated that "[t]he under-
lying precept of aiding and abetting is a requirement that the accessory in some way 'associate 
himself with the venture, that he participate in it as something that he wishes to bring about, 
that he seek by his action to make it succeed.''' [d. at 108 (quoting United States v. Peoni, 100 
F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938». One authority has stated that the modern approach in determin-
ing parties to a crime is to hold a person legally accountable for the conduct of another when 
that person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of the crime. W. LAFAVE & A. 
SCOTT, supra note 398, at 501. 
401. 204 N.W.2d 824 (Iowa 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857. 
402. [d. at 825 (emphasis added). See also State v. Fonza, 254 Iowa 630,118 N.W.2d 548 
(1962). The court declared: 
However for conviction there must be evidence that the accused committed the act 
constituting the offense or did 'aid and abet its commission.' Mere presence is not 
enough. To make the defendant guilty, he must have aided or abetted, or the act 
must have been the result of a confederacy. 
[d. at 635, 118 N.W.2d at 551 (emphasis added). 
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advising or encouraging the act prior to ... its commission."408 
A nexus (connection in their joint course of conduct) must be shown 
between the defendant charged with aiding and abetting and the other crim-
inal offender charged with commission of the crime,404 in order to prosecute 
under section 703.1 of the Code. Moreover, it is reversible error for a trial 
court to give an aiding and abetting instruction when the defendant is pros-
ecuted as the sole perpetrator of the crime, with no evidence of more than 
one person's participation.4oa On the other hand, it has been held408 that no 
fatal variance in the charge exists when the defendant is charged as a princi-
pal in a robbery but the prosecution's proof at trial shows only that he aided 
and abetted his armed confederate who actually carried out the robbery. 
The reason given by the Iowa Supreme Court is that Code section 703.1 
expressly provides that an aider and abettor shall be "charged, tried and 
punished" as a principal.407 
To be punishable, the aiding and abetting must have been done know-
ingly. The Iowa Supreme Court has stated that "[k]nowledge is essential; 
however, neither knowledge nor presence at the scene of the crime is suffi-
cient to prove aiding and abetting."408 Instead, an aider and abettor may be 
convicted only if he participates either with requisite intent, or with knowl-
edge that his principal has the requisite intent"OIl This knowledge or intent 
"is usually inferred from the circumstances. Participation in a crime may be 
inferred from the presence, companionship and conduct before and after the 
403. Uniform Jury Instructions, supra note 136, at No. 205 (emphasis added). While de-
fendant's participation as an accomplice can be proved by circumstantial evidence, "subsequent 
conduct is relevant only insofar as it tends to prove defendant's prior encouragement or partici-
pation. A defendant may not be convicted as a principal on a theory of aiding and abetting for 
conduct which would only make him an accessory after the fact." State v. Barnes, 204 N.W.2d 
827, 828-29 (Iowa 1972). In Barnes, with defendant's stated purpose for his presence imd loca-
tion at the theft scene being lawful and there being no direct evidence that defendant saw or 
had knowledge of the theft, the court reversed the conviction and held the circumstantial evi-
dence insufficient for the jury to find he was acting as a lookout (as a lookout, he would be a 
principal in the second degree). The court held: 
One cannot be convicted of crime upon a theory of aiding and abetting unless there is 
sufficient evidence to show he assented to or lent countenance and approval to the 
criminal act either by active participation in it or by some manner encouraging it 
prior to or at the time of its commission. 
1d. at 828. 
404. See generally State v. Gladstone, 78 Wash.2d 306, 474 P.2d 274 (1970). 
405. State v. Mays, 204 N.W.2d 862, 864-65 (Iowa 1973). 
406. State v. Black, 282 N.W.2d 733 (Iowa 1979). 
407. IOWA CODE § 703.1 (1979). 
408. State v. Barnes, 204 N.W.2d 827, 828 (Iowa 1972). 
409. State v. Lott, 255 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1977). But see J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra 
note 3, which states that "(aliding and abetting is usually done by one who intentionally associ-
ates himself with the commission of an offense. However, one may aid and abet another's crimi-
nally negligent conduct, and thus be guilty of a resulting crime which he did not anticipate 
being committed." 1d. § 62, at 18. 
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crime is committed."4lo 
The practical import of the second clause of section 703.1 is as yet un-
clear. Incorporating language contained in State v. Kittelson,411 this section 
states: "[t]he guilt of a person who aids and abets the commission of a crime 
must be determined upon the facts which show the part he or she had in it, 
and does not depend upon the degree of another person's guilt."4111 One in-
terpretation is that this section means that it is irrelevant to the guilt of one 
person that his accomplice is not convicted.413 Professor Yeager illustrates 
this interpretation as follows: "[o]ne who hires an insane person to kill an-
other is guilty of murder, even though the one who actually did the killing 
cannot be held responsible because of his or her insanity."414 
This provision should not be construed to mean that the law of vicari-
ous liability has been changed. This provision, read in conjunction with the 
next section on joint criminal conduct, means that an unarmed getaway 
driver who aids and abets a Robbery in the First Degree, committed directly 
by his armed accomplice, will also be punishable for Robbery in the First 
Degree, even though the driver was not armed.m Similarly, an aider and 
abettor' to a forcible "sex act" will be guilty of Sexual Abuse in the First 
Degree if either the perpetrator of the "sex act" or another accomplice 
causes "serious injury" to the victim of the sexual abuse, or to another. This 
guilt is incurred even though the aider and abettor did not himself cause the 
"serious injury," and even though he did not himself commit a "sex act." 
Absent the "serious injury" which the aider and abettor did not himself 
cause, however, the crime would only be Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree, 
except for section 703.1. 
These principles were reaffirmed in State v. Sanders,418 where the su-
preme court held that the new provision for a mandatory five-year term of 
imprisonment for use or possession of a firearm4l7 during a "forcible fel-
ony"4l8 applies also to a mere aider and abettor (here, in a Robbery) who 
did not personally have the firearm. Focusing on the language in section 
410. State v. Young, 211 N.W.2d 352, 354 (Iowa 1973). See State v. Cuevas, 281 N.W.2d 
627 (Iowa 1979) (evidence that defendant drove the car with prior knowledge of burglary plans 
is sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder on aiding and abetting theory). 
411. 164 N.W.2d 157, 162 (Iowa 1969). 
412. IOWA CODE § 703.1 (1979). 
413. Acquittal of a common law accessory before the fact does not bar a prosecution of his 
principal. State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63 (Iowa 1972). 
414. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 43, at 28. 
415. The conduct of one accomplice is attributable to all. Thus, all parties participating 
in a robbery need not be armed. If one is armed, then all are armed, and all can be convicted of 
Robbery With Aggravation. See IOWA CODE § 711.2 (1977) (repealed 1978); State v. Johnson, 
162 N.W.2d 453 (Iowa 1968). 
416. 280 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1979). 
417. See IOWA CODE § 902.7 (1979). 
418. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979) and text accompanying notes 86-943 supra. 
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703.1 that all persons involved in a criminal act shall be "punished as princi-
pals," the supreme court noted that this section "deals with both guilt and 
punishment." The court concluded: 
[sJection 711.1 defining robbery speaks in terms of a person who assaults 
or threatens with intent to commit a theft, yet defendant, who did not 
personally do so, is guilty of that crime because of section 703.1. Simi-
larly defendant, who did not hold the gun, is liable for the enhanced 
punishment of section 902.7 because of section 703.1.U8 
This approach seemingly ignores the entire last sentence of section 
703.1, which provides: "[t]he guilt of a person who aids and abets the com- . 
mission of a crime must be determined upon the facts which show the part 
he or she had in it, and does not depend upon the degree of another person's 
guilt. "410 A fair alternative reading of section 703.1 in its entirety would be 
that the first sentence abolishes the common law distinction between princi-
pals in the first degree, principals in the second degree, and accessories 
before the fact, thus rendering them all equally punishable for the generic 
offense of, for example, Robbery. This criminal responsibility for Robbery 
thus applies equally to the actual taker, the lookout or getaway driver, and 
the accessory before the fact who planned the robbery but did not actually 
participate at the scene of the robbery. The second sentence then could be 
read as differentiating among the various classifications of parties to a crime 
which, like Robbery, consists of more than one degree. Thus, the unarmed 
getaway driver as a mere aider and abettor would be guilty only of the low-
est degree of Robbery indicated, as stated in section 703.1, by "the facts 
which show the part he or she had in it, and. . . not. . . upon the degree of 
another person's guilt."411 Such facts would make the unarmed aider and 
abettor (as well as the accessory before the fact who is not even at the scene 
of the robbery) guilty of the elementary offense of Robbery in the Second 
Degree. Only their armed confederate would then be guilty of Robbery in 
the First Degree (for being armed). 
b. Section 703.2 (Joint Criminal Conduct). The aiding and abetting 
provision in section 703.1 thus relates to crimes which the defendant himself 
participated in to some degree, and which were jointly planned.411 A com-
panion provision in section 703.2 of the Code relates to additional or other 
crimes committed by defendant's accomplices without defendant's personal 
participation, and without joint planning of the crimes.42S 
419. 280 N.W.2d at 378. 
420. IOWA CODE § 703.1 (1979) (emphasis added). 
421. IOWA CODE § 703.1 (1979). 
422. For an analysis of how the justification concept of police activity under Code § 
704.11 may create a new complicity concept as applied to law enforcement officers and their 
agents during "active" undercover investigative activity, see text accompanying notes 814-29, 
infra. 
423. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 43, at 28. 
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This general concept of joint criminal conduct424 appears in section 
703.242G as a codification of well-recognized case law.m The concept is that a 
person, acting in concert with others in knowingly committing a public of-
fense, is 
responsible for the acts of the other done in furtherance of the commis-
sion of the offense or escape therefrom, and his or her guilt will be the 
same as that of the person so acting, unless the act was one which the 
person could not reasonably expect to be done in the furtherance of the 
commission of the offense.'" 
The crux of this provision is foreseeability of other crimes being com-
mitted by accomplices or co-conspirators.u8 This foreseeability is implied 
under the felony murder doctrine to make punishable for murder all co-
conspirators acting in concert in the commission of the underlying felony, 
upon the theory that a killing is a foreseeable consequence of inherently 
dangerous activity, such as robbery or sexual abuse.us This same principle 
should apply, as discussed above, to an aider and abettor to a forcible "sex 
act" who did not cause a "serious injury" himself or directly commit a "sex 
act," hut who is punishable for Sexual Abuse in the First Degree because his 
co-conspirator caused a "serious injury." If death is a foreseeable conse-
quence of sexual abuse, then obviously a "serious injury" is also foreseeable. 
On the other hand, an unplanned sexual abuse during a house burglary 
would be considered as an "independent frolic,"4so not imputable to a co-
conspirator in the burglary who did not aid and abet in the sexual abuse 
itself. 
2. Vicarious Liability 0/ Employers and Business Entities 
Sections 703.4 and 703.5 of the Code4s1 represent the first codification 
in Iowa of the general common law principle that employers and business 
entities can, in limited circumstances, be held criminally responsible for 
criminal acts of their employees. This theory of vicarious liability renders 
both the employer and the employee equally punishable for a crime. How-
ever, the import of these sections does not extend the concept of respondeat 
superior4s2 to the criminal law in general,488 without distinguishing between 
424. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 63. See also UNIFORM JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 204. 
425. IOWA CODE § 703.2 (1979). 
426. See State v. Kneedy, 232 Iowa 21, 3 N.W.2d 611 (1942). 
427. IOWA CODE § 703.2 (1979). 
428. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 63. 
429. See generally W. LAFAVE & R. SCOTT, supra note 398, at 515-17. 
430. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 43, at 28. 
431. IOWA CODE §§ 703.4, .5 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at 
Nos. 223-29; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 65-66. 
432. One commentator has noted that U[a]n employer may be civilly liable for harm 
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true crimes as opposed to civil offenses.484 Rather, supervisory persons and 
the business entity itself are being made criminally responsible "for their 
own misfeasance or nonfeasance, the criminal act of the employee being sig-
nificant only in that, being the consequence of such misfeasance or nonfea-
caused by an employee within the scope of employment, under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior, even if the former had forbidden the latter to do what was done, but this has no applica-
tion to criminal law." R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 637. 
433. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 65. 
434. Violations of public welfare measures, which in aid of the state's police power are 
designed to protect the public, are punishable "whether the offender was cognizant of the viola-
tion of the law." State v. Barry, 255 Iowa 1329, 1332, 125 N.W.2d, 833, 834 (1964). That is, 
vicarious liability is cognizable for a strict liability offense based upon certain regulatory mea-
sures. The statute in question in Barry imposed a duty upon car dealers to see that pasteboard 
registration-applied-for cards were not used on cars sold by them unless timely application for 
registration and certificate of title had been made by the buyer. Defendant Barry's conviction 
for violation of the statute was upheld, even though he had specifically instructed his employ-
ees not to sell the particular car in question and he was out of the country when that car was 
sold by one of his employees (and the registration requirements were not met by defendant's 
salesman). 
Noting that this statute amounted to "an absolute prohibition," the court pointed out that 
failure to put the ultimate duty upon the licensed dealer could render the statute "a dead 
letter." Id. at _, 125 N.W.2d at 835. Moreover, the court considered it within the legislature's 
perogative to adopt "such a method as the best way of preventing deleterious results to the 
public." Id. 
The Iowa Supreme Court stated in Barry: 
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that, in prohibitive statutes covering misde-
meanors, as this one is, where no provision is made as to the intention, and the word 
"knowingly" or other apt words are not employed, to indicate that knowledge is the 
essential element of the crime, intention is not an element of the crime. This is espe-
cially so where the act is forbidden by a statute in aid of the police power of the state. 
Id. at 834. 
Vicarious liability pyramided on top of strict liability was upheld in City of Iowa City v. 
Nolan, 232 N.W.2d 102 (Iowa 1976). Nolan's conviction for illegal parking was affirmed even 
though he was merely the owner of the vehicle and not its operator at the time of the incident. 
One of the applicable municipal ordinances imposed strict liability by making illegal parking an 
offense "without regard to the state of mind of the vehicle operator." Id. at 107 (McCormick, J., 
dissenting). The other ordinance "makes the vehicle owner culpable for conduct for which the 
vehicle owner is strictly liable." Id. The supreme court held it was constitutionally permissible 
under the "public welfare doctrine" for this municipal ordinance to impose prima facie strict 
criminal responsibility upon the registered owner of an illegally parked vehicle ... [b)y prov-
ing (1) the existence of an illegally parked vehicle, (2) registered in the name of the defendant, 
and (3) inability to determine the actual operator .... " Id. at 105. The court held further that 
a conviction could rest upon this prima facie inference, but, of course, the defendant could 
"come forward with evidence" to rebut that he should be held responsible as the registered 
owner of the vehicle. Id. "In the area of public welfare offenses, such burden shifting is not 
constitutionally infirm," the court determined. See id. See also, Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 
397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 848 (1960) (respondeat superior held 
applicable to civil offenses involving violations of detailed regulatory provisions in fields which 
were essentially non-criminal); R. PERKINS, supra note 398, which states: "Generally accepted, 
however, is the view holding the employer vicariously liable for a civil offense committed by his 
employee in the course of his employment." Id. at 814. 
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sance, it determines the nature and degree of the employer's or supervisor's 
guilt. "4SI1 
An administrative or supervisory person can have vicarious liability im· 
puted to him under section 703.4 for criminal acts committed by an em· 
ployee "acting under the employer's control, supervision, or direction"4S8 in 
any of these three all·inclusive ways: (1) affirmative action by the employer 
in directing the employee to commit the offense;4S7 (2) failure to act to stop 
an employee from knowingly committing a public offense with the intent 
that the employer will benefit thereby;4S8 or (3) affirmative action in as· 
signing a task to an employee with reasonable foreseeability that the task 
cannot be accomplished except for the employee committing a public of· 
fense.4S9 Criminal culpability on the same level as the employee committing 
the crime is imputed to business entities under section 703.5 in these limited 
circumstances: (1) acts of misfeasance or malfeasance on behalf of the busi· 
ness entity itself by nonperformance of duties imposed upon it by law, with· 
out regard for any showing of intent or lack of interest, and (2) criminal acts 
authorized, requested, or tolerated by a person in authority440 while acting 
within his authority and for the benefit of the business entity, with the 
criminal intent or negligence of this person in authority considered that of 
the business entity.441 
3. Accessory After the Fact 
The new Criminal Code has expressly invoked criminal responsibility 
for conduct amounting to the offender being an accessory after the fact.4" 
This represents a change in Iowa law, since the prior law448 had been inter· 
preted as not criminalizing this type of conduct.444 An accessory after the 
fact, of course, is not made equally responsible for the criminal acts of the 
person he assists, and thus vicarious liability is inapplicable to this crime. 
Rather, the only connection between the degree of severity of the offender's 
punishment and that of the person he assists depends upon whether the-
public offense committed was a felony or a misdemeanor. An accessory after 
the fact to a felony commits an aggravated misdemeanor, while an accessory 
435. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 65, at 19. 
436. IOWA CODE § 703.4 (1979). 
437. See generally UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 223. 
438. [d. at No. 224. 
439. [d. at No. 225. 
440. [d. at No. 227. See also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 398, at 228-37. 
441. See generally UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 226. 
442. IOWA CODE § 703.3 (1979). UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 301-
06; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 64. 
443. IOWA CODE § 688.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
444. In State u. Kittelson, 164 N.W.2d 157, 165 (Iowa 1969), the pre-revised accessory 
after the fact statute was interpreted as not defining a crime because it did not provide for any 
punishment. 
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after the fact to a misdemeanor commits only a simple misdemeanor. 
An accessory after the fact is a person, other than the accused's spouse, 
who (1) harbors, aids, or conceals; (2) a person accused of committing a pub-
lic offense; (3) with intent to prevent his apprehension; and (4) with knowl-
edge that a public offense has been committed.4411 This is a specific intent 
crime. The mere act of harboring, aiding, or concealing44e a fugitive is not 
sufficient to invoke criminal culpability. Rather, as explained in Uniform 
Jury Instruction No. 305, it must also be proved that "in so doing there was 
an intent to prevent his apprehension for the commission of the offense for 
which he was accused."447 Thus, a benevolent motive will not suffice to incur 
criminal culpability.448 
This crime also involves a second particularlized state of mind, requir-
ing the prosecution to prove that the ac~essory knew that a prior public 
offense had been committed.449 This, under Uniform Jury Instruction No. 
303, requires more than merely suspicion, speculation, or conjecture of a 
prior offense. Rather, the accessory must be shown "to be aware of, in-
formed, perceived, or had information of the commission [of a public 
offense]. "4110 
The implication in the language of the Criminal Code, as well as the 
language in Uniform Jury Instruction No. 301, is that a public offense must 
actually have been committed. However, in Uniform Jury Instruction No. 
304 it is stated that it is not necessary in convicting the accessory that the 
accused person he assisted was 
[i]n fact guilty of the offense for which he was being sought. Rather, it is 
only necessary that he was being sought for the commission of a [public 
offense] and thereafter the [accessory] knowing that a [public offense] 
had been committed and [X] was accused of so doing, harbored, aided or 
445. See generally UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 301. 
446. To "harbor, aid or conceal" is defined as meaning "to shelter, hide or provide a place 
of refuge or safety; or to lend assistance or help." UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, 
at No. 302. 
447. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 305. For an extensive discussion 
of the principle that the words "harbor" and "conceal" under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1071 (1978) muSt 
be narrowly construed so as not to include all forms of assistance, see United States v. Foy, 416 
F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1969). 
448. See W. LAFAVE & A. SC01T, supra note 398, at 523, citing State v. Jett, 69 Kan. 788, 
77 P. 546 (1904). 
449. See R. PERKINS, supra note 398, which states that provided a party did not aid and 
abet the principal felony in any way: 
One who is an accessory before the fact may also become an accessory to the same 
offense after the fact, but this is not true of one who is guilty as a principal felon. On 
the other hand, absence at the time of perpetration is not essential in the case of an 
accessory after the fact. 
[d. at 669. 
450. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS supra note 136, at No. 303. 
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concealed him with the intent to prevent his apprehension. m 
It also appears that it is unnecessary that the principal already be charged 
with the underlying crime. 
The requirement that another offense has been committed apparently 
means that the underlying public offense must have been completed prior to 
the alleged act of accessoryship after the fact. Thus, it has been held that 
the act of knowingly giving assistance to the perpetrator of a homicidal act 
before the death of the victim does not constitute being an accessory after 
the fact to murder.4t1z Also, mere passive failure to report a known crime 
does not render one an accessory after the fact.4t18 Nor is this punishable at 
all as criminal conduct, since the common law crime of Misprision of Fel-
ony4t14 is not recognized in Iowa criminal law. However, if one's failure to 
report another's known crime is grounded upon an agreement with the per-
petrator of the crime to not do so, then the separate crime of Compounding 
a Felony4t1t1 may have been committed, but this still does not render the 
"compounder" punishable for the principal's original crime. 
a. Lesser Included Offense. The difference between charging Acces-
sory After the Fact as a crime outright and submitting it as a lesser included 
offense4tl6 has been pointed out recently by the Iowa Supreme Court. In 
State v. Sanders,4t17 the court affirmed a conviction for Robbery in the First 
Degree although the trial court had refused to submit defendant's pro jury 
instruction that would have permitted the jury to find defendant guilty in-
stead of being only an Accessory After the Fact. Defendant's theory of the 
case was that the evidence merely showed that he had driven the getaway 
car and that he had played no part in the robbery itself. The supreme court 
pointed out the difference between a defendant's right in closing argument 
to argue to the fact finder "as a matter of defense to the robbery charge 
that the evidence only shows defendant helped the robbers get away"4tl8 and 
the prosecution's right "to try to convict defendant of the aggravated misde-
meanor of accessory after the fact."4t19 Rejecting the theory of Accessory Af-
ter the Fact as being a lesser included offense of Robbery, the supreme court 
determined that the legal test of a lesser included offense·" was not met 
451. [d. at No. 304. 
452. State v. Williams, 229 N.C. 348, 49 S.E.2d 617 (1948). 
453. W. LAFAVE & A. SCO'M', supra note 398, which states: "But under such circum-
stances, ... the aider may be found to be an acceBBOry after the fact to the felonious assault." 
[d. at 522-23 n.8. 
454. State v. Bosworth, 170 Iowa 329, 345, 152 N.W. 581, 588 (1915). See W. LAFAVE & A. 
SCO'M', supra note 398, at 526. 
455. See IOWA CODE § 720.1 (1979). 
456. See part II(D), infra. 
457. 280 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1979). 
458. [d. at 376. 
459. [d. 
460. That is, "the elements of the lesser offense are an elementary part of the greater 
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since these two offenses require different states of mind (specifically, to pre-
vent another's apprehension under Accessory After the Factm and to com-
mit a theft under Robbery).4ell 
b. Grading. There are two grades of Accessory After the Fact, with the 
distinction· based upon whether a felony or misdemeanor was the underlying 
crime by the other person being unlawfully assisted. An accessory is respon-
sible for an aggravated misdemeanor4ea when he unlawfully aids a known 
felon, but merely for a simple misdemeanor4414 when a known misdemeanant 
is involved. 
B. States of Mind4ea 
Unlike many revised codes in other jurisdictions, the new Iowa Criminal 
Code does not contain a separate chapter on states of mind.4ee Rather, the 
only specific reference to mens rea consists of including the term "reckless" 
in the chapter on definitional clauses.4e7 
Seven other particularized states of mind are used in the new Criminal 
Code without statutory definitional clauses.4ee This necessitates referral to 
definitions made in "pre-revision court decisions."4ell These seven states of 
mind are maliciously, intentionally, willfully, voluntarily, knowingly, with 
the purpose of, and specific intent.no In addition, several dozen crimes ap-
pear merely to be general intent crimes. Of these states of mind, only mali-
ciously, recklessly, knowingly, and intentionally are included in the Uniform 
Jury Instructions, as discussed below. . 
offense." Id. at 377, quoting State v. Millspaugh, 257 N.W.2d 513, 516 (Iowa 1977). See part 
II(D) infra. 
461. See IOWA COOE § 703.3 (1979). 
462. See id., at § 711.1. 
463. An aggravated misdemeanor is punishable by either a determinate term of confine-
ment not to exceed two years or a maximum fine of $5000 or both. Other sentencing alterna-
tives include a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a suspended sentence of probation, 
in lieu of the above-mentioned confinement or fine. See text accompanying notes 103-11 supra. 
464. A simple misdemeanor is punishable by either a determinate jail term not exceeding 
thirty days or a maximum fine of $100, but not both. Other sentencing alternatives include a 
deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a suspended sentence of probation, in lieu of the 
above-mentioned confinement or fine. See text accompanying notes 103-11 supra. 
465. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTI', supra note 398, at §§ 27-31 and R. PERKINS, 
supra note 398, at ch. 7. 
466. See Schantz, supra note 2, at 436-39. 
467. IOWA COOE § 702.16 (1979). 
468. This compares with a total of "at least 14 different terms apparently used to desig-
nate a state of mind" under the pre-revised criminal code. Schantz, supra note 2, at 437. 
469. Id. at 439. 
470. In addition, two specialized states of mind - malice aforethought and premeditation 
- relate only to the crime of Murder. See IOWA COOE § 707.1-.2 (1979). 
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1. Intent 
a. General Intent. A general criminal intent refers to whether the. de-
fendant intended deliberate or knowing action, as opposed to causing the 
prohibited result through accident, mistake, carelessness, or absent-minded-
ness.471 "When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a 
particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a 
future consequence,"47l1 the question is whether the defendant had the gen-
eral criminal intent to do the proscribed act. Intent is understood as an ele-
ment and therefore is not specifically enumerated in the individual statutes 
dealing with true crimes (as opposed to strict liability478 for regulatory 
offenses). 
A corollary to the proposition that every man is presumed to know the 
law is that criminal intent can be imputed even to persons who have no 
realization of the wrongfulness of their act, much less an actual intent to 
commit a crime. Indeed, "[W]hen a person capable of entertaining criminal 
intent, acting without justification or excuse, commits an act, prohibited as a 
crime, his intention to commit the act constitutes criminal intent. . . . 
[I]ntent is presumed from commission of the act, on the ground that a per-
son is presumed to intend his voluntary acts and their natural and probable 
consequences."474 This so-called "presumption" is stated in Uniform Jury 
Instruction No. 215 as follows: "In determining the intent of any person you 
471. State v. Peery, 224 Minn. 346, 28 N.W.2d 851 (1947). 
472. People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 456-57, 462 P.2d 370, 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 626 
(1969). See also TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 43, at 25 ("A person may intend to act as he or 
she does, but may not intend the results which make the act criminal."). 
473. Some minor criminal offenses, known as strict liability offenses, have no mens rea 
component and thus punish the offender without regard to his state of mind. These offenses 
"require only the proof of an act, without specific or general intent" to commit the crime or of 
knowledge that a crime is being committed. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 43, at 25. 
Legislatures have "wide latitude ... to declare an offense and to exclude elements of 
knowledge and diligence from its definition," especially in light of no general constitutional 
doctrine of mens rea ever having been articulated. City of Iowa City v. Nolan, 239 N.W.2d 102, 
104 (Iowa 1976). Legislation creating public welfare offenses, which have no ancestors in the 
common law, commonly dispense with "any awareness of wrongdoing." [d. The underlying ra-
tionale for invoking strict liability as to these offenses is that U[i]n the interest of the larger 
good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in 
responsible relation to a public danger." [d. 
The Iowa Supreme Court has determined that violations of traffic regulations squarely fit 
into the classification of minor crimes known as public welfare offenses. The classic examples of 
strict liability traffic offenses are overtime parking and illegal parking. See id. 
Minor moving traffic offenses also are examples of strict liability offenses. In City of Des 
Moines v. Davis, 214 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1974), it was held that speeding does not require intent 
or knowledge on the part of the· driver. This means that a speeding driver is guilty merely 
because of his act of driving over the speed limit, and thus neither intended to speed nor knew 
he was speeding. Nevertheless, legal excuse is cognizable, even as to strict liability offenses. An 
example of legal excuse is the common law criminal defense of sudden emergency. See id. 
474. J. MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 57-58 (1934) [hereinafter cited as J. MILLER]. 
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may, but are not required to, infer that he intended the natural and proba-
ble consequences which ordinarily follow his voluntary acts."47B 
This inference, without more, is sufficient to generate a jury question on 
the element of general mens rea. If, however, defendant offers offsetting evi-
dence, then the prosecution should - but need not as a matter of law -
offer rebuttal evidence in order to shore-up the inference (which may have 
been eroded by defendant's theory of the case). This inference does not, 
however, shift the burden of proof to the defendant when relying upon ab-
sence of general intent. In other words, the prosecution still must prove gen-
eral intent,m although the inference by itself may be sufficient. As ex-
plained by the Supreme Courts of the United States477 and Iowa:m 
[T]he entirely permissive inference or presumption ... allows - but 
does not require - the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof 
by the prosecutor of the basic one and that places no burden of any kind 
on the defendant . . . Because this permissive presumption leaves the 
trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does not shift the 
. burden of proof, it affects the application of the "beyond the reasonable 
doubt" standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational 
way the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference.m 
b. Specific Intent. A specific intent crime is "so defined as to require 
not merely that an act be committed voluntarily, but that its commission be 
accompanied by a specific intent,"480 a second and separate state of mind 
(beyond general mens rea with respect to the actus reus of the crime). That 
is, "[W]hen the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act 
or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of 
specific intent."481 
The Iowa Supreme Court has had only a few occasions to differentiate 
between general and specific intent. In State v. Redmon,488 the court charac-
terized Assault and Battery488 as a general intent crime and Assault with 
Intent to Inflict Bodily Injury484 as a specific intent crime under the pre-
revised law. Its only discussion consisted of quoting from a treatise ex-
475. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 215. 
476. But see State v. Jamison, 110 Ariz. 245, 517 P.2d 1241 (1974). 
477. County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, _ U.S. _, _, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 
2224 (1979) (emphasis added). 
478. State v. Rinehart, 283 N.W.2d 319, 321 (Iowa 1979), quoting County Court of Ulster 
County, New York v. Allen, _ U.S. _, _, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 2224 (1979)(emphasis added). 
479. [d. Regarding the constitutionality of a jury instruction on an inference of intent 
(both general and specific), see text accompanying notes 515-27 infra. 
480. J. MILLER, supra note 474, at 60. 
481. P. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL LAW 331 (1975). 
482. 244 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1976). 
483. See IOWA CODE § 694.1 (1975) (repealed 1978). 
484. See id. § 694.6. 
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cerpt,.S5 which stated: 
Specific intent is present when from the circumstances the offender must 
have subjectively desired the prohibited result. General intent exists 
when from the circumstances the prohibited result may reasonably be 
expected to follow from the offender's voluntary act, irrespective of any 
subjective desire to have accomplished such result.486 
Similarly, in State v. Barney,487 a prosecution for Assault With Intent 
to Commit Murder,.ss the court said that "[p]roof of a mere general feloni-
ous intent will not suffice; the crime charged requires a specific intent."4s9 
Indeed, the latter (in this instance the specific intent to kill) was deemed 
"the very 'gist' of the crime."4eo 
A better comparison has been made by a commentator, as follows: 
When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a par-
ticular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a 
future consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the 
proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent. 
When the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act 
or achieve some additional consequence; the crime is deemed to be one of 
specific intent.491 
He goes on to state that specific intent most commonly designates "a 
special mental element which is required above and beyond any mental 
state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime." An example of 
common law larceny was given.492 That specific intent crime "requires the 
taking and carrying away of the property of another, and the defendant's 
mental state as to this act must be established, but in addition it must be 
shown that there was an 'intent to steal' the property."493 In other words, 
the act or taking and carrying away must have been done willfully and in-
tentionally (i.e., through general criminal intent) as opposed to acting 
merely out of carelessness, mistake, or inadvertence (which would not be 
criminal at all). Additionally, the intentional act of taking and carrying away 
must be accompanied by the specific intent to steal. Theft would not occur 
if the property were merely taken for a temporary use, with or without an 
intent to return it directly to the rightful possessor. For example, the spe-
cific intent to steal is the essential element differentiating the crimes of 
485. 1 H. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 55 (6th ed. 1973). 
486. 244 N.W.2d at 797. 
487. 244 N.W.2d 316 (Iowa 1976). 
488. See IOWA CODE § 690.6 (1975) (repealed 1978). 
489. 244 N.W.2d at 318. 
490. [d. 
491. P. JOHNSON, supra note 481, at 329. 
492. [d. at 331. 
493. [d. 
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Theft of a Motor Vehicle494 and Operating Vehicle Without Owner's Con-
sent.c911 Relatedly, another commentator has stated that some crimes require 
a specified intention in addition to an intended act.498 Thus, the physical act 
in common law larceny may be done intentionally, deliberately, with full 
knowledge of all the facts and complete understanding of the wrongfulness 
of the act constituting larceny, and yet not constitute larceny unless the 
actor had an additional intention in mind - the intent to steal.497 
Kidnapping498 and Escape499 were two pre-revised crimes which were 
interpreted by implication as being merely general intent crimes. In other 
words, whereas both crimes had to be committed willfully or intentionally, 
nevertheless neither one had to be done with a specific purpose. For exam-
ple, in State v. Wharf/,lIoo an Escape case, the court held that it was unnec-
essary for the prosecution to prove that the prisoner left the prescribed work 
farm with the intent to escape to avoid further imprisonment. Instead, what 
mattered was that he committed the act of voluntarily leaving without per-
mission and contrary to law. His particular motive, purpose, or intent in 
doing so was immaterial under the statute, since the crime charged consisted 
only of the doing of acts which are prohibited.llol 
Similarly, the court held in State v. Wallace llOli that the section of the 
pre-revised Kidnapping statute involved therein did not require proof of any 
specific intent. The court concluded: 
[I]t is evident an offense is committed when an offender willfully, with-
out lawful authority, forcibly or secretly confines or imprisons another 
person within the state against his or her will. The act itself is prohibited 
and specific intent on the part of the offender is not an essential ingredi-
ent of the crime. It is enough if the prohibited act is done willfully and 
unlawfully.608 
Thus, the offender's intent or purpose was immaterial, and the prosecution 
did not need to prove anything beyond the mere unlawful act of confine-
ment. Contrastingly, another clause in the Kidnapping statutel104 did estab-
lish a specific intent crime with the act of seizure being for the purpose 
either of secret confinement or of removal of the victim from Iowa. 
In both of these cases, the supreme court recognized that "the legisla-
494. IOWA CODE § 714.1(1), .2(2) (1979). 
495. [d. § 714.7. 
496. R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 762. 
497. [d. 
498. See IOWA CODE § 706.1 (1962) (repealed 1978). 
499. See IOWA CODE § 745.1 (1962) (repealed 1978). 
500. 257 Iowa 871, 134 N.W.2d 922 (1965). 
501. [d. at 875, 134 N.W.2d at 925. 
502. 259 Iowa 765, 145 N.W.2d 615 (1966). 
503. [d. at 774, 145 N.W.2d at 621. 
504. See IOWA CODE § 706.1 (1962) (repealed 1978). 
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ture may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission a crime with-
out regard to the intent or knowledge of the doer."~o~ It then formulated this 
test for determining whether a statute is a general or specific intent crime: 
[w]hether a criminal intent or guilty knowledge is an essential element of a 
statutory offense is to be determined as a matter of construction from the 
language of the act, in connection with its manifest purpose and design.-
Sexual Abuse~o7 is another example of a general intent crime. The pros-
ecution need only prove the unauthorized act of sexual contact and essen-
tially can rely upon the inference of intent. Although a specific intent (to 
gratify the defendant's sexual passions) is not an element of the crime,~08 
nevertheless the defendant must have acted intentionally as opposed to act-
ing through a mistake,~o9 accident, carelessness, or absent-mindedness. 
c. Interrelationship of Specific Intent and General Intent. Considera-
ble confusion over the difference between general intent and specific intent 
is quite apparent in the Uniform Jury Instructions. The principal problem 
lies in using the meaningless term "intent" instead of the essential terms of 
either "general intent" or "specific intent." This problem is exacerbated by 
the only applicable Uniform Jury Instruction, which incidentally is entitled 
"Intent," covering only specific intent. The omission of a general intent in-
struction is inexcusable, especially in light of the danger of there being given 
no instruction on general intent. ~lO Moreover, the specific intent instruction 
is fuzzy, especially on the difference between general and specific intent, 
which is not even mentioned. 
The following suggested "model" instruction would inter alia clarify the 
meaning of general and specific intent as well as their interrelationship (by 
the addition of the italicized phrases to Uniform Jury Instruction No. 215): 
[a] (General Intent) 
You must find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted deliber-
ately or intentionally and not as a result merely of inadvertence, acci-
dent, carelessness, mistake, or absent-mindedness. 
[b] (Specific Intent) 
In addition, specific intent is an essential element of the ofi'enses(s) 
charged, and it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a 
505. State v. Wharff, 257 Iowa 871, 875, 134 N.W.2d 922, 925 (1965). Accord State v. 
Wallace, 259 Iowa 765, 774, 145 N.W.2d 615, 621 (1966). 
506. State v. Wharff, 257 Iowa 871, 875, 134 N.W.2d 922, 925 (1965). 
507. IOWA CODE § 709.1 (1979). 
508. See State v. Pilcher, 158 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Iowa 1968) (interpreting pre-revised 
crime of Rape). 
509. Strict liability does apply to statutory types of Sexual Abuse, however, as a mistake 
(albeit reasonable) as to a child-victim's age is no excuse for criminal responsibility. See State 
v. Newton, 44 Iowa 45 (1876). 
510. See State v. McCormack, _ N.W.2d _, _ (1980) (Uniform Jury Instruction No. 
1446 defining elements of Operating Vehicle Without Owner's Consent erroneous since general 
criminal intent not included as element of that offense). 
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particularized state of mind above and beyond the general intent re-
quirement set out in part (a) of this Instruction. Specific intent is a 
mental state, emotion, or condition of the mind with a design, resolve, or 
determination that the doing of an act shall be with a certain purpose. In 
this case you must find that the defendant acted with the purpose of 
(set out specific intent element). 
(c) Inference of Intent. 
Intent is seldom, if ever, capable of direct and positive proof. Rather, the 
intent, if any, may be arrived at by such reasonable inferences and de-
ductions as may be drawn from the facts proved by the evidence, in ac-
cordance with common experience and observation. In determining the 
intent of any person you may, but are not required to, infer that he in-
tended the natural and probable consequences which ordinarily follow 
his voluntary acts.51o.1 
299 
Concomitantly, each of the Uniform Jury Instructions setting out the 
elements of a crime should be amended to include the additional element 
that the defendant acted intentionally or with criminal intent. 
d. Inference on Intent. The Iowa Supreme Court has consistently 
taken the position that persons are presumed to intend the natural conse-
quences of their acts. While this presumption generally is thought of in 
terms of supplying by implication the basic underlying general criminal in-
tent, lUI nevertheless it. is not limited to general intent crimes. Indeed, as the 
supreme court has explained: 
It is a general rule, applicable to all criminal cases, including those where 
a specific intent is an element of the crime, that, [the] accused, if sane, is 
presumed to intend the necessary or the natural and probable conse-
quences of his unlawful voluntary acts, knowingly performed. Accord-
ingly, the law assumes a person to intend all the consequences which one 
standing in like circumstances and possessing like knowledge should rea-
sonably expect to result from any act which is knowingly done.au 
Similarly, it was noted in State v. RinehartG18 that "this court has al-
ways allowed resort to these inferences to prove specific intent. "1114 This re-
affirmation is especially significant in the light of Rinehart involving a con-
stitutional attack on the Uniform Jury Instruction which permits an 
inference of intent under certain circumstances, as discussed below. 
This inference has come under considerable attack recently. First, in 
State v. Whiteside llill the court upheld an instruction on intent which closely 
510.1 UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 215. 
511. See generally State v. Jamison, 110 Ariz. 245, 517 P.2d 1241 (1974) (unlike general 
intent, which can be shown by an inference of intent, specific intent must be proved by the 
prosecution). 
512. State v. True, 190 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Iowa 1971). 
513. 283 N.W.2d 319 (Iowa 1979). 
514. Id. at 323. 
515. 272 N.W.2d 468 (Iowa 1978). 
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followed Uniform Jury Instruction No. 215.1U8 The court summarily dis-
missed without merit defendant's contention that this inference "shifts the 
burden of proof on an essential element of the crime to him."D17 The only 
"discussion" was to. the effect that the court disagrees with Uniform Jury 
Instructions reluctantly. 
The matter did not end there, however. Several related appeals con-
testing the Uniform Jury Instruction followed closely upon the heels of the 
decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States in Sandstrom v. Mon-
tana,1I18 and County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen.rue In Sand-
strom, the Court declared unconstitutional a jury instruction stating that 
"the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his 
voluntary acts."1120 The Court determined that a reasonable jury could have 
interpreted this presumption as being conclusive or mandatory, that is, "as 
an irrebuttable direction by the court to find intent once convinced of the 
facts triggering the presumption. Alternatively, the jury may have inter-
preted the instruction as a direction to find intent upon proof of the defen-
dant's voluntary actions (and their 'ordinary' consequences), unless the de-
fendant proved the contrary by some quantum of proof which may well 
have been considerably greater than 'some' evidence - thus effectively 
shifting the burden of persuasion on the element of intent."1I1l Either inter-
pretation violated the fourteenth amendment's requirement that the state 
prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Contrary to the language in the jury instruction found constitutionally 
objectionable in Sandstrom (viz. "the law presumes that a person intends 
the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts"),IIU Iowa's applicable Uni-
form Jury Instruction reads: "In determining the intent of any person you 
may, but are not required to, infer that he intended the natural and proba-
516. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTION No. 215, supra note 136, reads in its entirety, as follows: 
[1) Where intent is an essential element of the offense(s) (or degree(s) of of-
fenses(s» charged, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Intent is a mental 
state, emotion, or condition of the mind with a design, resolve or determination that 
the doing of an act shall be with a certain purpose. As such, intent is seldom, if ever, 
capable of direct and positive proof. Rather, the intent, if any, may be arrived at by 
such reasonable inferences and deductions as may be drawn from the facts proved by 
the evidence, in accordance with common experience and observation. 
[2) In determining the intent of any.person you may, but are not required to, infer 
that he intended the natural and probable consequences which ordinarily follow his 
acts. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
517. 272 N.W.2d at 471. 
518. _ U.S. _, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979). 
519. _ U.S. _, 99 S. Ct. 2213 (1979). 
520. 99 S. Ct. at 2459-60. 
521. [d. at 2456 (emphasis added). 
522. [d. at 2454. 
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ble consequences which ordinarily follow his voluntary acts."OliS The differ-
ence in terminology between "the law presumes" and having a right to infer 
was considered crucial in State v. Rinehart,024 in which an instruction simi-
lar to Uniform Jury Instruction No. 215 was upheld against a Sandstrom-
type challenge. The court determined that this instruction, by its language, 
fully apprised the jury of its permissive nature and of the jury's implied 
option to reject its application. Read together with the other instructions, it 
was clearly indicated that the burden of proof remained on the state to 
prove all elemental facts of the charge and no where implied that the ele-
mental facts inferred from those proven would stand as established absent 
rebuttal by defendant. The court considered it particularly significant that 
the instruction was "couched in permissive words: 'you have a right to in-
fer.'''626 Nevertheless, the court observed that trial courts "would be pru-
dent" to include qualifying language in such instructions to expressly state 
that the jury would be free to ignore this permissive inference "even without 
rebuttal by the defendants."olle Here, however, the absence of such qualify-
ing or explanatory language was not fatal, in light of the concept of permis-
siveness of the inference being clearly conveyed in the instructions given 
when read as a whole.1I1I7 
2. Related States of Mind 
a. Intentionally. Three revised crimes expressly include a mens rea 
component of "intentionally."lIlIe The inclusion of an element of intentional 
action does not appear to be of much significance, however, in light of the 
restrictive meaning of the term "intentional" vis-a-vis the entire concept of 
general criminal intent. Indeed, with a very few exceptions, no unintended 
conduct is punishable under the Criminal Code, and thus criminally-pro-
scribed results via accident, mistake, carelessness, or absent-mindedness are 
not cognizable.629 This means that the effect of the element requiring the 
523. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 215. 
524. 283 N.W.2d 319 (Iowa 1979). The instruction in issue in Rinehart stated that jurors 
"have a right to infer that he knew the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary acts 
which ordinarily follow such act." [d. at 321. The Rinehart court held that this instruction was 
sufficiently permissive. [d. at 322. Uniform Jury Instruction No. 215 states explicitly that the 
juror is not required to so infer. See text accompanying note 590 supra. 
525. 283 N.W.2d 319, 322 (Iowa 1979). 
526. [d. at 323. 
527. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 215, is confusing in light of 
referring only to "intent" instead of either "general intent" or "specific intent." The logical 
assumption is that this is an instruction only on specific intent (in light of the reference therein 
to "with a certain purpose"). 
528. These three crimes are False Imprisonment, Criminal Mischief, and Escape. See 
IOWA CODE §§ 710.7, 716.1, 719.4 (1979), respectively. 
529. For a discussion of general criminal intent, see text accompanying notes 471-79, 
supra. 
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requisite proscribed act to have been done intentionally is merely to state 
. the obvious, viz. accidental or unintentional acts are not punishable under 
the Criminal Code irrespective of their results. 
This mens rea is not equivalent to the particularized state of mind of 
specific intent. The difference between acting intentionally and acting with 
a specific intent was spelled out definitively and accurately in State v. Wa-
terman. 1I30 The applicable state statuteliSl therein made it a crime to deface, 
defile, or cast contempt upon the United States flag. The uncontroverted 
proof showed that defendant had worn the flag as a poncho. Affirming his 
conviction, the supreme court held that such an act defaces, defiles, and 
casts contempt upon the flag, notwithstanding defendant's contention that 
" 'the Record is replete with uncontroverted testimony demonstrating that 
the defendant had no such mens rea.' "1I8S That is, defendant's very commis-
sion of the act necessarily had the effect of defacing, defiling, or casting con-
tempt upon the flag irrespective of defendant's intent or motive in inten-
tionally committing the act. Determining that flag desecration was not a 
specific intent crime, the court pointed out that the statute merely punishes 
"acts intentionally done which have the effect of desecrating our flag."lIaa 
Distinguishing specific intent from acting intentionally, the court added: 
"The person's reason for doing such an act is of no importance, except in 
those instances where the act is in the area of symbolic speech."II" Intimat-
ing that an evil intent is unnecessary, the court continued: "[E]ven if we 
assume that defendant had an honest political intent ... or that he had no 
intent at all, that element is not essential to a conviction of violating a stat-
ute which is malum prohibitum. "11811 
Under the State v. Waterman interpretation the three crimes explicitly 
requiring intentional actions without more should not be considered specific 
intent crimes. In this regard, the Uniform Jury Instructionll88 defining Crim-
inal Mischief is erroneous. Criminal Mischief is defined in the Code as 
"[a]ny damage, defacing, alteration, or destruction of tangible property is 
criminal mischief when done intentionally by one who has no right to so 
act. "1137 The mens rea element of intentional actions is delineated in the 
Uniform Jury Instructions as "[t]hat when he did so, it was with the intent 
to (damage), (deface), (alter), (destroy) the said property."I188 Under this er-
roneous instruction, the prosecution would, in effect, have to prove not only 
530. 190 N.W.2d 809, 813 (Iowa 1971). 
531. IOWA CODE § 32.1 (1971). 
532. 190 N.W.2d at 813. 
533. [d. (emphasis added). 
534. [d. (emphasis added). 
535. [d. 
536. UNll'ORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1603. 
537. IOWA CODE § 716.1 (1979) (emphasis added). 
538. [d. (emphasis added). 
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that the defendant's mischievous acts were done intentionally (as opposed 
to accidentally or carelessly) but also that these intentional acts were done 
with the specific intent to damage, deface, alter, or destroy the property af-
fected. However, like the flag desecration statute in State v. Waterman, the 
Criminal Mischief statute punishes acts intentionally done which have the 
effect of damaging property of another, and the offender's reason for doing 
such act is of no importance.1I8e Indeed, the offender's intent need not be evil 
and thus can be motivated by political protest (instead of any subjective 
desire to damage or destroy the particular property involved).II4O Contrast-
ingly, the Uniform Jury Instructions defining False Imprisonmentll41 and Es-
capell43 correctly require only that the respective act be done intentionally 
without also requiring that these intentional acts be done with specific 
purposes. 
b. Willfully. The defendant is required to have acted willfully in com-
mitting the crimes of Willful Disturbancell48 and Harassment of Public Of-
ficers and Employees.1I44 "Willfully," the Iowa Supreme Court has said, "or-
dinarily means intentionally, deliberately or knowingly, as distinguished 
from accidentally, inadvertently or carelessly."11411 This suggests that the of-
fender "must know what he is doing, must intend to act in the way pro-
scribed by the statute, anet he must have knowledge of the facts,"1148 but not 
necessarily an evil intent so long as he acted intentionally. Nor is the willful 
doing of the requisite proscribed act "the equivalent of, doing the act 'with 
the intent' to accomplish certain named results."1147 Accordingly, the of-
fender must be aware that he is disturbing a state or local governmental 
agency (for the crime of Willful Disturbance) and that he is preventing or 
attempting to prevent personnel of public agencies from performing govern-
mental duties (for the crime of Harassment of Public Officers and Employ-
ees). In other words, the offender must know of the governmental character 
of the agencies, officers, or employees as well as the disruptive or harassing 
nature of the conduct. On the other hand, the offender's specific intent in 
doing so is not ipso facto made an element of either crime. Nevertheless, 
Willful Disturbance is made a specific intent crime by additional statutory 
language (to wit, "with the purpose of disrupting ... "),1148 but there is no 
such language concerning the harassment offense. 
539. See IOWA CODE § 716.1 et. seq. (1979). 
540. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1603 (emphasis added). 
541. Id. No. 1011. 
542. Id. No. 1907. 
543. IOWA CODE § 718.3 (1979). 
544. Id. § 718.4. 
545. State v. Wallace, 259 Iowa 765, 773, 145 N.W.2d 615, 620 (1966) (emphasis added). 
Accord State v. Dunn, 199 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Iowa 1972). 
546. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 31(4) at 113 (1961) (footnotes omitted). 
547. Id. at 114 (footnotes omitted). 
548. IOWA CODE § 718.3 (1979). 
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c. . Maliciously. Malice is defined in the Uniform Jury Instructions as 
"a state of mind which leads one to intentionally do a wrongful act . . . 
which is done out of actual spite, hatred, ill will, or with an evil, wicked or 
unlawful purpose, knowing that the act is without just cause or excuse."Me 
Malice may be either expressed or implied (inferrable from defendant's 
conduct). 
This definition appears misplaced to the extent that it refers to an act 
being done out of "actual spite, hatred, [or] ill will."550 Malice, at least as it 
pertained to the pre-revised offense of Arson,m has been interpreted as not 
requiring any ill will, personal hostility, or revengeful motive on the part of 
the defendant towards the owner or possessor of the property damaged. m 
Rather, the Iowa Supreme Court determined that maliciously "denotes that 
malice which characterizes all acts done with an evil disposition, a wrong 
and unlawful motive or purpose; that state of mind which 'actuates conduct 
injurious to other without lawful reason, cause, or excuse."558 Continuing, 
the court said: "the intentional doing of a 'wrongful act,' without justifica-
tion or lawful excuse, will permit an inference of a wicked state of mind, i.e., 
legal malice, as opposed to actual malice."5M Similarly, malice in the context 
of murder, means "that condition of mind which prompts one to commit a 
wrongful act intentionally, absent legal justification or excuse."5511 
One of the more comprehensive d.efinitions of the ordinary legal concept 
of malice consists of two ingredients, in one commentator's analysis: "On the 
positive side 'malice' requires an intent to cause the very harm that results 
or some harm of the same general nature, or an act done in wanton and 
wilful disregard of the plain and strong likelihood that some such harm will 
result. And on the negative side it requires the absence of any circumstance 
of justification, excuse or recognized mitigation."558 He declares that "the 
state of mind required for malice, when less than an actual intent to cause 
the actus reus of the crime in question includes a vicious or callous disre-
gard of the likelihood of such harm resulting from what is being done; and it 
is this viciousness or callousness which distinguishes malice from criminal 
negligence."557 He claims that the customary legal meaning of "malice" in 
the crime of malicious mischief as requiring "actual ill-will or resentment 
toward [the] owner or possessor" is "quite illogical and resulted from a 
faulty analysis of the legal meaning of the word 'malice.' "5118 The confusion, 
549. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 216. 
550. [d. 
551. See IOWA CODE § 707.3 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
552. State v. Dunn, 199 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1972). 
553. 199 N.W.2d at 107. 
554. [d. 
555. State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Iowa 1972). 
556. R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 334. 
557. [d. at 769. 
558. [d. at 334. 
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he concludes has derived from assuming that "malice, as a jural concept, 
must involve intent plus some matter of aggravation whereas, in truth, the 
requirement is fully satisfied by intent minus any matter of exculpation or 
mitigation."GG9 In other words, malice "requires no more than the intentional 
doing of the actus reus in the absence of any circumstance of exculpation or 
recognized mitigation."1I6o In the final analysis, the jural concept of malice is 
clear when these two points are kept in mind: "[f]irst, that in the absence of 
justification, excuse or recognized mitigation, it is malicious to intend to do 
what constitutes the actus reus of the crime in question; second, that a state 
of mind may be malicious even without an actual intent to bring out such a 
result. "1161 
The foregoing analysis is borne out in terms of the Iowa law of malice, 
as already partially discussed.1I6s In addition, the state of mind of malice 
applies only to one or two crimes in the entire Iowa Criminal Code. In one, 
Injury to Animals,1I68 it would be illogical to require that the requisite mali-
cious actions toward the owner of an animal be done out of actual ill will or 
resentment or for revenge in light of there being no additional requirement 
that the offender even know the identity of the owner of the animal. In-
stead, the offender merely must act intentionally in callous disregard of the 
property rights of another person, any person. Malice may also be an ele-
ment of the new crime of Malicious Prosecution,1I64 although malice is not 
enumerated as an element in the statute.1I611 Even if malice is an element of 
this crime, nevertheless malice does not denote a requirement of ill will, re-
sentment, or revenge. Instead, Malicious Prosecution requires intenti9nal 
action without justification. An example would be a woman who falsely cries 
rape (now sexual abuse) to cover up her indiscretion. If a cover-up was her 
only motive, then the crime would still be complete although totally devoid 
of any evidence of ill will, resentment, or revenge toward her sex "partner." 
d. Purposely. The particularized mental state of purposely appears to 
be used in the new Criminal Code synonymously with specific intent.- No 
559. [d. at 767. 
560. [d. 
561. [d. at 766. 
562. See text accompanying notes 551-55, supra. 
563. See IOWA CODE § 717.1 (1979). 
564. See IOWA CODE § 720.6 (1979) and text accompanying notes 1382-83, infra. 
565. See text accompanying notes 1382-83, infra. 
566. "Purposely" replaces specific intent altogether as the applicable state of mind in 
Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a) (T.O.D. 1962). "Purposely" is defined therein as: 
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when: 
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his 
conscious object to engage such a result; and 
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the exis-
tence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. 
Herbert Wechsler has noted: 
The discrimination between acting purposely and knowingly is very narrow. Knowl-
HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 306 1979-1980
306 Drake Law Review [Vol. 29 
logical reason for using the cumbersome phrase "for the purpose of' in the 
definition of a few crimesll87 is apparent, instead of the usual specific intent 
language "with the intent to. "1188 
e. Voluntarily. One crime includes the related mens rea component of 
voluntariness. The crime of Permitting a Prisoner to Escapell89 is committed 
by any jailer or other public officer or employee who "voluntarily permits, 
aids or abets in the escape or attempted escape of any person in cus-
tody .... "1170 So used, "voluntarily" appears synonymous with "intention-
ally."1i7l However, use of the special term "voluntarily" makes it explicit that 
the defendant must have acted volitionally and with a criminal intent, 
rather than having been coerced (e.g., captured by a prisoner and forced to 
open the cellblock gate). Otherwise, a "captive" guard would act intention-
ally by meaning to do so, as opposed to accidentally or carelessly, even 
though he did so without criminal intent. 
3. Knowingly 
Several crimes require as an element a particularized mental state relat-
ing to specific knowledgell711 of some fact.1i78 This is separate and apart from 
edge that the requisite external, attendant circumstances exist is a common element 
in both conceptions. But action is not deemed purposive with respect to the nature or 
results of an actor's conduct unless, as the Code puts it, 'it was his conscious object to 
engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result'. Though acting knowingly 
suffices to establish liability for most offences, there are situations where our law has 
deemed it proper to require purpose; for example, treason and crimes of subversive 
speech, solicitation, complicity, attempts, conspiracy, and probably obtaining prop-
erty by false pretenses. The Code formulations on these subjects so provide. More-
over, in determining the gravity of crimes for purposes of sentence, it is often useful 
to lay stress on purpose. This is frequently the case under the older law as well as in 
the Code. 
H. WECHSLER, The Model Penal Code and the Codification of American Law, 419, 436. 
567. See IOWA CODE §§ 711.4 (Extortion), 718.1 (Insurrection), 718.3 (Willful Distur-
bance), and 722.4 (Bribery of Elector) (1979). 
568. Analyzing trends in criminal code revision, Herbert Wechsler has noted: 
"Many of the codes and drafts employ some form of the term 'intent' in preference to 
'purpose', defining it, however, to mean 'conscious object.' The danger of perpetrating 
the obscurities and ambiguities of old judicial exploitations of intention, often result-
ing in a concept indistinguishable from recklessness or negligence, is thus eliminated 
by the definition." 
H. WECHSLER, The Model Penal Code and the Codification of American Criminal Law, in 419, 
436 n. 45. 
569. IOWA CODE § 719.5 (1979). 
570. [d. (emphasis added). 
571. For a discussion of "intentionally" as a type of mens rea, see text accompanying 
notes 528-42, supra. 
572. Actual, as opposed to imputed, knowledge is required for all but one of these crimes 
with a scienter requirement. In contrast, the crime of leasing Premises for Prostitution is com-
plete upon the offender knowing or having reason to know that his premises are being used for 
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whether a defendant acted intentionally or deliberately, as well as to 
whether a defendant intended any specific result from the commission of his 
acts. 
The crucial distinction between acting willfully (or intentionally) and 
knowingly was made in State v. Perry.m In Perry, the defendant was 
charged with unlawfully and willfully resisting an officer in serving process, 
although the applicable criminal statute provided that "if any person know-
ingly and willfully resist or oppose any officer .... "11711 Reversing the convic-
tion, the supreme court first said that the word "unlawfully" added nothing 
to the elements of proof, and that "[i]t did not supply the omission of 
'knowingly.' "1178 The court continued: "An act may be knowingly done, and 
yet be unlawful, or it may be unlawful though done in ignorance."1177 Here, 
the prosecution had to prove that defendant not only acted willfully but also 
that he so acted "with knowledge that the person resisted or opposed was an 
officer."1178 Declaring that "knowingly" and "willfully" are not synonymous, 
the court said: 
To willfully do an act implies that it be done by design or with set pur-
pose. One might purposely do an act which would have the effect of im-
peding an officer in the performance of his duties, in entire ignorance of 
the capacity in which such officer was acting. The obstruction denounced 
is that, not only designedly or purposely interposed, but with knowledge 
that the person hindered was at the time an officer serving or attempting 
to serve . . . process. II" 
Nevertheless, this scienter requirement does not go to knowledge of the un-
lawfulness of the act.1I80 Thus, the defendant merely needed to know that 
the person he resisted was an officer and not that resisting an officer was 
illegal. 
The difference between specific intent and specific knowledge'81 was 
prostitution. See IOWA CODE § 725.4 (1979). Concerning a permissible inference of knowledge, 
see test accompanying notes 592-93, infra. 
573. "Knowing facts that would cause a reasonable man to know the danger is equivalent 
to knowing the danger. Ordinarily one is not guilty of a crime unless he is aware of the exis-
tence of all those facts which make his conduct criminal. Without guilty knowledge criminal 
intent cannot exist." 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 31(3) (1961). See also Comment, Willful Blind-
ness as a Substitute for Criminal Knowledge, 63 IOWA L. REV. 466 (1977). 
574. 109 Iowa 353, 80 N.W. 401 (1899). 
575. [d. (emphasis added). 
576. [d. at 354. 
577. [d. 
578. [d. 
579. [d. 
580. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 31(3) (1961). 
581. The particularized mens rea requirement of one crime, Arson, can be satisfied alter-
natively by specific intent to damage property or knowledge that property probably will be 
damaged. See IOWA CODE § 712.1 (1979). 
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pointed out in an Arizona case.1i82 The relevant statute made an assault and 
battery aggravated when the person committing the offense knows or has 
reason to know that" the victim is a police officer.G8S Rejecting the defen-
dant's contention that this was a specific intent crime, the appellate court 
determined that this was a general intent crime. Thus, the prosecution 
merely had to prove that the defendant committed an assault, that the per-
son assaulted was a police officer, and that the defendant knew or should 
have known that his victim was a police officer. The latter element satisfies 
the knowledge requirement. On the other hand, since this is not a specific 
intent crime, there is no requirement to prove the defendant's purpose in 
assaulting a police officer (e.g., to obstruct him in the performance of his 
duties). Recognizing that "[m]ere omission with knowledge of the facts is 
not enough, nor is an act willful which is merely careless or negligent or 
inadvertent,"084 the court determined that the defendant had acted inten-
tionally and thus had the requisite general criminal intent together with the 
requisite specific knowledge. 
Concerning the relationship of specific intent and knowledge, the court 
said that "lack of knowledge may disprove the existence of specific in-
tent."080 For example, "one cannot intend to steal property which he be-
lieves to be his own however careless he may have been in coming to that 
belief. "086 
Judicial interpretation of the pre-revised statute prohibiting carrying of 
concealed weapons is an example of a statute being read as requiring that 
the prohibited act be done intentionally and that defendant have knowledge 
of the weapon's real character, even though neither of these two require-
ments is expressly included as an element. In State v. Williams,087 the su-
preme court held that although "the object of carrying a concealed weapon 
is entirely immaterial" as bearing on defendant's guilt, nevertheless "[t]o be 
guilty of the offense one must have consciously or intentionally have carried 
the weapon."088 Defendant's theory of the case was that he had mistakenly 
taken another person's coat and thus was unaware of the presence of the 
weapon in the pocket of the coat he was wearing. The trial court erred in 
refusing to instruct that the jury must find that defendant knew a weapon 
was in his coat pocket. Similarly, the court noted in State v. Krana,089 a 
prosecution for going armed in a vehicle, that "while specific intent is not an 
element of this crime, the accused must be aware of the presence of the 
582. State v. Jamison, 110 Ariz. 245,517 P.2d 1241 (1974). 
583. Id. 
584. 110 Ariz. at _,517 P.2d at 1244. 
585. Id. 
586. Id. 
587. 184 Iowa 1070, 169 N.W.371 (1918). 
588. Id. at 1073, 169 N.W. at 372. 
589. 246 N.W.2d 293 (Iowa 1976). 
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gun."1190 
Speeding is an example of an offense which has been interpreted lie! to 
not require knowledge on the part of the driver of the automobile. This 
means that a speeding motorist is guilty irrespective of being unaware of his 
vehicle's speed or of the speed limit. 
Knowledge ordinarily is determined from the defendant's words and 
conduct as well as "reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom in 
accordance with common experience and observation."lIel Under Uniform 
Jury Instruction No. 230, the requisite knowledge of the defendant (i.e., a 
conscious awareness of the prescribed fact) can be inferredlle8 by the jury as 
"the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary acts which ordina-
rily follow such acts." 
4. Recklessly 
The statutory definition of recklessnessll" is fairly standard, viz. "a wil-
ful or wanton disregard for the safety of others."lIeli Suprisingly, only two 
crimes expressly have a mens rea comprised of recklessness: Reckless Use of 
Fire or Explosivesllee .and Abandonment of a Dependent Personlltl? (which 
can be committed either knowingly or recklessly). An even higher standard 
of criminal culpability seemingly would be required for one type of Involun-
tary Manslaughterll9s based upon "the commission of an act in a manner 
likely to cause death or serious injury." However, the supreme court has 
interpreted this statutory definition as being equated with recklessness. II" 
590. Id. at 295. 
591. City of Des Moines v. Davis, 214 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1974). 
592. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 230. 
593. Concerning the constitutionality of a similar permissive inference on intent, see text 
accompanying notes 511-27, supra. 
594. IOWA CODE § 702.16 (1979). 
595. See State v. Kernes, 262 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Iowa 1978). ReckleBBneBB as defined in 
Uniform Jury Instruction No. 217, as follows, amplifies the statutory definitional clause and the 
prevailing case law: 
A person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he willfully or wantonly disregards the 
safety of persons or property. It is more than a lack of reasonable care which may 
cause unintentional injury. Rather, reckleBBness is conduct, which is consciously done 
with willfull or wanton disregard of the consequences, when a person knows or should 
know a risk of harm to another or property is created. 
Though recklessness is willful, that is intentional, it is not intentional in the sense 
that harm is intended to result. It is, however, conduct which shows that the person 
knew or should have known of a danger and proceeded without any care or concern 
for the results of his actions. 
596. See IOWA CODE § 712.5 (1979) and text accompanying notes 911-17 infra. 
597. See id. § 726.3. 
598. See id. § 707.5(2). 
599. State v. Conner, 292 N.W.2d 682, 684 (Iowa 1980). In addition, the court held that 
recklessness must be read into the other type of Involuntary Manslaughter, defined in IOWA 
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The court, noting that "the words 'in a manner likely to cause death or seri-
ous injury' implies an awareness of the risk or at least that the accused 
should have been aware of the risk," said that "[i]t is this subjective aware-
ness of the risk, although usually determined objectively, that distinguishes 
civil negligence, which requires only objective awareness of the risk from 
criminal negligence .... "800 Mere criminal negligence by itself is not a basis 
for criminal liability for true crimes under the new Iowa Criminal Code.801 
C. Venue 
Venue no longer is jurisdictional in Iowa, under Code § 803.2 (and its 
forerunner802 since July 1, 1975). Prior to 1975,808 setting of venue (in the 
particular county where the crime was committed) was an essential element 
in proving (by direct or circumstantial evidence) any crime charged. Venue 
had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,80. similar to proof of the sub-
stantive elements of the crime (and convictions have been reversed for in-
sufficient evidence of venue).801 Now, however, venue is merely made the 
place of trial, with the prosecutor needing to prove only the State's jurisdic-
tion of the matter rather than also proving the particular county in Iowa in 
which the criminal activity occurred. Any objection defendant has to the 
place of trial must be made prior to trial, or it is waived.8°S Waiver for un-
timeliness is automatic irrespective of when defendant first discovers venue 
error.80? A successful objection, however, does not force a prosecutor to 
prove venue as an element of the crime. Rather, it merely forces relocation 
of the trial. 
Recently the Iowa Supreme Court, in State v. Allen, expressly held that 
venue is no longer an element of the crime.80s Several recent cases had im-
plied as much, but in Allen the supreme court decisively settled the issue. In 
CODE § 707.5(1), which punishes unintentional killings during the commission of a public of-
fense. The court thus refused to recognize the unlawful act doctrine as the sole mens rea for 
involuntary manslaughter, at least in vehicular homicide cases. 
600. [d. 
601. But see State v. Bahl, 242 N.W.2d 298, 301 (Iowa 1976): "At least to a point, the 
legislature could choose to make negligence the basis of a crime." 
602. IOWA CODE § 753.2 (1971) (repealed 1975). 
603. IOWA CODE § 753.2 (1971) (repealed 1975) provided: "The local jurisdiction of the 
district court is of offenses committed within the county in which it is held, and of such other 
cases as are or may be provided by law." (emphasis added). 
604. State v. Evely, 228 N.W.2d 196 (Iowa 1975). See generally Annot., Necessity of Prov-
ing Venue or Territorial Jurisdiction of Criminal Offense Beyond Reasonable Doubt, 67 
A.L.R.3d 988 (1975). 
605. See State v. Durhant, 196 N.W.2d 428 (Iowa 1972). 
606 .. State v. Donnelly, 242 N.W.2d 295 (Iowa 1976). 
607. [d. In this case, the error in venue was discovered during the State's case-in-chief. 
608. State v. Allen, 293 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Iowa 1980). 
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State v. Donneliy,809 the supreme court took note of the change in statutory 
language and the familiar legislative rule of statutory construction that a 
legislative amendment implies legislative intent for a substantive change in 
the original statute. Subsequently, the court observed in State v. Hanna810 
that its recent cases "make it clear venue objections may not be raised ex-
cept by motion prior to trial" and thus that "any objection to venue is 
waived unless raised before trial."611 
The change in statutory language makes clear that venue no longer is 
an element. The pre-1975 venue statute read: "The local jurisdiction of the 
district court is of offenses committed within the county .... "811 The word 
"jurisdiction" was the basis for venue being required to be proved as part of 
the prosecution's case. The current provision reads: "Criminal actions shall 
be tried in the county in which the crime is committed, except as otherwise 
provided by law. All objections to place of trial are waived by a defendant 
unless the defendant objects thereto prior to trial."e18 Thus, the trial court's 
jurisdiction is no longer a matter of proof at trial. Rather, the place of trial 
is to be decided on a pretrial motion/objection, as stated in Allen.814 Addi-
tionally, the state has the burden of proving venue by a preponderance of 
the evidence.e1G 
Even a successful objection to place of trial does not cause the prosecu-
tion to prove venue at trial, thus rendering the county as the situs of the 
crime jurisdictional. A trial court's jurisdiction cannot be left to the parties' 
agreements or be conditioned upon whether or not one party objects (to the 
place of trial) and is successful. 818 
The unequivocal statement by the supreme court in Allen should 
change the fact that some trial judges are continuing to include venue in 
their jury instructions.8l1 Fortunately, the Iowa State Bar Association's up-
609. [d. Accord State v. Bahl, 242 N.W.2d 298, 303 (Iowa 1976): "Under our holding in 
Donnelly it is immaterial whether the crash occurred in the southern part or northern part of 
Lee County." See Trimble v. State, 2 Greene 404 (1850) (division of Lee County into two sepa-
rate judicial areas upheld, with exclusive jurisdiction of the two areas). 
610. 277 N.W.2d 605 (Iowa 1979). 
611. [d. at 608. 
612. See IOWA CODE § 753.2 (1971) (repealed 1975) (emphasis added). 
613. IOWA CODE § 803.2 (1979) (emphasis added). 
614. "[TJhe defendant must secure a ruling by the trial court before the trial after the 
parties have had an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing or he waives the issue of improper 
venue. Absent an adverse ruling by the trial court, he may not seek appellate review of the 
issue." 293 N.W.2d at 18. The court's newly expressed limit for rulings on venue objections only 
applies to cases where the objection is raised after June 18, 1980. [d. at 19. 
615. [d. at 20. 
616. See State v. Fagan, 190 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 1971) (parties could not stipulate to bench 
trial on indictable offense under pre-revised law). 
617. These alternative ways of "proving" venue other than by direct evidence have been 
approved. State v. Brooks, 222 Iowa 651,269 N.W. 875 (1936) (venue established by inference); 
State v. Anderson, 209 Iowa 510, 228 N.W. 353 (1929) (affirming judicial discretion in permit-
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dated Uniform Jury InstructionsG18 do not include venue as an element. 
D. Lesser Included Offenses 
Generally, the new Criminal Code does not depart from the pre-revised 
law dealing with lesser included offenses,GIB the test in section 701.9 continu-
ing to be whether one offense is "necessarily included in another public of-
fense."G20 The statute bars conviction of a necessarily included offense upon 
conviction of a greater offense and permits a trial court to enter judgment of 
guilty of the greater offense in those cases where the jury may return a ver-
dict of guilty on both a lesser included offense and the greater offense. 
Section 701.9 must be read together with several rules found in the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure which deal with lesser included offenses. Rule 
6(1) authorizes prosecution by a single charging paper of each of the sepa-
rate crimes arising "out of the same transaction or occurrence."8lI1 The rule 
incorporates the substance of a former Code section making it unnecessary 
to charge lesser included offenses, it being sufficient to charge the greater 
offense only.GU Rule 6(2) merely restates, in rule form, the essence of section 
701.9, barring conviction of both the offense charged and an included 
offense. 
The Supreme Court has held in State v. Rouse818 that Rule 6(3) does 
not change the rule of former Iowa cases which required a request for an 
included offense instruction. Absent such request, the prior cases had held 
that any error in a failure of a trial court to give a lesser offense instruction 
was waived.G24 The new rule, in its entirety provides: 
In cases where the public offense charged may include some lesser of-
fense it is the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury, not only as to 
the public offense charged but as to all lesser offenses of which the ac-
cused might be found guilty under the indictment and upon the evidence 
adduced, even though such instructions have not been requested.GS& 
The Rule requires a trial court, in every case to determine, as a matter 
of law, whether the offense charged carries with it any lesser included of-
ting prosecution to reopen record to establish proof of venue); State v. Conley, 176 N.W.2d 213 
(Iowa 1970) (trial court properly took judicial notice of venue under circumstances of case). 
618. See note 136 supra. 
619. For an excellent and exhaustive critical analysis of the pre· revised standard, see 
Note, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine in Iowa: The Gordian Knot Untied, 59 IOWA L. 
REV. 684 (1974). 
620. See generally, J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 14; J. ROEHRICK, THE NEW 
IOWA CRIMINAL CODE: A COMPARISON, 513 (1978). 
621. IOWA R. CRIM. P. 6(1) (1979). 
622. See IOWA CODE § 773.29 (1975) (repealed 1978). 
623. State v. Rouse, 290 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1980). 
624. See State v. Veverka, 271 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1978). 
625. IOWA R. CRIM. P. 6(3) (1979). 
HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 313 1979-1980
1979-80] Iowa Criminal Code 313 
fenses. If the trial court determines that lesser included offenses are present 
under the statutory elements and evidence, then such offense must be sub-
mitted to the jury notwithstanding a failure of counsel to request such in-
structions. However, as noted in Rouse, this duty of the court does not re-
lieve counsel "of the responsibility of urging proper objection or 
exception. "828 
An issue created by Rule 6(3) was whether the failure of a trial court to 
give a lesser included offense instruction sua sponte would automatically 
result in a reversal of a conviction of a greater offense. Prior caselaw had 
indicated that in at least two situations a reversal would not be required. In 
those cases in which the trial court instructs on a greater offense as well as a 
lesser included offense and the defendant is convicted of the greater offense, 
there is no reversible error in a failure to instruct on additional lesser in-
cluded offenses.827 The rationale of the cases so holding, being based upon 
the lack of prejudice to a defendant under such circumstances, would seem-
ingly apply to cases which raise the issue under Rule 6(3). Moreover, in 
those cases in which the defendant objects to the submission of a lesser in-
cluded offense instruction for strategic or tactical reasons and the trial court 
does not submit the instruction, the defendant should not be entitled to a 
reversal on appeal on the grounds that Rule 6(3) required jury submission 
over defendant's objection.828 In Rouse, the Supreme Court refused to con-
sider defendant's appellate claim that a lesser included offense instruction 
should have been given, in light of defense counsel's specific waiver by stat-
ing he had no objections to the proferred instructions and by his failure to 
submit an instruction on the lesser included offense, coupled with his failure 
to object to the trial court's failure to give such an instruction.82D 
The question is less easily resolved in those cases where the trial court 
does not instruct on a lesser included offense sua sponte, either through 
inadvertence or based upon a determination that there are no lesser in-
cluded offenses of the offense for which the defendant is charged. Failure to 
so instruct in view of an appellate court's determination that, as a matter of 
law, a lesser included offense should have been submitted, seemingly would 
constitute reversible error in view of the Rule's apparently mandatory lan-
guage. However, the Supreme Court in Rouse rejected such a strict applica-
tion of the Rule, the implication being that the duty under Rule 6(3) is of a 
directory, instead of a mandatory, nature. A contrary ruling would be unfor-
tunate in view of the ramifications of such a position. If so applied, the Rule 
would permit a defendant an opportunity to simply stand mute and observe 
reversible error creep into the record, take a chance on a jury acquittal on 
the offense charged, with the knowledge that, if convicted, the conviction 
626. 290 N.W.2d at 914. 
627. State v. Pilcher. 171 N. W.2d 251 (Iowa 1969). 
628. State v. Veverka. 271 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1978). 
629. 290 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1980). 
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will be reversed on appeal. Otherwise, the "plain error" doctrine which has 
been rejected outright recently by the Iowa Supreme Court880 would have 
this one type of limited application (to the exclusion of all others). 
The practical solution on the trial court level would be for the judge to 
specifically ask the defense attorney if there are any lesser included offenses 
to be instructed upon. Surely, a negative (albeit mistaken) response would 
operate as a waiver. Moreover, an astute prosecutor should prompt such a 
discussion "to make the record." 
In State v. Holmes,881 the supreme court has already applied the pre-
revised standards for determining what constitutes a lesser included offense 
under the new Criminal Code. Thus, the two-test standard for determining 
whether one offense is "necessarily included" in the other "remains as 
before,"8s2 as formulated in State v. Stewart688 and State v. Stergion.884 The 
first step "focuses upon the legal or element test,"8811 with the lesser offense 
being "an elementary part of the greater offense."888 The second step "re-
quires an ad hoc factual determination,"887 that is, "a factual basis in the 
record for submitting the included offense to the jury."688 
1. Same Species Requisite 
There is another apparent limiting factor which is not expressly in-
cluded in the two-step standard but which nevertheless is an integral part of 
lesser included offense analysis, if not the starting point.88B It was pointed 
out in Stewart840 that lesser included offenses are thought to be of "the 
same nature or same species"641 as the greater offense(s). The court went on 
in Stewart to find that because the offenses of reckless driving and vehicu-
lar-type manslaughter were not "the same in law or in fact,"641 then reckless 
driving was not a lesser included offense of vehicular-type manslaughter via 
630. State v. Rinehart, 283 N.W.2d 319 (Iowa 1979). 
631. 276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979). 
632. State v. Sanders, 280 N.W.2d 375, 377 (Iowa 1979). 
633. 223 N.W.2d 250 (Iowa 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 902 (1975). 
634. 248 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1976). 
635. . [d. at 912. 
636. State v. Redmon, 244 N.W.2d 792, 796 (Iowa 1976). 
637. State v. Stergion, 248 N.W.2d 911, 912 (Iowa 1976). 
638. State v. Redmon, 244 N.W.2d 792, 796 (Iowa 1976). 
639. See State v. Furnald, 263 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1978), in which the court stated: 
Certain principles are applied to determine whether one crime is a lesser in-
cluded offense in another. We examine the two crimes to determine if they are of the 
same nature, or some species! (citation omitted). Narrowing the focus to determine 
whether one offense is 'necessarily included' within another, we apply two tests ... 
[d. at 752 (emphasis added). 
640. State v. Stewart, 223 N.W.2d 250 (Iowa 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 902 (1975). 
641. [d. at 251. 
642. [d. at 253. 
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reckless driving.648 Subsequently, the court was convinced in State u. 
Furnald644 that Iowa's criminal trespass crime is not "of the same nature or 
same species"64& as the breaking and entering statute, and thus the former 
was not a lesser included offense of the latter. The court based its conclu-
sion on what it considered "a logical inference" that the trespassing statute 
initially was enacted "at least in part to cope with the destructive fallout of 
the demonstrations and protests which commenced in the 1960's. "648 The 
fact remains, however, that the gravamen of both offenses is unlawful entry 
onto another's property. It is the purpose of the unlawful entry that differ-
entiates burglary from trespass. In order for an unlawful entry into the lim-
ited prescribed types of property (i.e., either an occupied structure or an 
enclosed space) to constitute Burglary, there must be an accompanying spe-
cific intent to commit either a felony, an assault, or a theft. An unlawful 
entry onto the same property for the mere purpose of socio-political protest, 
on the other hand, would merely constitute the much less severe offense of 
Trespass. 
2. Legal Test 
Under the legal or elemental test, the lesser offense "must be composed 
solely of some but not all elements of the greater crime. "647 That is, the 
lesser crime "must not require any additional element which is not needed 
to constitute the greater crime. "648 The lesser offense thus is "necessarily 
included within the greater."84& 
Put differently, to be "necessarily included in the greater offense," the 
lesser offense "must be such that it is impossible to commit the greater 
without having committed the lesser. "6&0 On the other hand, the court has 
noted that "[i]t is quite possible to commit one crime in the act of commit-
ting another and yet not have it be an included offense. "6&1 This is because 
under Iowa's two-step test for lesser included offenses the less serious crime 
is not included if its elements are not entirely included as a part of the 
elements of the major offense.6112 
In State u. Inger,6&3 the supreme court held that the provision in section 
643. [d. 
644. 263 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1978). 
645. [d. at 754. 
646. [d. 
647. State v. Holmes, 276 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Iowa 1979), quoting State v. Stergion, 248 
N.W.2d 911, 912 (Iowa 1976). 
648. [d. 
649. State v. Stewart, 223 N.W.2d 250, 252 (Iowa 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.s. 902 (1975). 
650. State v. Redmon, 244 N.W.2d 792, 801 (Iowa 1976), quoting approvingly State v. 
Leeman, 291 A.2d 709, 710-11 (Me. 1972). 
651. State v. Furnaid, 263 N.W.2d 751, 753 (Iowa 1978). 
652. [d. at 754. 
653. 292 N.W.2d 119 (Iowa 1980). 
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707.4 of the Code that Voluntary Manslaughter "is an included offense"GM 
in a murder prosecution ipso facto satisfies the legal test. "However, for the 
court to properly give a voluntary manslaughter instruction over specific ob-
jection by a party, there must also exist in the record a factual basis for such 
an instruction,"GOO the court added.GOG 
a. Pleadings. In analyzing the first or legal test, "the statutes and not 
the accusatory pleading or charge must establish the essential elements of 
the offense charged."GO'7 That is, the supreme court has held in State v. Red-
manGOS that "the statutory or legal element test should be the sole approach 
in determining what are the elements of the offense charged and that the 
language of the information or indictment charging the crime has no bearing 
on that analysis."so9 
b. Applications of the Legal Test in Robbery Prosecutions. Two deci-
sions under the new Criminal Code have taken a restrictive view of lesser 
included offenses on a charge of Robbery (in either degree). In both cases, 
the supreme court reaffirmed the pre-revised two-step legal elements and 
factual basis test and held that the legal elements test was not met. 
(1) Theft. In State v. Holmes,sso the supreme court held that Theft is 
not a lesser included offense of the revised crime of Robbery, even though 
the pre-revised crime of Larceny's1 (or Larceny from a Person)881 was a 
lesser included offense of the pre-revised crime of Robbery.888 The change 
resulted from the revised definition of Robbery not requiring a taking (un-
like under the pre-revised law).s" Consequently, under the new Criminal 
Code, each of these offenses requires an additional element. That is, Theft 
requires a taking while Robbery does not, and Robbery requires either an 
assault or certain threats while Theft does not. 
This change is unfortunate, since it will or can cause an all-or-nothing 
approach in a Robbery prosecution in which the evidence of the requisite 
assault is slim but the evidence of a taking is solid.880 Under the pre-revised 
654. [d. at 121 (emphasis added). 
655. 292 N.W.2d at 122. 
656. A similar provision makes Involuntary Manslaughter a lesser included offense of 
Murder in either degree and of Voluntary Manslaughter. See IOWA CODE § 707.5 (1979). Com-
pare id. § 714.7 (Operation Vehicle Without Owner's Consent), which states: "A violation of 
this section may be proved as a lesser included offense on an indictment or information charg-
ing theft." [d. (emphasis added). 
657. State v. Redmon, 244 N.W.2d 792, 801 (Iowa 1976). 
658. 244 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1976). 
659. [d. at 801. 
660. 276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979). 
661. See IOWA CODE § 709.1 (1975) (repealed 1978). 
662. [d., § 709.6. 
663. See State v. Fonza, 254 Iowa 630, 634, 118 N.W.2d 548, 551 (1962). 
664. See text accompanying notes 1302-36, supra. 
665. This differential in the quantum of proof as to the various essential elements of the 
pre-revised offense of Robbery was discussed in State u. Taylor, 140 Iowa 470, 474, 118 N.W. 
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law,666 the lesser included offense of Larceny from a Person was appropriate 
for this situation (e.g., in a purse snatching not involving a protracted strug-
gle).867 The public interest is not served by an all-or-nothing verdict which 
will result in either an over-conviction for a non-violent act of Theft or an 
acquittal of a thief charged with Robbery. Complicating this unfortunate 
situation further is the fact that the prosecutor is in complete control. If he 
suspects that he has a weak case of a violent taking, he can follow Professor 
Yeager's advice668 and charge the defendant in two counts, one for Robbery 
and the other for Theft. This dual approach covers the prosecution on both 
fronts, while the defense, of course, must sit passively while the prosecution 
selects its charging options.8611 Under such a dual approach, presumably the 
jury would be instructed to consider the count on Robbery first and to not 
consider Theft at all if a guilty verdict is found on the Robbery count. Oth-
erwise, there could be the spectacle of a defendant being convicted of both 
Robbery and Theft for the same taking. Because Theft is not a lesser in-
cluded offense of Robbery, it is a distinct possibility that double jeopardy 
would not preclude both convictions870 however, a sense of justice certainly 
would. Moreover, a defendant acquitted of Robbery arguably could face a 
second prosecution (for Theft), in light of Theft not being a lesser included 
offense.671 Again, a sense of justice should prevent this, whether the Consti-
747. 748 (1908): 
If there was a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors as to the element of force 
and violence. it was their duty to find the deCendant guilty of no greater offense than 
larceny from the person. If there was a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors 
under the evidence as to whether the watch was taken from the person of the prose· 
cuting witness. it was their duty to find the defendant guilty of no greater offense 
than larceny. Granting that the evidence of the prosecuting witness was sufficient. if 
believed. to warrant the jury in finding the element of force and violence. the jury was 
not bound to so find. The jury might properly hesitate to find such fact. because of 
the indefinite and unsatisfactory character of the evidence as to that particular ques-
tion. In other words. the evidence in proof of the element of force and violence was 
not so strong as the evidence of the larceny or of larceny from the person. It follows 
that the jury could consistently have failed to find the defendant guilty of robbery. 
and yet have found him guilty of larceny. or of larceny from the person. 
666. IOWA CODE § 711.1-.3 (1975)(repealed 1978). 
667. But see State v. Carr. 43 Iowa 418. 423 (1876). which holds that "a sudden snatching 
from the hand or person of another constitutes the force and violence sufficient under our stat-
ute to constitute robbery." 
A better view was taken in People v. Patton, 389 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (Ill. 1979), which 
concluded that where an article is taken "'without any sensible or material violence to the 
person, as snatching a hat from the head or a cane or umbrella from the hand' the offense is 
theft from the person rather than robbery." 
668. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON. supra note 3. § 252. 
669. See note 1050 infra. 
670. See State v. Stewart. 223 N.W.2d 250. 253 (Iowa 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 902 
(1975). 
671. [d. 
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tution does or not. 
(2) Accessory After the Fact. In State v. Sanders,672 the supreme 
court held that Assessory After the Fact878 is not a lesser included offense of 
Robbery. The legal elements test was not met because each offense has a 
different state of mind (i.e., to prevent another's apprehension under Acces-
sory After the Fact and to commit a theft under Robbery). 
(3) Assault. Another apparent change from the pre-revised law is that 
an Assault is no longer a lesser included offense of Robbery.874 This change 
should occur in light of the statutory three-alternative definition of the ac-
tus reus of Robbery. That is, a person commits the actus reus component of 
a robbery when he does "any of the following acts ... 
1. Commits an assault upon another. 
2. Threatens another with or purposely puts another in fear of immedi-
ate serious injury. 
3. Threatens to commit immediately any forcible felony."876 
Thus, an assault is only one of three alternative ways of committing the 
actus reus component of Robbery. Although serious threats as the other two 
ways closely resemble an assault, nevertheless the law is clear that a mere 
threat, standing alone, does not constitute an assault. 
Application of the existing, lesser included offense standard clearly indi-
cates that Assault is not a lesser included offense of Robbery. In the two-
step process under that standard, the first step "requires consideration of 
the legal elements,"878 with this legal elements test being as follows: "The 
lesser offense must be composed solely of some but not all elements of the 
greater crime. The lesser crime must not require any additional element 
which is not needed to constitute the greater crime."877 
The essential fact is that the lesser crime of Assault is "not needed" to 
constitute a Robbery. That is because an assault is only one of three differ-
ent alternative ways of committing the actus reus for a Robbery. Under the 
prevailing test for a lesser included offense, as applied in State v. Stewart878 
(which was cited with approval in the new-Code case of State v. Holmes),878 
a lesser crime cannot be a lesser included offense if the greater crime does 
not require all of the elements of the lesser crime. It is irrelevant that the 
greater crime includes the lesser crime as one of its alternative ways of being 
committed. This point was most dramatically illustrated in State v. Stewart, 
672. 280 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1979). 
673. IOWA CODE § 703.3 (1979). 
674. See State v. Duffy, 124 Iowa 705, 100 N.W. 796 (1904). 
675. IOWA CODE § 711.1 (1979). 
676. State v. Holmes, 276 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Iowa 1979). 
677. Id., quoting State v. Stewart, 223 N.W.2d 250, 252 (Iowa 1974), cert. denied, 423 
U.S. 902 (1975). 
678. 223 N.W.2d 250 (Iowa 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 902 (1975). 
679. 276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979). 
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which held that reckless drivingS80 was not a lesser included offense of the 
pre-revised crime of Manslaughter.s81 So-called "vehicular" Manslaughter 
under the pre~revised law could result by operating a motor vehicle in either 
of two-ways: (1) reckless operation or (2) operation while intoxicated.s81 
Therefore, this type of Manslaughter consisted of three elements: (1) caus-
ing unlawful death of a person; (2) without malice aforethought; (3) by oper-
ation of a motor vehicle either (a) recklessly or (b) while intoxicated. Be-
cause reckless operation of a motor vehicle was not required for 
Manslaughter, the supreme court held that the lesser offense of Reckless 
Driving was not a lesser included offense.s8s Similarly, the elements of the 
revised crime of Robbery are: (1) with intent to commit theft; (2) doing any 
of these acts (a) committing an assault, or (b) threatening immediate serious 
injury, or (c) threatening immediate commission of any forcible felony; (3) 
to aid in the intended theft or to escape from the scene. 
This result is unfortunate, especially in these cases with slim evidence 
as to the defendant's intent in committing an assault. A jury could very well 
believe that the defendant committed an assault and yet be unsure as to 
whether there was an intent to steal something. This leaves the jury with 
the dilemma of turning a person loose who they are sure has committed 
Assault. Assuming that the jury will follow its instructions, legitimate con-
cern arises over the potential over-conviction for Robbery, in these circum-
stances of an all-or-nothing approach. The prosecutor, on the other hand, is 
protected from the consequences of this all-or-nothing approach, as he can 
gamble on a Robbery conviction, content with the knowledge that an acquit-
tal for Robbery would apparently not preclude him from reprosecuting for 
an Assault based upon the same transaction. After all, in State v. Stewart, 
the supreme court held that the state could prosecute for "vehicular" Man-
slaughter following an acquittal for Reckless Driving arising out of the same 
occurrence, without constituting double jeopardy. 
c. Critique. The basic all-or-nothing approach - untempered by ex-
amination of the pleadings - is unfortunate. It is hoped that the Iowa Su-
preme Court will revise its position on this inflexible approach, especially in 
light of the applications analyzed above. The problem has been exacerbated 
by significant statutory changes in the definitions of many crimes in the new 
Criminal Code (especially Robbery). 
Consideration of the pleadings would be reasonable in the Robbery-
Theft and Robbery-Assault situations. If, for example, the defendant is 
charged (in the indictment or trial information) with Robbery by taking X, 
and the evidence at trial supports an actual taking, then Theft should be 
submitted to the fact-finder as a lesser included offense. Theft obviously 
680. See IOWA CODE § 321.283 (1979). 
681. See IOWA CODE § 690.10 (1975) (repealed 1978). 
682. See IOWA CODE § 321.281 (1979). 
683. 223 N.W.2d at 253. 
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would not be submitted, if either the pleading or the trial evidence did not 
show an actual taking. This case-by-case approach would temper the poten-
tially distorted results of the all-or-nothing approach in the Robbery-Theft 
situation created in State v. Holmes. ss• 
The following procedure is suggested as a better approach. The prosecu-
tor could request a lesser included offense only i( he had given pre-trial no-
tice of such intent. Absent such notice, he would be precluded from making 
such a request at trial. Nevertheless, the defense could (in either circum-
stance) request a theory of the case instruction on the lesser included of-
fense. The court, on the other hand, should not given such an instruction 
sua sponte.SS& 
The essentially "self-contained" elemental standard is also problematic 
whether the elements of the greater nor the lesser crime are being analyzed. 
By "self-contained" it is meant that neither the greater or the lesser crime 
can be committed in any other way in order for the lesser included offense 
standard to be met. For example, as noted above, Trespass was held to not 
be a lesser included offense of Breaking and Entering in State v. Furnald688 
because " it cannot be said the elements of the 'lesser' offense are entirely 
included as a part of the elements of the major offense."SS? The rationale in 
Furnald was that only a building was included in the particular Breaking 
and Entering statute whereas the Trespass statute referred broadly to 
"property." That term obviously includes land, but unauthorized entry onto 
land by itself can never constitute Breaking and Entering. In other words, 
the situs of the unlawful entry is broader for a Trespass than for a Breaking 
or Entering (and now Burglary) - since the broad term "property" obvi-
ously includes buildings (and now "occupied structures" and "enclosed 
spaces") and more (e.g., land). 
This "entirely included" approach appears to focus on the wrong as-
pect. The broad concept of "property" in the Trespass statute vis-a-vis a 
building (or "occupied structure") in the breaking and entering (now Bur-
glary) statute does not involve a different element being required for the 
lesser offense. Rather, this means that the element of situs can be met in 
alternative ways. The three elements of the most common type688 of Bur-
glary are (1) unlawful entry; (2) onto another's property that consists of ei-
ther an "occupied structure" or an "enclosed space;" and (3) with specific 
684. 276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979). See text accompanying notes 660-71 supra. 
685. This suggested approach is a modified version of the one approved in People v. Ri-
vera, 525 P.2d 431, 433-34 (Colo. 1974) (en banc), which was noted disapprovingly in State v. 
Redmon, 244 N.W.2d 792, 800 (Iowa 1976). See also text accompanying notes 622-30, supra. 
686. 263 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1978). 
687. [d. at 754. 
688. Burglary is not limited to unlawful entry, however, as discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 967 -68 infra. This is another reason why Trespassing is not a lesser included offense 
of Burglary under the present standard, but would be irrelevant under the revised standard 
proposed in this Article. 
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intent to commit a felony, an assault, or a theft. The two elements of the 
most common type of TresspassG89 are (1) unlawful entry; (2) onto another's 
"property" of any kind. The fact that the lesser crime can be committed on 
different types of property than the greater crime can should not have legal 
significance. The crux of the. matter is that the issue will never come up 
unless either an "occupied structure" or an "enclosed space" was unlawfully 
entered, since otherwise there would be no Burglary charge. However, in a 
Burglary prosecution, a lesser included offense instruction on Trespass 
should always be given. Under the evidence of the case, the case consists of 
an unlawful entry into another's "occupied structure" or "occupied space" 
- with or without a specific intent to commit a felony, as assault, or a theft. 
Obviously, defendant could be convicted of Trespassing if only the first two 
elements are present. So why shouldn't Trespassing be a lesser included of-
fense of Burglary? Otherwise, there remains the possibility of the all-or-
nothing and double prosecution spectacles that were discussed above in rela-
tion to Robbery and Theft.G80 
Approaching it from the opposite direction, the prevailing lesser in-
cluded offense standard holds in effect that a greater offense which can be 
committed in alternative ways does not have a lesser included offense 
merely because the lesser offense constitutes one of these alternative ways. 
For example, OMVUI891 has been held89S under the pre-revised law not to be 
a lesser included offense of vehicular-type ManslaughterGII8 because the lat-
ter can be foundationed on either OMVUI or Reckless Driving. It was ap-
parent to the supreme court in State v. StergionG94 that "a key element in 
OMVUI - driving while under the influence - is not necessarily included 
in the offense of vehicular manslaughter."89t! The upshot in Stergion was 
that the defendant's conviction for OMVUI was affirmed even though he 
had previously been acquitted of vehicular-type Manslaughter "arising out 
of the same incident and collision."898 Similarly, the court in State v. Stew-
artG97 earlier had affirmed a conviction for Manslaughter following an ac-
quittal for Reckless DrivingG98 arising out of the same occurrence. 
Another aspect of this "alternative element" approach deserves scru-
tiny, especially in light of the new Code approach of separating the major 
689. Trespassing is not limited, however, to unlawful entry, as discussed in text accompa-
nying notes 1038-43 infra. 
690. See text accompanying notes 684-85 supra. 
691. See IOWA CODE § 321.281 (1979). 
692. State v. Stergion, 248 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1976). 
693. See IOWA CODE § 690.10 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
694. 248 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1974). 
695. [d. at 913. 
696. [d. at 912. 
697. 223 N.W.2d 250 (Iowa 1974). 
698. See IOWA CODE § 321.283 (1979). 
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offenses into several degrees. In State v. Redmon699 the supreme court up-
held the trial court's refusal to instruct on Assault With Intent to Inflict 
Great Bodily Injury and on AssaulFoo in a 1976 prosecution for the pre-
revised offense of Burglary With Aggravation701 (which relied upon an as-
sault as the basis for the Burglary being of an /ilggravated nature). The court 
noted that "it would have been possible for defendant to have committed 
aggravated burglary without having first committed [an assault),"70Il and 
pointed to the fact that a burglary is complete upon the requisite breaking 
and entering with an intent to commit a public offense. The crucial point 
overlooked, however, was that defendant was not merely charged with Bur-
glary. Instead, because the charge was aggravated burglary, the crime was 
not complete until the assault was inflicted. This is apparent upon a simple 
reading of the statute, which spoke of "actually assault any person being 
lawfully therein"70s instead of with the intent to assault any person therein. 
Once again, a more practical solution could be achieved if the jury were free 
to choose a lesser verdict of Assault, believing that an Assault actually oc-
curred but that the offender had not broken into the victim's dwelling. The 
evidence could have been conflicting over whether he was invited or tres-
passed, but clear as to the physical attack. The jury should not be placed in 
the dilemma of the all-or-nothing verdict.7M 
3. Factual Test 
As explained by the Court in Stewart:701 "It is only after the elements 
of the lesser crime are shown to be necessarily included in the greater crime 
that a second inquiry is made. The second inquiry is a factual one, under-
taken on a case by case basis."706 The factual test "merely requires there be 
enough evidence introduced at trial to justify the submission to the jury of 
an instruction on the proposed lesser included offense."707 
This second step is never reached when the first test is not met. Con-
versely, an offense which meets the legal test for a lesser included offense 
will nevertheless not be submitted in a particular case in which there is no 
evidentiary basis in the trial record for so doing. 
A lesser included offense must be determined in light of the evidence in 
each case.708 "Where the facts present a situation in which the major offense 
699. 244 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1976). 
700. See IOWA CODE § 708.2(2) (1979). 
701. See IOWA CODE § 708.02 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
702. 244 N.W.2d at 798. 
703. See IOWA CODE § 708.02 (1977) (repealed 1978) (emphasis added). 
704. See text accompanying notes 684-85 supra. 
705. State v. Stewart, 223 N.W.2d 250 (Iowa 1974). 
706. Id. at 252. 
707. State v. Redmon, 244 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Iowa 1976). 
708. State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1973). 
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could not have been committed without the commission of a lesser one, the 
lesser will be included."709 Put differently, the salient question on this sec-
ond step is "whether, under the facts of the case, the greater offense could 
have been committed without the commission of the lesser."710 
This factual determination is not affected by imagining how the major 
offense might have been otherwise accomplished.711 Instead, the actual facts 
of the particular case are controlling. 
Conversely, the fact that a lesser crime actually was committed during 
the commission of a greater crime does not give rise to a lesser included 
offense. The supreme court in Everett v. Brewer,712 rejected the notion that 
"the elements for an included offense could be conjured from the facts 
alone, in the absence of a determination all the elements of the lesser of-
fense were also elements of the greater."718 In other words, the particular 
facts in any given case cannot supply "an included offense outside the ele-
ments of the major crime."714 For example, the trial court's refusal to in-
struct on simple possession in a drug sale case was upheld in State v. 
Habhab711l even though there clearly was evidence in the trial record of de-
fendant's actual possession of the drug contemporaneous with the sale. 
The principle that the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to 
the State has been held718 to have no application to the determination of 
whether or not to submit a lesser included offense. If there is sufficient evi-
dence in the trial record to support a conviction for the lesser offense, it 
must be submitted. For example, a trial court's refusal to submit lesser 
forms of homicide has been held717 to be reversible error where the record 
contained sufficient evidence of murder without the necessity for the jury to 
find the defendant had specific intent to kill. . 
Conversely, an instruction on a lesser included offense need not be sub-
mitted where there is no evidence in the trial record to support the lesser 
crime718 (that is, the defendant was guilty of the greater crime or noth-
ing).719 Thus, where there was no evidence of criminal negligence, it was not 
error to refuse submission of an Involuntary Manslaughter instruction in a 
prosecution for Murder.720 Similarly, it is proper to refuse to submit an in-
struction on second-degree murder where the prosecution's only theory of 
709. State v. Habhab, 209 N.W.2d 73, 75 (Iowa 1973). 
710. Everett v. Brewer, 215 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Iowa 1974). 
711. State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Iowa 1973). 
712. 215 N.W.2d 244 (Iowa 1974). 
713. [d. at 246. 
714. State v. Habhab, 209 N.W.2d 73, 75 (Iowa 1973). 
715. [d. 
716. State v. Reese, 259 N.W.2d 771 (Iowa 1977). 
717. [d. 
718. State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1973). 
719. State v. Conner, 241 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1976). 
720. State v. Millspaugh, 257 N.W.2d 513 (Iowa 1977). 
• 
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the case is the felony-murder rule.721 Moreover, it is not reversible error to 
fail to give lesser included offense instructions in a prosecution for first-de-
gree murder on the felony-murder doctrine where the defense elected either 
to be convicted of felony murder or to be acquitted (that is, all or noth-
ing).722 On the other hand, it has been held error to refuse defense-requested 
lesser included offense instructions on second-degree murder and man-
slaughter is a prosecution for felony murder where it was possible on the 
record evidence for the jury to determine that the shooting was not 
intentional.728 
III. INCHOATE OFFENSES 
Inchoate crimes724 are independent crimes consisting of incompleted 
criminal activity related to other more serious criminal offenses.7I11 These 
include Solicitation, Conspiracy and Attempt.7lI8 Each of these offenses "al-
ways presuppose[s] a purpose to commit another crime''7I' that is, a target 
substantive crime, such as sexual abuse. If a substantive crime is committed 
the defendant(s) will be punished for it. If not, however, the defendant(s) 
can be punished for whatever inchoate crime(s)7I8 was committed. Although 
the degree of harm, if any, is considerably less for inchoate crimes than if 
the substantive crime had been committed, nevertheless persons who have 
committed inchoate crimes have shown criminal propensity and thus should 
be punished as a deterrence to further criminal activity. Of course, defen-
dant(s) cannot be punished for both the inchoate and substantive crimes.'· 
721. State v. Conner, 241 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1976). 
722. State v. Veverka, 271 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1978). 
723. State v. Cuevas, 282 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa 1979). 
724. The term "inchoate crimes" is used in G. Dlx & M. SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 684 (1973) [hereinafter cited G. DIX & M. SHARLOT), as compared to the term 
"anticipatory offenses" used in W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTJ', supra note 398, §§ 58-66. 
725. G. Dlx & M. SHARLOT, supra note 724, at 684. 
726. The interrelationship of these inchoate offenses is described as follows: Solicitation 
occurs when X requests Y to join him in committing sexual abuse; Conspiracy arises when Y 
agrees and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiraceous agreement is committed by one of 
them; an attempt occurs when either X or Y performs some perpetrating act sufficient to set 
the plan in motion (e.g., "grabbing" the intended sexual abuse victim and "announcing" his 
intentions). TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 43. 
727. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01-.03, Comment to art. 5, at 24 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). 
728. But see note 729 infra. 
729. Under common law principles of merger, Solicitation merges into Conspiracy, and 
thus a successful solicitor cannot be convicted of both Solicitation and Conspiracy. Begley v. 
Commonwealth, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1546,60 S.W. 847 (1901). See R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 
584. In Iowa, a person "may not be convicted and sentenced for both the conspiracy and for the 
public offense." IOWA CODE § 706.4 (1979). The term "public offense" appears broad enough to 
include both the attempted offense and the consummated substantive offense. However, a per-
son can be convicted for Attempt even when the evidence clearly shows that the target substan-
tive offense was consummated. See State v. Banks, 213 N.W.2d 483 (Iowa 1973)(upholding a 
• 
• 
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A. Attempt780 
The new Criminal Code, like the former Code, does not contain a gen-
eral attempt statute. The attempted offense is incorporated into the con-
summated substantive offense itself in many statutes in the new Code,781 
thus rendering the attempted offense and the consummated substantive of-
fense equally punishable. Attempted murder,m however, is maintained as a 
separate offense. Another more limited way to charge attempted offenses is 
by way of the crime of Assault While Participating in a Felony under section 
708.3 of the Code.788 However, assault is an essential element of that offense. 
The potential overlapping of proscribed attempt-type conduct covered 
by a substantive offense (e.g., Robbery) and the inchoate offense of Assault 
While Participating in a Felony does not render the substantive offense un-
constitutional. In State v. Pierce,784 the supreme court held both that due 
process does not preclude the General Assembly, in its legislative perogative, 
from eliminating taking as an element of the revised crime of Robbery and 
that the Robbery statute "is no less clear merely because the conduct pro-
scribed may overlap conduct which is also proscribed under a separate stat-
ute"78Ci (referring to Assault While Participating in a Felony as it relates to 
an unsuccessful, or attempted, Robbery). Although not resolved by the ratio 
decidendi of State v. Pierce, it appears that standard principles of 
prosecutorial discretion788 will govern on the question of whether an at-
tempted Robbery or attempted Sexual Abuse is charged under the more se-
vere respective substantive offenses or under the less severe inchoate-type 
offense of Assault While Participating in a Felony. 
A casus omissus occurs concerning an unsuccessful theif since the crime 
of Theft787 does not include the attempted offense within its definition.788 
The same situation apparently occurs with the would-be burglar who has 
merely attempted to break in at the time of his apprehension, since at-
tempted burglary apparently is not included in the definition of Burglary 
jury verdict of guilty for the pre-revised crime of attempted rape even though penetration in-
disputably occurred and defense theory was consent). 
730. See generally, W. LAFAVE & A. SCO'M', supra note 398, §§ 59-60; R. PERKINS, supra 
note 398, at 552-90. 
731. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 711.1-.3, 712.1-.4 (1979) (Robbery and Arson). 
732. See IOWA CODE § 707.11 (1979). 
733. This "revised" crime consolidates the following three pre-revised crimes: IOWA CODE 
§§ 694.5 (Assault with Intent to Commit a Felony); 694.7 (Assault with Intent to Commit Cer-
tain Crimes); 698.4 (Assault with Intent to Commit Rape)(1977) (repealed 1978). See text ac-
companying notes 684-704 infra. 
734. 287 N.W.2d 570 (Iowa 1980). 
735. [d. at 574. 
736. See note 1050 infra. 
737. See IOWA CODE §§ 714.1-.2 (1979) and text accompanying notes 1064-1213 infra. 
738. But see discussion of Fraudulent Practices as a limited attempted theft provision in 
text accompanying notes 1214-49 infra. 
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itself.739 
Professor Yeager reports that "a general effort was made [in the draft-
ing process] to avoid the problems inherent in formulating specific 'criminal 
attempts' legislation by defining the underlying substantive crimes broadly 
enough to include all the conduct which should be treated as criminal."74o 
Contrastingly, Professor Schantz opines: "Perhaps most surprisingly, the 
[then] Proposed Code eschews a general attempt provision."741 This "incor-
porating" or "equalizing" approach thus focuses upon the defendant-actor's 
conduct rather than upon the gravity of the harm done. 
1. Overt Act 
In the absence of statutory modification in the Iowa Code, the following 
common law principles relating to what constitutes an attempt should pre-
vail. A criminal attempt is "a step towards a criminal offense with specific 
intent to commit that particular crime. "741 Thus, there must be an overt act 
"amounting to more than mere preparation and performed in furtherance of 
the commission of the prohibited act,"748 together with proof of specific in-
tent. The Iowa Supreme Court fashioned the following test for determining 
the sufficiency of the conduct constituting the overt acts under the pre-re-
vised law: 
The overt act must reach far enough towards the accomplishment, to-
ward the desired result, to amount to the commencement of the consum-
mation, not merely preparatory. It need not be the last proximate act to 
the consummation of the offense attempted to be perpetrated, but it 
must approach sufficiently near it to stand either as the first or some 
subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the 
offense after the preparations are made. Whenever the design of a person 
to commit crime is clearly shown, slight acts done in furtherance of that 
design will constitute an attempt .... 744 
The above articulated test does not apply, however, to the crime of At-
739. IOWA CODE § 713.1 (1979). See text accompanying notes 997-1007 infra. 
740. Yeager Note, supra note 68, at 513. 
741. Schantz, supra note 2, at 442. 
742. R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 552. 
743. Yeager Note, supra note 68, at 513. See also R. PERKINS, supra note 398, which 
states: 
A distinction is made between measures taken by way of preparation for the commis-
sion of a crime and steps taken in the direction of its actual perpetration . . . Be-
tween preparation for the attempt and the attempt itself, there is a wide difference. 
The preparation consists in devising or arranging the means or measures necessary 
for the commission of the offense; the attempt is the direct movement toward the 
commission after the preparations are made. 
[d. at 557 (cites omitted). 
744. State v. Roby, 194 Iowa 1032, lO43, 188 N.W. 709, 714 (1922). 
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tempted Murder.745 The statutory definition of that crime contains its own 
specific test, one which applies expressly only to Attempted Murder.74e This 
test embodies "any act by which he or she expects to set in motion a force or 
chain of events which will cause or result in the death of such other 
person. "747 
The failure of the General Assembly to provide a general statutory test 
for determining attempt liability, while at the same time providing a specific 
test for one crime, should mean that the above-mentioned common law test 
previously adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court remains in effect for all 
other crimes. Because the legislature "is presumed to know the existing 
state of the law at the time of the enactment of a new statute,"748 the failure 
to provide a statutory test of general applicability is a strong indication of 
legislative intent to leave the common law test intact except as to the one 
crime of Attempted Murder. Of course, the supreme court is free to adopt 
the section 707.11 definition relating to Attempted Murder as the general 
test. However, the Special Committee on Uniform Court Instructions of the 
Iowa State Bar Association is not privileged to make such an election to 
utilize the Attempted Murder test. Nevertheless, the committee's revised 
Uniform Jury Instructions relating to general attempt liability utilize the 
specific test set out in the Iowa Code § 707.11.7411 
2. Mental State 
Attempt liability is grounded solely upon specific intent7110 to commit a 
particular crime. As such, attempt liability cannot be based upon negli-
gence,7111 no matter how "great the danger or extreme the negligence."7111 
745. See IOWA CODE § 707.11 (1979). 
746. See Adams v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 257, 208 S.E.2d 742 (1974), in which a convic-
tion for attempted prostitution was reversed because of the application of the general test for 
attempt liability instead of the specific test applicable only to this offense. "Attempted prosti-
tution, unlike attempts to commit crimes generally, is defined solely by CODE § 18.1-194 and, as 
so defined, is incorporated within the offense of prostitution itself." [d. at 258, 208 S.E.2d at 
743-44. 
747. IOWA CODE § 707.11 (1979). 
748. State v. Rauhauser, 272 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Iowa 1978). 
749. See IOWA CODE § 707.11 (1979). 
750. See notes 480-509 supra. 
751. "The act must be done with the specific intent to commit the particular crime the 
accused is charged with attempting to commit. This intent cannot be supplied by negligence, 
nor can there be an attempt at negligence, because a negligent act is necessarily done without 
intention." J. MILLER, supra note 474, at 96. But see W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 398, 
which states: 
Maya defendant be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime which is defined only 
in terms of reckless or negligent conduct? In theory at least, it is conceivable that 
conviction might be possible if the completed crime consists simply of reckless or 
negligent creation of danger and it was shown that the defendant actually intended to 
engage in conduct creating that danger. 
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Furthermore, the prosecution must prove that the defendant acted "with a 
certain purpose,"7G3 as set out in the applicable statute.nf 
"To do an act from general malevolence is not an attempt to commit a 
crime, because there is no specific intent, though the act according to its 
consequences may amount to a substantive crime."7GG This difference be-
tween murder and attempted murder in this regard is an anomoly, since "to 
commit murder, one need not intend to take life, but to be guilty of an 
attempt to murder, he must so intend. It is not sufficient that his act, had it 
proved fatal, would have been murder."7G8 
B. Solicitation7G7 
A new crime in the form of a general solicitation statute7G8 was included 
in the new Criminal Code. Although there was no solicitation statute of gen-
eral application under the pre-revised law, there were nevertheless at least 
three major specific solicitation statutes of limited application.7G9 In addi-
tion to the general solicitation statute which applies to felonies of all classes 
as well as to aggravated misdemeanors, the new Criminal Code contains 
some substantive offenses which, by definition, include acts of solicitation 
(e.g., Suborning Perjury,780 Bribery,781 and Prostitution).m In these latter 
Id. § 59, at 429. 
752. R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 574. 
753. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 215. 
754. "When a statute makes an offense to consist of an act combined with a particular 
intent, that intent is just as necessary to be proved as the act itself, and must be found as a 
matter of fact before a conviction can be had .... " Thacker v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 767, 
_, 114 S.E. 504, 505 (1922) (conviction for attempted murder reversed because of lack of 
evidence of intent to kill). Accord, Aikerson v. State, 295 So.2d 778 (Miss. 1974) (reversal of 
conviction for assault with intent to commit rape where the evidence "merely depicted a some-
what aimless attack," and was lacking as to the act of assault being done with the requisite 
intent to commit rape). 
755. Thacker v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 767, _, 114 S.E. 504, 506 (1922) (citing W. 
CLARK, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 111 (2d ed. 1902». 
756. Id. at _, 114 S.E. at 506 (citing 1 J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 729, at 522 (9th ed. 
1923». 
757. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 101-03; W. LAFAVE & A. 
SCOTT, supra note 348, § 58; R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 582-88. 
758. IOWA CODE § 705.1 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 
501-06. "The thought is that persons who actively promote the commission of crimes by others 
are sufficiently dangerous to the general welfare to be considered criminals, even when their 
attempts at such promotion are unsuccessful." STUDY COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, Comment 
at 31. 
759. IOWA CODE §§ 690.8 (Advising or Inciting Murder); 721.3 (Attempt to Suborn Per-
jury); 724.2 (Solicitation for Prostitution (1977) (repealed 1978). 
760. IOWA CODE § 720.3 (1979). 
761. Id. § 722.1. 
762. Id. § 725.1. 
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instances, the prosecution, of course, would be for the substantive offense,7u 
as the specific statute controls over the general statute.784 
The elements of Solicitation are: (1) command, entreat, or otherwise at-
tempt to persuade; (2) another person; (3) to commit a particular7811 felony 
or aggravated misdemeanor; (4) with "corroborated" intent that the "target" 
crime actually be committed. The gist of the offense is in the act of persuad-
ing or attempting to persuade.788 Thus, the crime is complete with the act of 
speaking words even though the request is refused,787 provided that there is 
sufficient corroborative evidence of defendant's intent.788 Moreover, the per-
son solicited is never guilty of Solicitation788-even if he agrees to the crimi-
nal design, as only the solicitor can be guilty of Solicitation.770 The criminal 
responsibility of the successfully-solicited person must rest upon his partici-
pation in other inchoate crimes (i.e., Conspiracy or attempted substantive 
offenses) or in the consummated substantive offense itself.771 
1. Corroboration of Intent 
The act of soliciting must be done with the specific intent771 that the 
solicited act be done "under circumstances which corroborates [sic] that in-
tent by clear and convincing evidence," under Iowa Code section 705.1.778 
763. "[F]or such offenses this section [on Solicitation] should be disregarded as irrelevant, 
on the theory that one cannot be guilty of soliciting an act which is itself a solicitation." J. 
YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, at 30. 
764. Cartee v. Brewer, 265 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1978); State v. Thompson, 253 N.W.2d 608 
(Iowa 1977). 
765. "Particular" crimes must be solicited because to prohibit general exhortations would 
involve free speech problems. G. DIX & M. SHARLOT, supra note 724, at 750. 
766. By including commanding, entreating, or otherwise attempting to persuade as alter-
native modes of the actus reus, the revised crime of Solicitation is much broader than the actus 
reus of the pre-revised specific solicitation statutes. See, e.g., State v. Willis, 218 N.W.2d 921 
(Iowa 1974) (the term "solicit another" in the pre-revised crime of Solicitation for Prostitution 
signifies the "asking or urging of another"). 
767. A person is guilty of Solicitation even if the person solicited immediately rejects the 
proposal, and regardless of whether or not there is any agreement or overt act. Hutchins v. 
Municipal Court, 61 Cal. App. 3d 77, 132 Cal. Rptr. 158 (Dist. Ct. App. 1976); accord, State v. 
Blechman, 135 N.J.L. 99, 50 A.2d 152 (1946) (one who counsels another to burn solicitor's in-
sured building is guilty of Solicitation even though no step is taken to carry out the solicitor's 
request). 
768. See IOWA CODE § 705.1 (1979). 
769. See State v. Walker, 247 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1976). 
770. "Conspiracy differs from solicitation in that one person alone is criminally liable for 
solicitation by reason of suggesting to or commanding or persuading another that he commit a 
crime; while in conspiracy two or more persons, with common intent and purpose, agree among 
themselves upon the criminal objective." J. MiLLER, supra note 474, at 107. 
771. The parameters of the criminal responsibility of the solicitor are discussed in the 
text accompanying notes 795-804 infra. 
772. See text accompanying notes 480-509 supra. 
773. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 503. 
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The purpose of corroboration is to protect against the possibility that com-
ments made in jestm may form the basis of a criminal prosecution.7711 A 
corroborative overt act778 might include producing a detailed "blueprint" of 
an intended robbery scene or taking a solicited person to the intended crime 
scene to "case" the place. 
2. Corroboration of Testimony by the Solicited Person 
The evidentiary rules set out in Rule 20(3) of the Iowa Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure prevent a conviction based solely upon the uncorroborated 
testimony of a "solicited person."777 By the terms of the rule, this corrobora-
774. E.g., idle machismo tavern "talk." 
775. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, states: 
[T]he [drafting] committee was somewhat apprehensive that a solicitation statute 
might prove to be excessively restrictive on free speech or be otherwise subject to 
abuse, resulting in prosecutions for casual comments which are not intended to be 
taken serioUsly; hence the unusual provision for renunciation and the requirement of 
corroboration of intent by clear and convincing evidence. 
Id. § 101, at 29. 
776. "Such corroboration cannot be supplied merely by the fact of the solicitation, 
but must be proved independently. The evidence must tend to show, strengthen, con· 
firm or point out that the defendant, when he solicited the commission of the offense, 
if he did so, intended that the offense be committed. The corroboration may be 
proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence." 
UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 503. 
777. Whether an undercover police officer or agent who successfully can be a "solicited 
person" for purposes of the corroboration requirement in Rule 20(3) remains to be determined. 
On its face, Rule 20(3) does not exempt peace officers or their agents and there is no sound 
public policy reason for the courts to do so by judicial interpretation. This non-exemption ap-
proach would be especially meaningful in a situation in which the "solicited" crime is never 
attempted or completed (e.g., a contract murder with an undercover police officer allegedly 
approached by the defendant to be the supposed "hit man"). 
A trickier question is whether the officer is a "solicited person" when the evidence shows 
that he actually initiated the contact which directly culminated in criminal activity with an-
other. That is, can an undercover officer approach a suspected drug dealer and offer to make a 
buy, then be "solicited" by the dealer's offer to sell? Probably so, in light of the evident public 
policy protecting a person against a conviction for Solicitation, a new statutory crime unrecog-
nized at common law and which punishes speech, based solely upon the uncorroborated word of 
another person claiming to have been solicited. Of course, an officer may be reluctant to estab-
lish that he actually initiated or "instigated" this course of conduct in light of the policy activ-
ity provision in IOWA CODE § 704.11 (1979), as discussed in text accompanying notes 814-24 
infra. 
In State v. Iowa District Court, 271 N.W.2d 704 (Iowa 1978), the supreme court refused to 
adjudicate on a point of law the question of whether a successful police undercover agent is a 
"solicited person" whose trial testimony on a charge of Delivery of a controlled substance would 
require corroboration under IOWA R. CRIM. 20(3). Because "a substantial factual controversy" 
arose with the defendant claiming that the agent "solicited" the purchase and the officer claim-
ing that the defendant voluntarily offered the drugs to him following contact with the defen-
dant by a third party on behalf of the officer, the supreme court held that "it is inappropriate 
to adjudicate the point." 271 N.W.2d at 705. 
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tion must be established "by other evidence which shall tend to connect the 
defendant with the commission of the offense [and it] is not sufficient if it 
merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof." 
It should be permissible to prove corroboration by either direct or circum-
stantial evidence.778 
A jury would be instructed under Uniform Jury Instruction No. 202 
that it, .in effect, first must find that a witness is a "solicited person," as 
defined therein. If it does, "then the defendant cannot be convicted solely 
upon the solicited person's testimony." Instead, the jury must find "other 
evidence which tends to connect the defendant, that is, tends to single out 
and point to him as one of the persons who committed the offense [of 
Solicitation]."778 
The issue of corroboration, of course, will only arise when there is no 
other prosecution witness. Thus, this provision does not ipso facto require 
corroboration of the testimony by a "solicited person," upon pain of its ex-
clusion or its being stricken. 
3. Renunciation 
A statutory defense of renunciation exists in section 705.2 of the Code. 
Renunciation, however, apparently must be successful and not merely at-
tempted, notwithstanding the zealousness of such an attempt.780 That is, the 
defendant-solicitor must either persuade the solicited person not to commit 
the target crime or must otherwise prevent the commission of that offense. 
If unsuccessful, then the defendant-solicitor is equally guilty, as an acces-
sory before the fact, if the target substantive crime is committed or at-
tempted by his "confederate."781 The terms of the statute itself state: 
A renunciation is not voluntary and complete if it is motivated in whole 
or in part by (a) the person's belief that circumstances exist which in-
crease the possibility of detection or apprehension of the defendant or 
another or which makes more difficult the consummation of the offense 
or (b) the person's decision to postpone the offense until another time or, 
to substitute another victim or another but similar objective.78• 
Moreover, the renunciation must be timely. It must occur before the com- . 
mission of an overt act by any of the co-conspirators. Once the conspiracy is 
complete upon the requisite agreement and an overt act, then renunciation 
is no longer operative, since renunciation is a defense only for the crime of 
778. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 50. 
779. Id., at No. 202. 
780. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 505, which states that "the 
'renunciation' by the defendant must be complete and voluntary, that is, done under such cir-
cumstances that clearly indicated he did not want or intend that the offense be committed." 
781. See notes 798-800 infra. 
782. IOWA CODE § 705.2 (1979) (emphasis added). 
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Solicitation and not for Conspiracy.783 
The new Criminal Code is silent as to the allocation of the burden of 
proof where renunciation is asserted as a defense. However, the burden of 
disproving renunciation is placed upon the prosecution in Uniform Jury In-
struction No. 504.784 Pursuant thereto, the prosecution would have to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that "the persuasion and prevention was [sic] 
not done under such circumstances as to indicate the defendant's complete 
and voluntary abandonment or rejection of his intent that the offense be 
committed." . 
Such an approach appears to be erroneous/811 because of its misunder-
standing of the nature of the crime of Solicitation. This crime is complete 
(and thus ipso facto punishable) upon the very commission of the act of 
persuading or attempting to persuade, accompanied by the requisite in-
tent.786 The issue of renunciation therefore does not even arise until some-
time after the crime of Solicitation is complete.787 Whereas renunciation, if 
proved, would, in effect, vitiate the solicitor's intent, nevertheless the requi-
site intent is to be determined co-terminous with the commission of the 
criminal act.7BB Renunciation is therefore different from the defenses of in-
sanity, diminished responsibility, and entrapment.789 These three defenses 
negate the existence of the mens rea component at the time of the commis-
783. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 103. 
784. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 504. 
785. J. ROEHRICK, supra note 620, states: 
This [section 705.2] is a codification of the common law defense to solicitation; that 
is, there was no intent and the defendant abandoned his plans. It is felt, however, 
that the last sentence may place a burden of proof upon the defendant to show that it 
falls outside of the exceptions which are listed therein. Obviously for the defense to 
prevail, there must be a complete and voluntary renunciation. Therefore, if the de-
fendant introduces the defense of solicitation, he will have the burden of proof. Thus, 
this is likely to be held as an affirmative defense. 
[d. at 57 (emphasis in original). 
786. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 103. Professor Yeager does not 
squarely discuss the issue of allocation of the burden of proof, but it appears that the implica-
tion from the overall tenor of his discussion is that he feels that renunciation is an affirmative 
defense to be proved by the defendant. See State v. Blechman, 135 N.J.L. 99, 50 A.2d 152 
(1946). 
787. Solicitation, like Burglary, is a consummated offense upon the concurrence of the 
requisite actus reus and requisite mens rea, irrespective of the "target" substantive crime ever 
being committed or even attempted. See People v. Robles, 207 Cal. App. 2d 891, 24 Cal. Rptr. 
708 (1962) (burglary). The Robles court stated that "[p]roof of intent at the time of entry does 
not depend upon the subsequent commission of the felony or even an attempt to commit it." 
[d. at _, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 710. 
788. See note 741, supra. 
789. None of these three defenses is defined in the Criminal Code, thus leaving intact the 
pre-revised common law definitions set by the Iowa Supreme Court. These defenses are set out 
in the UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 206, 209, 213 (respectively). De-
fenses are not discussed in this Article. 
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sion of the criminal act. As such, the substantive crime is never actually 
completed when any of these latter three defenses is asserted.7IIO 
790. This conclusion is buttressed by the general approach taken in State v. Reese, 272 
N.W.2d 863 (Iowa 1978), which is the most recent decision on the question of allocation of the 
burden of proof as to defenses in criminal cases. In Reese, the court recognized for the first 
time the existence of the defense of necessity in a prosecution for Escape [under IOWA CODE § 
745.1 (1977) (repealed 1978)J and then held that the state has the ultimate burden of risk of 
non-persuasion to disprove necessity beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant has met 
his burden of going forward with the evidence by generating a fact question on the defense. 
In reaching its conclusion on the burden of proof, the court analogized to its prior decisions 
placing the burden on the state to disprove the defenses of alibi, entrapment, insanity, intoxica-
tion, and self defense. Most particularly, the court felt that the analogy with entrapment was 
"especially persuasive because that defense, like necessity, is a question which arises after a 
showing of defendant's guilt has been made. In spite of such showing, as a matter of public 
policy, a conviction cannot be tolerated." 272 N.W.2d at 867. The reference to entrapment 
"[arisingJ after a showing of defendant's guilt has been made" indicates that the court pres-
ently takes the traditional approach that entrapment merely operates as justification to excuse 
what otherwise is crystallized or completed criminal activity, that is, that the entrapped defen-
dant nevertheless formed the requisite criminal intent to commit the crime. An alternative 
approach would be that an entrapped defendant lacked the requisite criminal intent because 
that intent had not originated in his own mind but instead was implanted there improperly by 
law enforcement agents. See State v. Heeron, 208 Iowa 1151, 226 N.W. 30 (1929). 
In Reese, the court determined that the defense of necessity "does not negate any element 
of a crime." 272 N.W.2d at 866. Rather, "the question of necessity arises only after it has been 
determined that a crime has occurred as an entirely independent inquiry." id. This tack is 
questionable. Alternatively, the crux of the matter is that a prisoner faced with a situation of 
necessity (via "a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack or substantial bodily injury in 
the immediate future" with no time for complaint to the prison authorities or the courts) com-
mits the actus reus of unauthorized departure because of this necessity and thus lacka any 
criminal intent in escaping. [d. The focus should properly be upon the motivational force in 
departing. 
Similarly, a person acting in self defense essentially has not acted with criminal intent. He 
instead had intended to kill but not because of any criminal motivation. The above is the 
proper analysis of the defenses of entrapment, self-defense, and necessity-that is, a defendant 
acting in any of these circumstances did not act with the requisite criminal intent. 
Nevertheless, the reference in Reese to "a question which arises after a showing of defen-
dant's guilt has been made" definitely has implications for the question of burden of proof on 
the defense of renunciation. As noted, the crime of Solicitation is already complete before the 
attempted renunciation. Indeed, there would be no need for renunciation unless the crime had 
already been committed. Thus, under the prevailing approach of the Iowa Supreme Court, re-
nunciation would be akin to entrapment, self-defense, and necessity in being "a question which 
arises after a showing of defendant's guilt has been made." Even so, renunciation does not meet 
the second part of the prevailing test, namely, U[iJn spite of such showing, as a matter of public 
policy, a conviction cannot be tolerated." A defendant who was entrapped should not be con-
victed because of the intolerableness of such improper law enforcement activity. A defendant 
who acts in self-defense should not be convicted because of his inalienable right of self-preser-
vation. A prisoner who escapes out of necessity should not invoke criminal responsibility. And 
the burden of disproving these three defenses should be on the state. However, renunciation is 
different. There is nothing unfair about requiring a defendant who has already exhibited the 
requisite conduct constituting the crime of Solicitation to carry the burden of proof as to his 
alleged defense of renunciation. Conclusively, the defendant in a prosecution for Solicitation 
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On the other hand, renunciation appears more analogous to the defense 
of having a valid prescription, on a charge of possession of a controlled sub-
stance.781 In such a case, the prescription acts as an excuse for the defen-
dant's act of possession, but the defendant bears the burden of proving the 
existence of a valid prescription.791 Likewise, it can be argued that the de-
fense of renunciation acts as an excuse for the actual commission of the 
solicitation offense, and that, therefore, the defendant should have the bur-
den of proving the renunciation defense. 
Further support is found for the above argument when one considers 
the test which the Iowa Supreme Court has followed in determining the al-
location of the burden of proof relating to statutory exceptions. That test 
may be articulated as follows: If the exception is material in arriving at the 
definition of the crime, that is, where the exception is considered an essen-
tial element of the crime, then the prosecution has the burden of showing 
that the exception does not apply. When an exception merely furnishes an 
excuse for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, however, then the 
duty devolves upon the defendant to bring himself within the exculpatory 
provision.798 Additionally, if the statutory requirement for the existence of 
the exception may be satisfied by objective facts "inaccessible as a practic@l 
matter to the prosecution but peculiarly within defendant's knowledge," 
then the exception is normally considered a defense or justification and not 
an element of the crime. 7tH 
4. Extent of Liability 
Solicitation amounts, in effect, to an attempt to form a conspiracY.7911 If 
the solicitation is unsuccessful, then the solicitor still can be convicted of 
Solicitation.796 If the solicitation is successful, then both the solicitor and 
the solicitee(s) can be convicted of at least ConspiracY, even if the target 
substantive crime is never completed or even attempted.797 If the design is 
attempted or completed, then the original solicitor will be equally liable as 
an accomplice or co-conspirator for all acts committed within the scope of 
did have criminal intent at the time of his actus reus, absent any improper influences militating 
against a voluntary and informed judgment. The same certainly cannot be said about a defen-
dant whose conduct (the actus reus) was motivated by entrapment, self-defense, or necessity. 
791. See IOWA CODE § 204.401(3) (1979). 
792. [d. § 204.507, which states that "[i)t is not necesaary for the state to negate any 
exemption or exception set forth in this chapter [on controlled substances) ... [T)he proof of 
entitlement to any exemption or exception by the person claiming its benefit shall be a valid 
defense." See State v. Gibbs, 239 N.W.2d 866 (Iowa 1976); State v. Lynch, 197 N.W.2d 186 
(Iowa 1972) (upholding constitutionality of verbatim predecessor statute). 
793. State v. Lynch, 197 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa 1972). 
794. State v. Gibbs, 239 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1976). 
795. See generally, W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 398, § 58, at 417. 
796. State v. Blechman, 135 N.J.L. 99, 50 A.2d 152 (1946). 
797. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 398, § 58, at 414. 
HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 335 1979-1980
1979-80] Iowa Criminal Code 335 
the Conspiracy while he remains a member thereof7l8 (either of attempt?" 
or the completed target offenseSOO). 
The crime of soliciting another person to commit a crime (either jointly 
with the solicitor or on behalf of the solicitor) is thus distinct from Conspir-
acy, Attempt Liability, and Aiding and Abetting. Being a distinct offense 
itself, Solicitation criminalizes wrongful conduct at a much earlier stage. As 
such, it plugs a loophole in the Iowa criminal law, since "[t]he law of at-
tempts and accomplice liability frequently would not reach this culpable 
conduct if the solicited crime did not occur."SOl Accordingly, the mere act of 
Solicitation in hiring a "hit man" to murder someone does not constitute the 
crime of attempted murder where the murder never was attempted.80s In 
this circumstance, the act of soliciting is mere preparation whereas attempt 
liability requires a perpetrating act.soa Solicitation plus some other conduct 
transcending preparation may constitute an attempt, however.804 
5. Merger 
A successful solicitor presumably cannot be convicted of both Solicita-
tion and Conspiracy. Solicitation, in the nature of an attempted conspir-
acy,SOG thus merges into Conspiracy.sGe Nor can a solicitor be guilty of both 
Solicitation and the substantive offense itself.807 This is because his criminal 
responsibility will arise from the commission of the substantive offense itself 
(as either a principal or as an accessory before the fact via Solicitation) or 
798. G. Dlx & M. SHARLOT, supra note 724, at 749-50; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTI', supra note 
398, § 58, at 417; R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 582-84. 
799. "If the one solicited goes far enough to incur guilt of an attempt to commit the 
[target substantive] crime, the solicitor is also guilty of attempt." R. PERKINS, supra note 398, 
at 584 [citing State v. Jones, 83 N.C. 605 (1880); UbI v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. (Gratt.) 706 
(1849)]. 
800. "One who successfully solicits another to commit a crime is guilty of the offense 
committed unless some special defense is available to him." [d. at 582 [citing People v. Harper, 
25 Cal.2d 862, 156 P.2d 249 (1945)]. 
801. Schantz, supra note 2, at 441. 
802. Gervin v. State, 371 S.W.2d 449 (Tenn. 1963). 
803. [d. at 451. 
804. [d. at 452. Whereas a mere solicitation generally is not considered sufficient for at-
tempt liability, "a solicitation accompanied by other overt acts, such as the furnishing of mater-
ials, is an attempt." W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTI', supra note 398, § 62, at 423. 
805. G. Dlx & M. SHARLOT, supra note 724, at 749. 
806. Begley v. Commonwealth, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1546,60 S.W. 847 (1901); J. MILLER, supra 
note 474, at 107. 
807. "The solicitation is so far merged in the resulting offense that the solicitor cannot be 
punished for both." R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 584. Perkins continues, however: 
[d. 
"There is no sound reason why there should be any rule of absolute merger. If the 
evidence of an indictable solicitation is clear, for example, while there is a condict as 
to whether the one solicited did or did not proceed far enough to have committed a 
criminal attempt, there should be no bar to a conviction for the solicitation." 
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from the Conspiracy (if the substantive crime is not committed). 
6. Classification of Crime Solicited 
Solicitation, under Code section 705.1, applies only to felonies and ag-
gravated misdemeanors. Thus, it is not a crime to solicit another to commit 
serious or simple misdemeanors. 
This omission is questionable, in light of wrongful conduct being left 
unpunishable. The public interest is not served by indirectly "permitting" 
persons to solicit others to commit even such a "minor" offense as a simple 
Assault. Granted, the potential harm is less if Solicitation of a serious or 
simple misdemeanor is successful (than if a more serious offense is solicited) 
nevertheless, the criminal law should not leave such gaps in ordering a 
peaceful society. This statutory gap is especially questionable in light of the 
revised related offense of Conspiracyll°8 applying to all three levels of 
misdemeanors. 
7. Grading 
There are two grades of Solicitation, with the distinction based upon 
whether a felony or an aggravated misdemeanor is the crime which is the 
object of the solicitation. Solicitation of a felony of any class809 is itself a 
class D felony.8lO As a non-forcible felony, however, Solicitation is not sub-
ject to the prohibition on ameliorative sentencing options (i.e., a deferred 
judgment, a deferred sentence, or a suspended sentence) applicable to "for-
cible felonies"811 even though a "forcible felony" is the object of the solicita-
tion. Solicitation of an aggravated misdemeanor is itself punishable as an 
aggravated misdemeanor.8ta 
808. See IOWA CODE § 706.3 (1979) and text accompanying notes 831-61 supra. 
809. The single penalty for Solicitation of any class of felony offenses focuses solely on 
defendant's act of soliciting another to commit a felony without taking into account the serious-
ness of the particular felony solicited. Thus, the same five-year imprisonment for Solicitation 
applies to Solicitation of a class A felony offense (which is punishable by a life term); Solicita-
tion of a class B felony offense (25-year term); Solicitation of a class C felony offense (lO-year 
term); or Solicitation of a class D felony offense (5-year term). 
810. The single grade of this offense is a class D felony. It is punishable by either an 
indeterminate term of inprisonment of five years or a maximum fine of $1,000 or both. Because 
this offense is a "forcible felony," none of the ameliorative sentencing alternatives (i.e., a de-
ferred judgment, a deferred sentence, or a suspended sentence of probation) is available, in lieu 
of the above-mentioned imprisonment. Moreover, being a "forcible felony," this offense is also 
subject to the mandatory minimum five-year sentence if a firearm is used or possessed during 
its commission. 
811. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (l979). 
812. An aggravated misdemeanor is punishable by either a determinate term of confine-
ment not to exceed two years or a maximum fine of $5000 or both. Other sentencing alterna-
tives include a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a suspended sentence of probation, 
in lieu of the above-mentioned confinement or fine. 
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This grading is unsound, especially when considered in context with the 
grading of the related offense of Conspiracy.8lS Providing in the Conspiracy 
statute for different grades (and corresponding different penalty levels) de-
pending upon whether a "forcible felony" or a non-forcible felony was the 
target crime is preferable to the singular approach in Solicitation. Such a 
differentiation would focus upon the gravity of the crime solicited. An even 
better approach would have been a sliding scale punishing Solicitation as 
two classifications lower than the crime solicited (e.g., Solicitation of a class 
A felony would be punishable itself as a class C felony). 
8. Police Activity Limitation 
A new provision in section 704.11 of the Code establishing legitimate 
police undercover activity as justification for otherwise complicity in a crime 
has caused excitement in the law enforcement community, because of its 
arguable implications for rendering the undercover agent or informant guilty 
of the crime of Solicitation, if not also for the substantive offense being in-
vestigated, unless the strict requirements of the supposed defense are met. 
Because of poor draftsmanship, an innocuous provision intended merely to 
codify a well-recognized common law defense814 has instead the potential of 
being a complicity provision extending criminal liability to law enforcement 
officers and their agents. Only a common sense approach by prosecutors in 
charging and by courts in interpreting this provision can prevent a ridicu-
lous result. Magnifying the problem is the fact that the General Assembly 
has supposedly already "repaired" the provision. In its amended form, this 
provision reads: 
704.11 POLICE ACTIVITY. A peace officer or person acting as an . 
agent of or directed by any police agency who participates in the com-
mission of a crime by another person solely for the purpose of gathering 
evidence leading to the prosecution of such other person shall not be 
guilty of that crime or of the crime of solicitation as set forth in section 
seven hundred five point one (705.1) of the Code, provided that all of the 
following are true: 
1. He or she is not an instigator of the criminal activity. 
2. He or she does not intentionally injure a nonparticipant in the 
crime. 
3. He or she acts with the consent of superiors, or the necessity of 
immediate action precludes obtaining such consent. 
4. His or her actions are reasonable under the circumstances. 
This section is not intended to preclude the use of undercover or 
surveillance persons by law enforcement agencies in appropriate circum-
stances and manner. It is intended to discourage such activity to tempt, 
urge or persuade the commission of offenses by persons not already dis-
B13. See IOWA CODE § 706.3 (1979) and part III(C)(5) of this Article. 
B14. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTl', supra note 39B, at 402-07. 
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posed to commit offenses of that kind.81& 
It is clear that all four of the listed provisos are necessary in order for 
this provision to apply. The concern is over the proviso that an officer or his 
agent (e.g., an informant) must not have been "an instigator of the criminal 
activity." The anxiety was heightened with the silence in the original form 
of section 704.11 regarding whether or not the officer or agent could be held 
criminally responsible for Solicitation, in light of express conditional excul-
pation for the substantive crime under investigation without mention of ex-
culpation for Solicitation. An amendment in 1979818 added a phrase also ex-
culpating the officer or informant from the crime of Solicitation. However, 
the result is that an officer or agent still must meet the four-part test set out 
in section 704.11 itself in order to qualify for exculpation from personal 
criminal responsibility for either Solicitation or the substantive crime under 
investigation. The legislative response to this problem was wholly inade-
quate. The one change made in part one of the four-part test was changing 
the phraseology from the officer or agent must not be "the instigator of the 
criminal activity" to "an instigator of the criminal activity." The distinction 
between "the" and "an" is not evident. An undercover narcotics agent who 
attempts to make a "buy" certainly could be considered to be "an," if not 
"the," instigator. 
The term "instigator" is not defined elsewhere in the Criminal Code 
and presumably the ordinary dictionary definition will be ascribed to it.817 
The word "instigate" is defined in Webster's Dictionary as: "To goad or urge 
forward: set on: provoke, incite."8l8 Little solace is found in this broad defi-
nition8l9 for the undercover agent or informant who initiates a meeting with 
a drug dealer, contract murderer, pimp, fence, or other person suspected of 
criminal involvement and offers money or other form of inducement for ac-
complishment of the criminal act by the other person. 
The determinative question thus is: Did the General Assembly intend 
that undercover narcotics agents remain passive, without making an initial 
815. IOWA CODE § 704.11 (1979). 
816. [d. 
817. State v. Wilson, 287 N.W.2d 587 (Iowa 1980). 
818. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1171 (unabridged ed. 1961). 
819. Although focusing upon whether the defendant had been entrapped, the Illinois Su-
preme Court has taken a realistically narrow approach to what constitutes "instigation" or so-
licitation by peace officers. In Illinois v. Clark, 7 Ill.2d 163, _, 130 N.E.2d 195, 199 (1955), 
that court held that "lilt is not an instigation or solicitation to commit a crime for an individ-
ual or officer, having reason to believe another is committing a crime, to furnish an opportunity 
for the commission of the offense, if the purpose is, in good faith, to secure evidence against a 
guilty person and not to induce an innocent person to commit a crime." No entrapment was 
found in this case, in which an informant acting under the directions of a police officer con-
tacted defendant by telephone and told defendant that he wanted to get some "stuff." Defen-
dant told him to come over. The informant then went to defendant's apartment and was sold 
narcotic drugs. [d. 
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contact or overture, but being merely ready to make a "buy" once the drug 
dealer instigates the contact? The legislative history of this provision sup-
ports the proposition that this was not the intent. This provision first ap-
peared in the bill recommended by the Criminal Code Revision Study Com-
mittee in its final report to the General Assembly in January 1973."SO The 
language in the Committee's proposed bill was verbatim to that in Code 
section 704.11 in its original form until the 1979 amendment. Moreover, the 
language remained the same throughout the legislative process, appearing 
verbatim in S.F. 1150 and S.F. 85 (both as introduced and as passed). 
The following explanatory comment to this section was made in a re-
port by the subcommittee of the special standing committee which reviewed 
the study committee's proposed bill during the 1973 legislative session: 
The purpose of this section is to authorize the use of informants and 
undercover agents in situations where the successful prosecution of per-
sons engaging in a criminal activity should make this COUlse of action 
necessary. The limits to which police officers may go in gathering evi-
dence under these circumstances has never been clearly spelled out. The 
restrictions contained in the above section are suggested as adequate to 
permit the effective use of informants and undercover agents, without 
encouraging them "to go to excess in performing these duties.8Il 
The emphasis clearly was upon codification of the well-recognized principle 
permitting officers and their agents to use "undercover" activities. su Cer-
tainly, "effective use" of undercover agents cannot be made when they are 
rendered passive, albeit investigatorially impotent, by a provision precluding 
them from being "an instigator" of another's criminal activity. 
Minimally, what should have been done to repair this section was to 
have stricken altogether any reference therein to an officer or his agent be-
ing "an instigator," thus leaving only the three other tests. Additionally, the 
provision should have been amended to read that an officer or agent "who, 
without criminal intent, participates in the commission of a crime by an-
other person solely for the purpose of gathering evidence ... " Nevertheless, 
proof of the officer's or agent's criminal intent would seem to be required 
even without such express legislative language. A basic tenet of our criminal 
law has been that criminal responsibility requires a "criminal" mind,sss and 
. 820. Report of Criminal Code Rev. Study Comm., Proposed Revision of Iowa Criminal 
Laws § 410 at 35 (1974). 
821. Substantive Law Subcomm. of the Crim. Code Review Comm., (Tent. Draft No.4, 
1974), expl. comment to § 410. 
822. See generally R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 1031·36. 
823. See State v. Schultz, 242 Iowa 1328, 50 N.W.2d 9 (1951). This rule, when applied to 
a peace officer, is best expressed in the old case of State v. Torphy, 78 Mo. App. 206 (1899), 
wherein the court stated: 
Another illustration of the doctrine that the intent determines criminality is found in 
the rule that a detective who joins with persons in the commission of a crime for the 
purpose of securing their arrest and conviction is not punishable, although he 80 far 
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thus common law principles on mental state should be read into the statute. 
This would exculpate an officer or agent who clearly is "involved" merely as 
part of his assigned investigation and not also to make an illegal personal 
gain. 
Ideally, the entire provision should be repealed in its entirety. This 
statutory repeal would reinstate the common law principle recognizing po-
lice activity as a defense to prosecution for the crimes participated in by an 
officer or agent in attempting solely to gather evidence against a criminal 
suspect. The legislative intent, as evidenced in the above mentioned sub-
committee report, was laudable in placing some statutory restrictions upon 
excesses in undercover activity. But the import of the provision is grossly 
misplaced by, in effect, saying that an undercover agent who acts "exces-
sively" (as defined in the very restrictive four-part test in section 704.11) 
becomes criminally responsible himself - for the crimes he is investigating. 
A better approach to regulating an officer's or agent's "excesses" during 
a undercover investigation would be to establish a separate, comparatively 
minor, criminal offense of Excessive Investigation or something akin. There 
certainly is precedent for such an approach, as evidenced by the serious mis-
demeanor offense in Code section 808.10 for an officer who either mali-
ciously sues out a search warrant without just cause or who willfully exceeds 
his authority during execution of a search warrant. This provision dates 
back to 1851.824 
The last paragraph of section 704.11, as amended, is an interesting par-
adox. This paragraph was added by the General Assembly in an amendment 
in 1979 in response to the law enforcement community's concern over crimi-
nal responsibility of peace officers or their agents arising under the original 
provision for the reasons noted above. At first blush, this paragraph evinces 
the legislative intent that peace officers or their agents be immunized when 
performing their duties, including undercover activity, under ordinary cir-
cumstances. However, this explanatory paragraph is rife with qualifying lan-
guage, to wit: this activity must be carried out "in appropriate circum-
stances and manner" in order to be immunized. The "appropriateness" of 
an officer's or agent's actions would seem to be subject to judging under the 
quad-partite statutory test, which, of course, includes the factor of the of-
ficer or agent not being "an instigator of the criminal activity." 
The second sentence of the "explanatory" paragraph injects even more 
confusion. This sentence states that the intent merely is to "discourage" the 
use of undercover agents "to tempt, urge or persuade the commission of of-
fenses by persons not already disposed to commit offenses of that kind." 
This statutory reference to criminal predisposition of the target of the un-
cooperates as to be guilty if his intention had been the same as theirs. 
[d. at _. See also State v. McKean, 36 Iowa 343 (1873). 
824. See IOWA CODE § 3308 (1851). 
• 
HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 341 1979-1980
1979-80] Iowa Criminal Code 341 
dercover activity unfortunately conjures up the subjective test of entrap-
ment. Entrapment, of course, is a defense for the target of the undercover 
activity. The problem is that the currently-recognized test of entrapment in 
Iowa is the objective test82!! (which focuses upon the officer's or agent's activ-
ity rather than upon the target person's criminal predisposition). 
This provision clearly does not authorize entrapment. Indeed, its very 
intent may be to negate the police-immunity defense of police activity in 
certain circumstances. The upshot of this dual approach is that section 
704.11 leaves intact a defendant's right to raise entrapment (in its common 
law sense) as a defense to his criminal liability while at the same time im-
munizing a peace officer or his agent during legitimate undercover activity 
to the extent that "entrapment" (in its particularized sense under section 
704.77) is not employed. Undercover activity short of "entrapment" is im-
munized under section 704.11; undercover activity constituting "entrap-
ment" is not. 
This interpretation considers "entrapment" in a particularized sense for 
purposes of this provision only. The starting point of the analysis is that the 
term "entrapment" does not appear in section 704.11. Indeed, the applicable 
terminology is contra.ry to the existing entrapment standard. This is evi-
denced in the last sentence of the amended provision, which states that its 
intent is "to discourage such activity to tempt, urge or persuade the com-
mission of offenses by persons not already disposed to commit offenses of 
that kind." 
The phrase "not already disposed" speaks the language of the subjec-
tive standard for the defense of entrapment which focuses upon the criminal 
defendant and especially his criminal predisposition or proclivity. Prior to 
the final passage of the new Criminal Code, even in its initial form in 1976, 
the Iowa Supreme Court had abandoned the subjective test of entrapment 
and substituted the objective test.818 The latter focuses upon the particular 
activities of the undercover peace officer or his agent. The pertinent ques-
tion thus is whether "a law enforcement agent induce[d] the commission of 
an offense using persuasion or other means likely to cause normally law-
abiding persons to commit the offense."827 Thus, the fact-finder must deter-
mine "what the effect of the agent's conduct would be on a normally law-
abiding person."828 As stated in State v. Mullen,s28 "the defense is treated 
primarily as a curb upon improper law enforcement techniques, to which the 
predisposition of the particular defendant is irrelevant."88D 
It bears repeating that the word "entrapment" is not used in section 
825. State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1974). 
826. [d. at 381. 
827. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 213. 
828. [d. 
829. 216 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1974). 
830. [d. at 382. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 213. 
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704.11, as it has a definite legal meaning (i.e., the objective test). If the legis-
lative intent was to change the standard for entrapment, the easiest way to 
accomplish this would have been to use the word "entrapment" in the afore-
mentioned explanatory last sentence in the amended provision. Instead, 
however, the statutory language refers to discouraging police activity that 
involves persons "not already disposed to commit offenses of that kind." 
Because, as noted above, the thrust of this sentence is not to change the 
standard for the defense of entrapment, there must have been some other 
purpose for this statement. A logical interpretation would be that this ex-
planatory sentence clarifies that the word "instigator" in section one of the 
provision refers to entrapment in the subjective sense. This interpretation is 
of dual significance. First, as noted above, the word "instigate" should be 
read as meaning more than to merely initiate. Otherwise, effective under-
cover police activity would become almost a nullity. Indeed, "instigate" 
means to goad, provoke, or incite, as noted above. 
Secondly, this amended provision, so interpreted, would qualifiedly im-
munize police activity which constitutes entrapment under the objective 
test. Under the parameters of the objective test an officer or agent must still 
act reasonably and under the guise of authority. Accordingly, all personal 
violence crimes would be off limits. Either way, however, the defense of en-
trapment, as interpreted under the objective test, remains available to the 
private individual-criminal defendant who was the object of the undercover 
criminal investigation. 
C. Conspiracys31 
Several changes were made in the revised crime of Conspiracy.s8s These 
changes have resulted in a "desirably narrower"S38 crime than under pre-
revised law.s84 The gist of this crime remains, however, centered upon an 
unlawful agreement or combination.s811 The essential elements consist of (1) 
831. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 11-16; UNIFORM JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 601-12; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 398, §§ 61-62; . 
R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 612-35. 
832. IOWA CODE § 706.1 (1979). Additionally, several specific conspiracy statutes relating 
to controlled substances offenses appear in IOWA CODE §§ 204.401(1), .401(2), .402(2), .403(2) 
. (1979). 
833. Schantz, supra note 2, at 441n.99. 
834. IOWA CODE §§ 719.1, 782.6 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
835. As explained in UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 605, an express 
agreement is not necessary. Rather, the members of a conspiracy must "in some way or manner 
or through some contrivance, [comel to a mutual understanding to commit a criminal act." [d. 
In contrast, under UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 606, mere association 
with others to discuss common criminal interests "does not necessarily establish the existence 
of an agreement or make one a member of a conspiracy." 
A conspiracy agreement can be inferred from presence at the scene of a crime together and 
joint participation in criminal activity. If a person understands the unlawful nature of acts 
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an agreement or combination of two or more persons (2) to engage in crimi-
nal activity (3) with an overt act by at least one conspirator designed to 
accomplish the purpose of the Conspiracy. 
1. Mens Rea or Purpose 
There must be a criminal purpose of the conspiracy, either in whole or 
in part, thus eliminating the alternative purpose of committing a lawful act 
in an unlawful manner888 as existed under the pre-revised statute.1I87 Thus, 
Conspiracy remains a specific intent crime.888 
2. Overt Act 
Another change is that the revised crime requires the additional ele-
ment of an overt act (by one or more of the co-conspirators), the nature of 
which evidences "a design to accomplish the purpose of the conspiracy by 
criminal means. "888 This could consist of some preparatory step being taken 
to carry out the design, "or which at least has a tendency to forward the 
purpose of the conspiracy."84o Examples of overt acts in a conspiracy to 
commit murder would be for one of the co-conspirators to hand a loaded 
gun and a photograph of the intended victim to the trigger man, or even for 
the trigger man to obtain these on his own.841 
taking place and nevertheless assists in any manner in carrying out of the common scheme, he 
is a co-conspirator. Bender v. State, 253 A.2d 680 (Del. 1969). 
836. See State v. Jennings, 195 N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 1972); J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra 
note 3, § 112. 
837. One authority states: 
This definition of Conspiracy changes the law in Iowa. Previously a conspiracy could 
involve an agreement to commit civil wrongs. However, with the new definition, it 
appears that a conspiracy may only exist for the purpose of committing criminal acts. 
Therefore, no longer will a conspiracy exist to injure the property rights of another or 
to do injurious acts, unless they are, in and of themselves, criminal acts under other 
provisions of the code. 
J. ROEHRlCK, supra note 620, at 59. 
838. The prosecution must prove, under the UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, 
at No. 602, that the defendant entered into a conspiraceous agreement "with the intent that 
the object or purpose of the agreement be performed." See text accompanying notes 480-509 
supra. 
839. IOWA CODE § 706.1 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 
607; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 113. 
840. California v. Olson, 232 Cal.App.2d 480, _, 42 Cal. Rptr. 760, 767 (1965). 
841. Compare United States v. Armone, 363 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1966) (yes) with New York 
v. Flood, 53 Misc.2d 109, 277 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (no), for contrasting opinions on 
whether mere conversations between or among co-conspirators in forming and planning the 
conspired design constitute overt acts. 
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3. Numerical Considerations 
Another apparent change will cause a conspiracy to be treated "as a 
single conspiracy whether one or many criminal acts are planned."ulI This is 
because of the new statutory language referring to "a course of conduct." As 
a result, an agreement to burglarize a dwelling with the intent to pilfer its 
contents will not support two separate charges of Conspiracy to Commit 
Burglary and Conspiracy to Commit Theft.s43 
4. Merger 
The most significant change in the law of Conspiracy effected in the 
new Criminal Code is to eliminate multiple convictions for the inchoate of-
fense of Conspiracy and the substantive offense which was the target crime 
(or objective of the conspiracy).su Therefore, multiple defendants acting in 
concert to commit a burglary cannot be convicted of both Burglary and 
Conspiracy to Commit Burglary.84G Because the statutory language says that 
a person "may not be convicted and sentenced for both [offenses),"U8 both 
offenses may still be prosecuted by including them in multiple counts of the 
indictment/trial information.s47 Under Iowa law, a person is not convicted 
until entry of judgment by the court.us Accordingly, it appears that the trier 
of fact could be given verdict forms as to both offenses, with the prosecution 
then being required to elect before entry of judgment which conviction it 
wants recorded. If this procedure is permissible, then the prosecution will no 
doubt argue for a further extension whereby it would be permitted to seek 
deferment of entry of judgment on one of the two offenses until the convic-
tion on the other offense has been upheld (or the time for appealing has 
expired).s49 The prosecutor's optionSGO in selecting either Conspiracy or the 
target substantive offense conspiraceously achieved is especially potent 
842. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 112. 
843. See State v. Caine, 105 N.W. 1018 (Iowa, 1906). ct. Lievers v. State, 3 Md.App. 597, 
241 A.2d 147 (1968) (conspiracy to utter a forged check was merged into conspiracy to obtain 
money by false pretenses, since no false representation independent of the uttering was shown 
by the evidence). 
844. IOWA CODE § 706.4 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 116. 
845. This statutory change in section 706.4 thus overrules State v. Reynolds, 250 N.W.2d 
434, 439 (Iowa 1977) (no double jeopardy bar for multiple prosecutions of conspiracy and target 
substantive offense). 
846. IOWA CODE § 706.4 (1979). 
847. But see J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 111: "Finally, although it is still 
possible to charge one with both the conspiracy and the substantive offense, he may not be 
convicted of both." 
848. Iowa Beer & Liquor Dep't v. McBlain, 263 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1977). 
\ 849. But see IOWA R. CRIM. P. 22(1) which states that "[u)pon a plea of guilty [or a) 
verdict of guilty. . . the court must fix a date for pronouncing judgment, which must be within 
a reasonable time . ... " [d. (emphasis added). 
850 .. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 116. 
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when a class D "forcible felony" (a five-year offense)8&1 is the object of the 
Conspiracy (a ten-year offense). This option is untenable. 
One defect in the pre-revised law of Conspiracy which was not cured in 
the new Criminal Code is its "multilateral" definition of Conspiracy (an 
agreement of two or more persons) which, according to Professor Schantz, 
"has created loopholes when for one reason or another one of the alleged 
parties to the agreement cannot be prosecuted."8&2 He notes that "[t]he 
Model Penal Code attempts to close this loophole by a 'unilateral' definition 
of conspiracy: liability is defined in terms of the defendant's act of agreeing 
rather than in terms of an agreement between two or more persons."8&8 
5. Grading 
There are five grades of Conspiracy, with the penalty classification 
ranging from a class C felony down to a simple misdemeanor.8&4 Conspiring 
to commit a "forcible felony"81111 is punishable as a class C felony,8118 whereas 
a Conspiracy to commit any other (a non-forcible) felony is itself a class D 
felony.8&? On the other hand, a Conspiracy to commit a crime included in 
any of the three classes of misdemeanors is punishable as a misdemeanor of 
the same classification as the target crime.8118 
This five-level grading system contrasts favorably with the one grade of 
Conspiracy under the pre-revised law.8l1D The former uniform penalty was an 
indeterminate term of imprisonment of three years, with no authorized fine. 
Moreover, Conspiracy was limited under the pre-revised law to felonies as 
the target crimes. Thus, a conspirator was equally punishable whether he 
had conspired under the pre-revised law to commit a life-imprisonment of-
fense (e.g., Murder in the First Degree) or merely a one-year felony (e.g., 
Assault with Intent to Inflict Great Bodily Injury). Moreover, the pre-re-
vised three-year penalty was inadequate for the most major target crimes 
(e.g., a life-imprisonment offense), as well as inequitable for the most minor 
felonious target crimes (e.g., the one-year felony of Assault with Intent to 
Inflict Great Bodily Injury). The new penalty schedules are considerably 
higher for all felonies, with an authorized ten-year term for Conspiracy to 
commit a "forcible felony" and a five-year term for Conspiracy involving 
any other felonies. These schedules cure most but not all of the problems of 
851. See text accompanying notes 70-102 supra. 
852. Schantz, supra note 2, at 441 n.99. 
853. [d. 
854. For a general discussion of the penalty schedules and various sentencing alternatives 
for these five classifications of crimes, see notes 70-111 supra and accompanying text. 
855. See text accompanying notes 70-96.3 supra. 
856. See id. 
857. See id. 
858. See IOWA CODE § 706.3 (1979). 
859. See IOWA CODE § 719.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
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inadequacy and inequity under the pre-revised law. Nevertheless, a person 
conspiring to commit a life offense (e.g., Murder in the First Degree) or even 
a twenty-five year class B felony (e.g., Robbery in the First Degree) is sub-
ject to a term of ten years while a person who conspires to commit a forcible 
felony in the class C (ten years) or class D (five years) schedule range is also 
subject to a ten-year sentence. This schedule, of course, is untenable as to 
the class D felony target crimes. 
One ameliorative measure in the new Criminal Code permits a fine as 
an alternative penalty to either imprisonment or a suspended sentence. Un-
like the pre-revised law, both class C (up to $5000) and Class D (up to 
$1000) felonies in the new Criminal Code can be punishable, in the sentenc-
ing court's judicial discretion, by fine only.860 
Another change is that the revised crime of Conspiracy applies to mis-
demeanors as target crimes. This change seems appropriate, since unlawful 
combinations of persons intent upon committing a crime should be punisha-
ble irrespective of the classification of target substantive crime(s). The pub-
lic interest is better served by discouraging group criminal activity even of a 
comparatively minor nature. This is especially true with the creation of the 
classification of aggravated misdemeanors which includes several rather seri-
ous offenses (including some pre-revised downgraded felonies).861 
1. Arson862 
IV. PROPERTY ABUSE OFFENSES 
A. Arson and Related Crimes 
The revised crime of Arson consolidated into one offense several pre-
revised crimes,86s including intentional unlawful burnings of both real and 
personal property,8M damage by explosives,861i and attempted Arson.- The 
elements of Arson are as follows: (1) either causing a fire or explosion or 
860. See IOWA CODE § 909.1 (1979) and text accompanying notes 75-102 supra. 
861. For example, the pre-revised felony offense of Assault with Intent to Inflict Great 
Bodily Injury was downgraded to an aggravated misdemeanor in the related newly-constituted 
offense of Assault with Intent to Inflict Serious Injury. Cf. IOWA CODE § 694.6 (1977) (repealed 
1978); IOWA CODE § 708.2(1) (1979). A temporizing effect of the new classification is apparent in 
the statutory treatment of the so-called "victimless crime" of Prostitution, which is punishable 
now as an aggravated misdemeanor instead of as a five-year felony under the pre-revised law. 
Compare IOWA CODE § 724.2 (1977) (repealed 1978) with IOWA CODE § 725.1 (1979). 
862. IOWA CODE § 712.1 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 
1201-11; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 271-76; R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 216-
30. 
863. For an extensive discussion of the pre-revised law through the changes proposed in 
the 1974 bill, see Note, Arson, 60 IOWA L. REV. 529 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Arson Note]. 
864. See IOWA CODE §§ 707.1-.4 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
865. [d. §§ 697.3, .4. 
866. [d. § 707.5. 
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placing combustible material or an incendiary or explosive device (2) in or 
near real or personal "property"867 (3) either with intent to destroy or dam-
age such property or knowing such property would probably be destroyed or 
damaged. Several related offenses comprise the remainder of chapter 712 of 
the Iowa Code, as discussed in the remainder of part IV (A) of this Article. 
a. Attempted Arson Included. The revised crime of Arson is statuto-
rily defined to include attempted Arson, thus rendering attempted burning 
or attempted explosion equally punishable with burning or exploding. The 
attempt constitutes the act of placing combustible material or any incendi-
ary or explosive device in or near real or personal property.868 Attempted 
Arson requires sucessful placing of these devices, and a mere attempt to 
place these devices is not part of Arson, but instead is punishable under the 
related but less serious offense of Threats to Place Incendiary or Explosive 
Devices.889 Likewise, a person apprehended in possession of these devices 
and intending to use them to commit a public offense, but having not yet 
placed or attempted to place them in or near real or personal property, com-
mits the rel~ted but less serious crime of Possession of Explosive or Incendi-
ary Materials or Devices.87o 
b. Specific Result. Arson is no longer a specific result crime. It is 
neither necessary that any actual damage occur, nor that fire or explosion 
itself occur. This is a change from common law Arson which required at 
least some damage,871 with mere charring generally considered to be suffi-
cient for Arson.872 
c. Mens Rea. The new Criminal Code eliminates the requirement of 
specific intent which existed under the pre-revised statute. One authority 
states that, "[t]he specific intent to damage or destroy, or the general intent 
to do the act with knowledge of its probable consequences, is all that is 
required"873 under the revised statute. Recklessness,87. however, plays no 
part in Arson, with Reckless Use of Fire or Explosives8711 being a separate, 
but related and less serious, offense. 
Malice878 was also eliminated as an element in the new offense. How-
867. "Property" is defined broadly as "anything of value," whether real or personal, in 
IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979). See text accompanying notes 204-06 supra. 
868. [d. § 712.1 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 272. 
869. IOWA CODE § 712.8 (1979). See discussion in text accompanying notes 925-31 infra. 
870. [d. § 712.6. See discussion in text accompanying notes 918-24 infra. 
871. R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 220-21. 
872. "Hence, the discoloration, scorching, or shrivelling of wood by fire may not amount 
to a burning, but the charring of wood, even in the absence of an actual blaze, is designated as a 
burning." Arson Note, supra note 863, at 533-34 (citing State v. Spiegel, 111 Iowa 701, 705, 83 
N.W. 722, 723 (1900». 
873. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 272. 
874. See text accompanying notes 594-601 supra. 
875. IOWA CODE § 712.5 (1979). See text accompanying notes 911-17 infra. 
876. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 216: 
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ever, this change may not be of major significance in light of the restrictive 
interpretation given the term "maliciously" under the pre-revised law. In 
State v. Dunn,877 the Iowa Supreme Court pointed out that, while the pre-
revised Arson statute required willful and malicious burning, willfully means 
"purposely, deliberately, intentionally" and "the intentional doing of a 
'wrongful act,' without justification or lawful excuse, will permit an inference 
of a wicked state of mind, i.e., legal malice, as opposed to actual malice."878 
Accordingly, the court held that the prosecution was not required to prove 
the defendant's unlawful burning of another's personal property stemmed 
from his or her personal hostility or revenge towards the other person. To 
the contrary, the proof was that the defendant was hired by the owner of an 
automobile to burn the automobile, so that the owner could collect the in-
surance proceeds.878 
d. Explosions. The newly-constituted offense of Arson, unlike its com-
mon law origin, is not limited to burningM° or even to attempted burning. 
Rather, it is a more encompassing crime of destruction which includes dam-
age or attempted damage by explosion. The venacular of this revised crime 
includes such terms as "combustible material,"881 "incendiarY device,"88l1 
and "explosive device."888 In contrast, only incendiary and explosive devices 
Where "malice" is an essential element of the offense(s) or the degree(s) of offense(s) 
charged, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Malice is a state of mind 
which leads one to intentionally do a wrongful act (to the injury of another) (in disre-
gard of the rights of another) which is done out of actual spite, hatred, ill will, or with 
an evil, wicked or unlawful purpose, knowing that the act is without just cause or 
excuse. Malice may be either express or implied. 
Express malice is that which is established by proof of spite, hatred, ill will, or an 
evil, wicked or unlawful purpose or by proof of a deliberate or fixed intent to do 
injury. 
Implied malice is that which may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the 
accused, and the means used by him in doing the wrongful and injurious act without 
legal justification or excuse. 
[d. See also text accompanying notes 549-65 supra. 
877. 199 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1972). 
878. [d. at 108. 
879. [d. 
880. See R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 220-23. 
881. The term "combustible material" is not defined in the Criminal Code. However, 
"[s}ince the ordinary meaning of 'incendiary' is 'designed to cause fires,' it is difficult to com-
prehend how combustible material can become incendiary material without becoming an in-
dendiary device." J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 278. For the statutory definition of 
"incendiary device," see IOWA CODE § 702.21 (1979). 
882. IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1977), was amended in 1978 adding the following definitional 
clause: "An incendiary device is a device, contrivance, or material causing or designed to cause 
destruction of property by fire." 1978 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1183 (67th G.A.). It would appear 
that the definition of "incendiary device" in the UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS will need to be 
revised in order to conform with the statutory standard. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
supra note 136, at No. 1213. 
883. The term "explosive material" is comprehensively defined outside the Criminal Code 
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are included in the coverage of the related crimes comprising the remainder 
of chapter 712 of the Iowa Code. 
e. Felony Murder Rule. The definitional change in the revised crime 
of Arson has the additional effect of altering the scope of the application of 
Arson as the underlying felony in a first degree felony murder situation. The 
basic change was brought about by the elimination of a dwelling house as 
the sole subject of the revised crime of Arson. Under the pre-revised law, 
every Arson could be the underlying felony in a first degree felony murder 
prosecution.884 The revised crime of Arson, even in the first degree, not only 
is not limited to a dwelling house but also does not automatically include a 
dwelling house. Moreover, an intentional murder during an Arson in the sec-
ond or third degree would be Murder in the Second Degree under the sec-
ond-degree felony murder rule,8811 whereas the crime would only be Involun-
tary Manslaughter888 if such a killing were unintentional. 
f. Arson by Owner Exception. The broad approach taken in the Arson 
statute necessitated a specific provision887 authorizing burning or blowing up 
of one's own unwanted "property,"888 either directly or through another per-
son. This, of course, may be done provided that no insurer is defrauded and 
the life or property of another person is not unreasonably endangered. The 
latter proviso thus sets a standard of care for a person who is burning his 
own property lawfully, without attempting to defraud his insurer.8811 Both of 
these provisos must be present for a defendant to be within the protection 
of this limited defense. In order for this defense to be applicable, the prose-
cution must be unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt anyone (or 
more) of the following three factors: (1) that the defendant did not have the 
owner's consent to so act, (2) that an insurer "was exposed fradulently to 
the risk of loss," or (3) that the defendant's acts were done "in such a way" 
that the life or property of another "was unreasonably endangered. "8110 
g. Grading. Arson is in the first degree8111 when the attendant circum-
stances were such that presence of a person could have been reasonably an-
ticipated on or near the property involved. "[T]he mere possibility of the 
presence of a person is insufficient. Rather, the property must have been 
itself in IOWA CODE § lOlA. 1 (1979). In light of the absence of anything to the contrary, it is 
appropriate to read the § 101A.1 definition into the Arson and related offenses material in 
Chapter 712 under the principle of compatible statutory provisions being read in pari materia. 
884. See IOWA CODE §§ 690.2 & 707.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
885. See IOWA CODE § 707.3 (1979). 
886. See id. § 707.5(1). 
887. [d. § 712.1. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 273. 
888. For the statutory definition of property, see IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979) and text 
accompanying notes 204-06 supra. 
889. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 273. 
890. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1209. 
891. IOWA CODE § 712.2 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 
1204, 1208. 
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such that a reasonable person would have anticipated or expected a person's 
presence in or on the property."892 
The actual presence of a person may not be sufficient if such presence 
was not "reasonably anticipated," such as a trespasser in a warehouse or in 
an apparently abandoned property. Conversely, actual presence of a person 
clearly is not required. Rather, only reasonable anticipation of the presence 
of a person is required. The anticipation would be great where the target 
property is a dwelling house, or other residential or commercial property 
normally occupied by persons.893 
Occupied residential property arguably should even carry a presump- . 
tion that presence of a person therein was reasonably anticipated. However, 
any such presumption should be rebuttable, with the defendant carrying the 
burden of proving particular circumstances which would indicate that the 
presence of persons was not reasonably anticipated. This situation would 
occur, for example, where residential occupants unexpectedly returned home 
early from vacation, and the defendant was only aware of their original 
plans. Any presumption of presence of persons in an occupied dwelling 
house should not be conclusive because of the omission of any specific refer-
ence in the Arson statute to a dwelling. 
A more meaningful approach would have been to expressly include an 
occupied dwelling in the category of Arson in the First Degree. That ap-
proach would more closely comport with the adage that a man's home is his 
castle, as was statutorily exemplified in the pre-revised statute, as well as 
having the advantage of eliminating any technical distinctions between ac-
. tual presence of persons and reasonable anticipation of persons. Express in-
clusion of a dwelling was contained in the Criminal Code Revision Study 
Committee's report89• and in S.F. 85 as introduced in 1975.8911 The fact that 
S.F. 85 was amended to delete specific mention of a dwelling is a strong 
indication of legislative intent that actual presence of persons even in a 
dwelling is not sufficient when there is no reasonable anticipation of persons 
being present. 
Arson in the Second Degree898 includes acts of Arson, whether success-
ful or not, directed toward (1) real property of any value in which presence 
of persons was not reasonably anticipated, (2) personal property exceeding 
$500 in value, or (3) standing crops of any value.89? This makes Arson in the 
892. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1208. 
893. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 43, at 60. 
894. See STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, § 1202, at 24 (property covered to in-
clude "a dwelling, or a building in which the presence of one or more persons can be reasonably 
anticipated"). 
895. The same language as that quoted in note 894 supra, was included in § 1202 of S.F. 
85, as introduced, but subsequently was deleted before final passage of S.F. 85. 
896. IOWA CODE § 712.3 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 
1205. 
897. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. '1205. 
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Third Degree8B8 a residual section, covering only Arson involving personal 
property valued at $500 or less. Because Arson no longer is a specific result 
crime, these dollar amounts relate to the value of the property involved and 
not to the amount of damage caused, if any. Unlike in the Theft statute,8BB 
no standard for determining value is set out in the Arson statute, nor is 
there an. amplifying Uniform Jury Instruction.Boo 
h. Sentencing Options. Arson in the First Degree is a class B felony 
whereas Arson in the Second and Third Degrees are class C and D felonies, 
respectively.Bol Only first degree Arson is a "forcible felony,"B02 and thus po-
tentially subject to either the five year minimum term (if a firearm was in-
volved)B08 or the first degree felony murder rule. Moreover, the ameliorative 
sentencing options of a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a sus-
pended sentence are not available for first degree Arson,BM unlike the two 
lower degrees of Arson.Boll Moreover, no fine can be imposed for Arson in the 
First Degree unlike for the two lower degrees of Arson, thus leaving the sen-
tencing judge with no discretion, being limited to the one sentencing option 
of imposing the twenty-five year prison term. 
Another important sentencing .change has occurred in the treatment of 
attempted Arson. Under the pre-revised law, attempted Arson, without 
more, was punishable by either an indeterminate penitentiary term of two 
years or a maximum fine of $1000,908 with all three above-mentioned amelio-
rative sentencing options available.907 The revised crime of Arson includes 
attempted Arson,908 which means that attempted Arson, if it qualifies as a 
class B felony,90B can be punishable by as much as an indeterminate peni-
tentiary term of twenty-five years, without the availability of a fine only as 
an alternative sentence. Furthermore, none of the three ameliorative sen-
tencing options is available9lo for the revised crime of attempted Arson. 
898. IOWA CODE § 712.4 (1979). 
899. [d. § 714.3. 
900. Cf, UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1442 (value in theft cases). 
901. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70-
102 supra. 
902. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979). 
903. See id. § 902.7. 
904. See IOWA CODE §§ 702.11, 907.3 (1979). 
905. See IOWA CODE § 789A.l (1977) (repealed 1978). 
906. See id. § 707.5. 
907. See id. § 789A.1. 
908. See text accompanying note 868 supra. 
909. For a comprehensive discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompa-
nying notes 70-102 supra. 
910. In a related matter of strengthening arson investigations, a 1979 legislative act au-
thorizes certain law enforcement agencies to request relevant information held by insurance 
companies, which must produce it. A simple misdemeanor penalty attaches to a failure either 
to release this information or to fail to keep it confidential. (S.F. 339). 
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2. Reckless Use of Fire or Explosive 
The related revised offense of Reckless Use of Fire or Explosives911 fills 
the void in the law of Arson when the defendant did not act intentionally in 
using fire or explosives unlawfully. The elements are: (1) recklessly91l (2) 
using fire or any incendiary or explosive device and (3) thus endangering 
property or safety of another.91B So defined, (as "using"), there is no such 
thing as an attempted reckless use. Like the other related offenses below, 
this offense has only one degree and thus is not concerned at all with the 
values of the real or personal property involved. Unlike under the pre-re-
vised statutes,914 no actual damage is required, nor is it necessary for the 
prosecution to show actual loss of control of any fire which was recklessly 
started.9l11 Moreover, Reckless Use of Fire or Explosives was not a criminal 
act under the pre-revised law.918 This crime is merely a serious 
misdemeanor.917 
3. Possession of Explosive or Incendiary Devices918 
This is a mere possessory offense, where defendant is apprehended in 
possession919 of explosive920 or incendiary9ll devices but has not yet placed 
or attempted to place such devices in or near real or personal property. Nev-
ertheless, this act of possession must be accompanied by a specific intent911 
to use these devices to commit a public offense.9l1S The intended offense 
911. IOWA CODE § 712.5 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 
1203, 1212-13; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 277; Arson Note, supra note 863, at 
540-42. 
912. See text accompanying notes 594-601 supra. 
913. IOWA CODE § 712.5 (1979). 
914. See IOWA CODE §§ 707.7-.8 (1977) (repealed 1978) (setting out fire and allowing fire 
to escape, respectively). 
915. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 277. 
916. See IOWA CODE §§ 697.3-.4 (1977) (repealed 1978) (both of these offenses are specific 
intent crimes); J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 277. 
917. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 103-
11 supra. 
918. IOWA CODE § 712.6 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 
1214-17; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 278. 
919. "Possession" does not require the devices to be on the defendant's person. It is suffi-
cient if defendant is exercising dominion and control over them. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1217. 
920. See text accompanying note 883 supra, for the definition of explosives. 
921. See note 882 supra, for the definition of incendiary devices. 
922. See text accompanying notes 480-509 supra. 
923. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, states: 
The major problem of the state in prosecutions under this section will be the proof of 
intent. This may limit the use of this section to attempt situations in which the ac-
tion has not progressed to the point that a violation of§ 712.1 can be proved, or to 
conspiracies in which the possession of these devices is the overt act. 
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could be any of several offenses other than Arson, such as Burglary, Extor-
tion, or Murder. This possessory offense is a class C felony, but it is not a 
"forcible felony. "92. 
4. Threats to Place Incendiary or Explosive Devices9111 
The elements of this revised offense9s6 are as follows: (1) either threat-
ening to place or attempting to place (2) any incendiary or explosive device 
(3) in any place endangering persons or property.8lI7 So defined, this encom-
passes an attempted form of attempted Arson.928 The word "attempt" is not 
defined in the Code, but is defined in a Uniform Jury Instruction as occur-
ring when a person, "with the intent or purpose to commit an offense, takes 
action toward completing the offense."lIslI This offense is a class D felony, 
but it is not a "forcible felony."88o 
The more serious offense of Arson881 would occur if this threat is carried 
out by either (a) causing a fire or explosion or (b) actually placing these 
devices in or near property, with the requisite state of mind. For some rea-
son, the lowest degree of Arson is classified as a class D felony, the same as 
is the classification for this inchoate-type offense. The offense of Threats to 
Place Incendiary or Explosive Devices is not a "forcible felony," however, as 
is Arson in the Third Degree. 
5. False Reports982 
This specific type of false report offense consists of: (1) conveying or 
causing to be conveyed (2) to any person (3) any false information (4) about 
placement of incendiary or explosive devices (5) in any place where persons 
or property would be endangered (6) with knowledge988 that the information 
[d. § 278. 
924. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70-
102 supra. 
925. IOWA CODE § 712.8 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 
1220-21; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 280. 
926. See IOWA CODE § 697.7 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
927. "Note that there does not appear to be a requirement that the accused knew that the 
location would endanger persons or property, only that it could have so endangered a person or 
property. This is extremely subjective and vague." J. ROEHRICK, supra note 620, at 136. 
928. "This section is one of the few attempt sections of the new code." J. ROEHRICK, 
supra note 620, at 136. 
929. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1221. But see text accompany-
ing notes 742-49 supra, as to whether this is the proper test for attempt liability. 
930. See text accompanying notes 70-102 supra. 
931. See IOWA CODE § 712.1-.4 (1979) and accompanying notes 862-909 supra. 
932. [d. § 712.7. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 1218-19; J. 
YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 279. 
933. See text accompanying notes 572-93. 
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is false. 934 The crime is not limited to making false reports to official agen-
cies such as fire or police departments, but includes spreading false rumors 
to other private individuals. Further, there is no temporal limitation, with 
false reports thus relating to either past, present, or future conduct.93& This 
is a class D felony, but is not a "forcible felony."938 
B. Criminal Mischief 
The revised general offense of Criminal Mischief987 replaces several pre-
revised specific Malicous Injury statutes9SS dealing with various acts of prop-
erty damage or destruction. Its elements are: (1) intentionally; (2) without a 
right to do so; (3) damaging, defacing, altering, or destroying; (4) tangible 
"property,"989 public or private.940 This includes damage to both real and 
personal property.sn 
1. Intentional Action 
Criminal Mischief is premised upon intentional actions together with 
knowledge of having no right to take such actions. Thus, damaging another's 
property through recklessness or mere carelessness is not sufficient to incur 
criminal culpability. Rather, intentional conduct is required~ and the prose-
cution must prove under the Uniform Jury Instructions that defendant in-
tended to damage, deface, alter, or destroy the property.941 Elimination of 
934. IOWA CODE § 712.7 (1979). 
935. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 279. 
936. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70-
102 supra. 
937. IOWA CODE §§ 716.1-.6 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at 
Nos. 1601-06; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 371-77; R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 
331-39. Malicious Mischief was the common law predecessor offense. 
938. See IOWA CODE § 714 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
939. This offense is expressly limited by statute to tangible property [see IOWA CODE § 
716.1 (1979»), contrary to the statutory general definition of property as "anything of value" 
including both "tangible and intangible property." IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979). "Because the act 
is one of physical damage or destruction, the subject matter of criminal mischief must be tangi-
ble property, whether real or personal." J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 371. The 
statutory general definition appears to be controlling, nevertheless, on the point of tangible 
property "of any value" being covered in the provisions or criminal mischief. 
940. IOWA CODE § 716.1 (1979). One commentator states that section "717.1 [Injury to 
Animals) should be compared with § 716.1, which is concerned with damage to tangible prop-
erty. Although animals are property, and are certainly not intangible, the inclusion of both § 
716.1 and this section indicates a purpose to confine § 716.1 to inanimate property." J. YEAGER 
& R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 392. 
941. See IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979). "The term [property) includes all that is included in 
the terms 'real property' and personal property.''' [d. See also note 939 supra. An example of 
damage to real property would be vandals intentionally tearing up sod. This would constitute 
criminal mischief even though the sod could be replaced and the lawn fully restored. 
942. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1603. Accord, J. YEAGER & 
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malice as a particularized state of mind has broadened the scope of this 
revised crime by not requiring that the intentional act of mischief be done 
"out of spite, hatred, ill will, or with an evil, wicked, or unlawful purpose, 
knowing that the act is without just cause or excuse," as that term question-
ably is defined in the Uniform Jury Instructions.943 
2. Grading and Sentencing Options 
The grading of this offense into four degrees is essentially geared to the 
amount of damage caused. The key is the cost of replacing, repairing, or 
restoring the property, rather than either the value of the property affected 
or the amount of property valuation decrease caused. Moreover, the act of 
mischief need not result in a lowering of the value of the property in-
volved.944 A special verdict form is included in the Uniform Jury Instruc-
tions941 for the jury to determine the cost of repair, replacement, or restora-
tion of the property damaged or destroyed by defendant. 
There are three special situations in which the cost of the damage is 
immaterial. These involve: (1) substantial interruption or impairment of ser-
vice rendered by a public utility; (2) damage to a signal or barricade in-
tended to protect the public from a hazardous condition such that it is ren-
dered substantially less effective than before and (3) damage to certain legal 
and commercial instruments. Additionally, intentional unlawful disinter-
ment of human remains constitutes Criminal Mischief in the Third Degree, 
pursuant to an amendment in 1978.948 The four classifications are simple 
misdemeanor947 (for damage of $100 or less); aggravated misdemeanor948 (for 
R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 372. But see text accompanying notes 528-42 supra, as to this not 
actually being a specific intent crime. 
943. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 216 ("malice"). The pre-
revised offense of Malicious Injury, Iowa Code § 714.1 (1977) (repealed 1978), was interpreted 
in Larson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 258 Iowa 348, 139 N.W.2d 174 (1965), as follows: "The 
mere intentional doing of an act prohibited by statute or omitting the performance of a statu-
tory duty, does not alone constitute malicious mischief, though it may damage the property of 
another." Id. at 353, 139 N.W.2d at 176. Noting that acting unlawfully and willfully does not 
constitute maliciousness, the court in Larson determined that a person acts maliciously if at 
the time of the act he "was bent on mischief against some person, ordinarily the owner, and was 
prompted by an evil mind to destroy or injure the property." Id. at 352. But see text accompa-
nying notes 549-65 supra, as to "malice not requiring spite, hatred, or ill will." 
944. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 372. 
945. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136,.at No. 1606. 
946. 1978 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1029 (67th G.A.), amending IOWA CODE § 716.5 (Supp. 
1978). This provision, however, does not include exposing of or abandoning of dead bodies. See 
IOWA CODE § 714.22 (1977) (repealed 1978); State v: Aldrich, 231 N.W.2d 890 (Iowa 1975). A 
legislative bill in 1979 to include abandonment in the homicide chapter failed to pass. H.F. 75 
(1979). 
947. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70-
102 supra. 
948. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70-
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damage from $100-plus to $500); class C felony9<l9 (for damage from $500-
plus to $5000); and class D felony9110 (for damage in excess of $5,000). 
Neither felony is classified as a "forcible felony," and both felonies are pun-
ishable, in the sentencing court's discretion, by a fine only or by any of the 
ameliorative sentencing options (i.e., a deferred judgment, a deferred sen-
tence, or a suspended sentence), in lieu of imprisonment. 
The legislative judgment in skipping the intermediate misdemeanor 
penalty - the serious misdemeanor - is subject to criticism, especially in 
light of all of the sentences for misdemeanor offenses being of a non-indeter-
minate basis. That is, a sentencing judge can, in his discretion, impose a 
defini~ or fixed term of any number of days up to the maximum for the 
particular classification. Thus, a person convicted of the lowest degree of 
Criminal Mischief for causing property damage not exceeding $100 is sub-
ject to a possible jail term of any number of days in the comparatively nar-
row range of one to thirty days, whereas a person convicted of the very next 
lowest degree of Criminal Mischief is subject to a possible term of imprison-
ment of any number of days in the broad range of two years (i.e., one to 730 
days) with any term in excess of one year potentially subject to being served 
in the penitentiary or adult reformatory.9U At least, the less 'expansive 
schedule of imprisonment under a serious misdemeanor (up to one year) 
would reduce this unnecessarily broad range of discretion.9111 Interestingly, 
two other "property" offenses - Theft and Fraudulent Practices9118 - have 
five grades, including all three levels of misdemeanors. The reason for such 
differentiation between stealing another's property altogether or in merely 
damaging is unknown. Nevertheless, this very classification scheme ap-
peared unchanged throughout the legislative process, starting with the pro-
posal of the Criminal Code Study Committee. 8114 
3. Merger 
Section 716.2 of the Criminal Code requires merger of all acts of Crimi-
nal Mischief against several items of property attributable to "a single 
scheme, plan or conspiracY,"9I1D such that only one offense has been commit-
ted. Accordingly, the total damage is to be aggregated with one charge filed, 
based upon the highest degree of the total value, rather than filing several 
102 supra. 
949. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70-
102 supra. 
950. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70-
102 supra. 
951. See IOWA CODE § 903.4 (1979). 
952. See id. § 714.2. 
953. See id. §§ 714.9-.13. 
-954. See STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, §§ 1603-06, at 34-35; S.F. 85. 
955. IOWA CODE § 716.2 (1979). 
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charges based upon the non-aggregated value of the individual items. This 
statutory provision apparently establishes the principle of episodic immu-
nity but only as to the crime of Criminal Mischief, in that the prosecution 
must include all of the acts or damage in the initial prosecution, or be 
barred from future prosecution of other acts of mischief committed as part 
of the same scheme, plan or conspiracy. 11M 
C. Burglary and Related Offenses 
1. Burglary 
The revised crime of BurglaryBII7 is different in many respects from both 
its statutory forerunners and the common law offense. It includes the pre-
revised crimes of Burglary,8D8 Burglary by Explosives,"111 Burglary by Elec-
tricity or Gas,B60 Breaking and Entering,HI Breaking and Entering Railway 
Cars,962 Larceny in the Nighttime,HS and Larceny in the Daytime.H4 It does 
not include, in their entirety, the pre-revised crimes of Entering a Bank 
With Intent to RobB611 and Attempting to Break and Enter.-
a. Act. The actus reus was changed considerably by making Burglary 
either an unlawful entry crime or an unlawful remaining over crime. The 
breaking requirement has been eliminated altogether, although the revised 
crime of Burglary can be committed by a breaking, as compared to the pre-
revised offense which required both a breaking and an entering. Moreover, 
the actus reus can occur by remaining on certain property after expiration of 
a limited right or privilege to do so. Professor Yeager reports that "[t]his is 
substantial departure from prior law,',"7 and queries: 
[Wjill the state have to prove that he had formed the necessary intent at 
the time his presence in the place became unlawful, or will it be sufficient 
to prove that at some time while he was unlawfully present he formed 
the intent, for example, the intent to commit assault? The language sug-
956. That is, U[t)he merger of these acts into a single offense occurs as a matter of law, 
and not at the discretion of the prosecution .... " J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 373. 
957. IOWA CODE §§ 713.1-.3 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUcnONS, supra note 136, at 
Nos. 1301-14; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 291-96; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTl', supra 
note 398, § 96; R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 414. 
958. See IOWA CODE §§ 708.1-.3 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
959. [d. § 708.4. 
960. [d. § 708.5. 
961. [d. § 708.8. 
962. [d. § 708.11. 
963. [d. § 709.4. 
964. [d. § 709.5. 
965. [d. § 708.9. U[W)hile some of the activity which that section prohibited will be bur-
glary under this code, most of it will be treated as robbery under Chapter 711." J. YEAGER & R. 
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 291. 
966. See IOWA CODE § 708.10 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
967. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 294. 
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gests the latter.9ss 
b. Nighttime. The element of nighttime as an aggravating circum-
stance was eliminated in the new Criminal Code, with the time of day being 
totally irrelevant, as it should be. This is in line with the accompanying 
elimination of a dwelling house· being burglarized as another aggravating 
circumstance. 
c. Structure. The type of structure subject to being burglarized under 
the new Criminal Code is either an "occupied structure" or certain enclosed 
(or secure) areas, with a dwelling house no longer singled out for special 
treatment."9 An "occupied structure" is statutorily defined as "any build-
ing, structure, land, water or air vehicle, or similar place adopted for over-
night accommodation of persons, or occupied by persons for the purpose of 
carrying on business or other activity therein, or for the storage or safekeep-
ing of anything of value."970 Nevertheless, by express statutory language, a 
person need not actually be present at the time of the burglary.971 An "occu-
pied structure" clearly encompasses an automobile which typically provides 
incidental storage.971 
Additionally, the definition of the alternative type of real or personal 
property protected under the Burglary statute, an enclosed area,978 is ampli-
fied in the Uniform Jury Instructions, which state: "An 'enclosed area' is one 
which is so designed, built or enclosed that it is secure for the keeping of 
valuable property, and it reasonably appears the area was meant to be se-
cure from theft or criminal mischief. An 'enclosed area' need not be a struc-
ture or building."974 An example would be a fenced enclosure containing 
nursery plants and gardening equipment adjacent to a shopping center. 
Under such broad definitions of an "occupied structure" and an "en-
closed area," any secure area can be burglarized. Professor Yeager states, 
"[t]he requirement is that it not be open to the public, or, if it is open, that 
968. [d. 
969. A similar change was made in the revised crime of Arson. 
970. See id. § 702.12. 
971. [d. 
972. That an automobile is not primarily used for storage or safekeeping of property 
should not exclude an ordinary automobile from coverage under the burglary statute, as the 
statute does not contain such qualifying language as a vehicle primarily used for the storage or 
safekeeping of property. Moreover, exclusion of automobiles from the burglary statute would 
mean that there would be no aggravated form of theft involving break-ins of automobiles. This 
is because the revised crime of Theft does not contain provisions similar to the pre-revised 
crimes of Larceny in the Nighttime and Larceny in the Daytime. See IOWA CODE §§ 709.4-.5 
(1977) (repealed 1978) (respectively). See also Emery v. Fenton, 266 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1978), 
which characterized the new Criminal Code as "primarily a restatement" of the pre-revised law. 
[d. at 8. 
973. See IOWA CODE § 713.1 (1979). 
974. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1313. 
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one remain in the building or area after it is closed to the public. "970 
d. Burglarious Intent. Burglary has remained a specific intent crime, 
of course. However, the scope of the burglarious intent has been narrowed 
somewhat from the all encompassing pre-revised burglarious intent to com-
mit "any public offense."976 Now, Burglary occurs only when the requisite 
unlawful act is done with the accompanying intent to commit "a felony, as-
sault, or theft."977 Whereas this includes all assaults and thefts of both fel-
ony and misdemeanor grades, other misdemeanors are omitted as target 
crimes, such as the two lowest degrees of Criminal Mischief.976 These situa-
tions apparently will be left to punishment under the Criminal Trespass 
statute979 for the unlawful entry as well as the statute covering the target 
crime itself (e.g., Criminal Mischief980 for any damage done by vandalism). 
e. Attempted Burglary. The revised crime of Burglary encompasses 
only a few of the situations of the pre-revised crime of Attempted Breaking 
and Entering.981 There is no longer a general crime of Attempted Burglary. 
It is true that one form of Burglary under the new Criminal Code is by 
breaking an occupied structure or enclosed area. However, a "breaking" 
under the traditional common law interpretation requires actual removal or 
putting aside of an obstruction to entry.981 Thus, a person caught in the act 
of attempting to remove such an obstruction, such as jimmying the lock on 
or even breaking part of a window without quite permitting entry, would not 
be covered. 
Professor Yeager disagrees with the above discussion, claiming that the 
attempted offense is included, or at least enough of the attempted offense as 
should be punishable is included; it is not clear which.988 He explains that 
the intent of the drafters was that "either a breaking or an entering should 
be required as the minimal overt act on which criminality should be predi-
cated in these circumstances. Since that minimal overt act, if proved, will 
establish the offense of burglary itself, no provision need be made for an 
offense of attempted burglary."984 
There are several other alternative charges to Attempted Burglary, if 
975. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 293. 
976. See IOWA CODE § 708.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
977. IOWA CODE § 713.1 (1979). 
978. [d. §§ 716.5-.6. 
979. [d. § 716.7. 
980. [d. §§ 716.1-.6. 
981. See IOWA CODE § 708.10 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
982. "Making an opening into a building by trespass" occurs "when an intruder removes 
or puts aside some part of the structure relied on as an obstruction to intrusion." State v. 
Houglund, 197 N.W.2d 364, 365 (Iowa 1972). Accord, UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 
136, which states that "[t)he term 'breaks' or 'broke' means the removal or putting aside of any 
obstruction to entering. No damage need result to the property." [d. at No. 1306. 
983. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 291. 
984. [d. 
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there is no such charge, when entry is not gained. Of course, the offense of 
Burglary itself is complete upon a successful breaking. Possession of Bur-
glar's Tools981l is a viable alternative since would-be burglars typically have 
some "tools of the trade" to facilitate gaining forceful entry. Also, the Iowa 
Supreme Court has been quite liberal in characterizing ordinary tools as 
burglar's tools.98s The utility of this inchoate offense is that it is graded 
identically with the consummated offense of Burglary in the Second De-
gree.987 One difficulty is that the prosecution needs to prove burglarious in-
tent of the person found in possession of burglar's tools, and the statutory 
presumption of burglarious intent under the pre-revised statute was elimi-
nated in the new Criminal Code. A third possibility is Criminal Mischief,988 
which would require proof of physical damage to the property. Considerable 
damage would be necessary, however, before the offense would be a felony 
(over $500),989 except in special circumstances. The last alternative would be 
Criminal Trespass,99o which would require unlawful entry onto public or pri-
vate property to be burglarized. However, Trespass is only a misdemeanor, 
even when the aggravated form involving personal injury is involved.991 
f. Felony Murder Rule. Unlike under the pre-revised law,992 not all 
burglary under the new Criminal Code is subject to being an underlying fel-
ony for application of the felony murder rule to Murder in the First Degree. 
This is because Burglary in the Second Degree is excluded from the statu-
tory definition of a "forcible felony," which is the basic qualifying factor for 
the felony murder rule.99s As the revised crime of Arson,9tu however, an in-
tentional murder during the commission of an ordinary burglary (i.e., Bur-
glary in the Second Degree) would constitute Murder in the Second Degree 
under the second degree felony murder rule,991l whereas the homicidal crime 
would only be Involuntary Manslaughter if such a killing was uninten-
tional. 99S Another change is that the coverage of the revised crime of bur-
glary is much broader, as it is not limited to break-ins of dwelling houses. 
g. Grading. Burglary is of the first degree997 when a defendant or an 
accomplice either (1) merely has in his possession a "dangerous weapon,"998 
985. IOWA CODE § 713.4 (1979). 
986. See State v. Knudtson, 195 N.W.2d 698 (Iowa 1972). 
987. IOWA CODE § 713.3 (1979). 
988. IOWA CODE § 716.1 (1979). 
989. Id. § 716.4. 
990. Id. § 716.7. 
991. Id. § 716.8(2). 
992. See IOWA CODE § 690.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
993. See IOWA CODE § 707.2(2) (1979). 
994. See text accompanying notes 862-910 supra. 
995. See IOWA CODE § 707.3 (1979). 
996. See id. § 707.5(1). 
997. Id. § 713.2. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTION, supra note 136, at No. 1314. 
998. IOWA CODE § 702.7 (1979). 
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an "explosive device,"888 or an "incendiary device,"IOoo or (2) "intentionally 
or recklessly inflicts physical injury on any person."1001 The first alternative 
is satisfied by the mere act of possession, thus rendering unnecessary any 
discharging or detonating of the weapon. Under the second alternative, it 
appears that any degree of physical injury will suffice. Why the more restric-
tive general term of "serious injury"100ll was not incorporated herein is not 
clear, especially since a "serious injury" is necessary for first degree Rob-
berylOos as well as for first degree Sexual Abuse.1004 This provision, neverthe-
less, is more restrictive than its pre-revised counterpart. The latter only en-
compassed an actual assault as an aggravating circumstance to support a 
charge of Burglary With Aggravation,lool1 and an assault, by definition, ne-
cessitates no touching at all. looe The presence of a confederate, aiding and 
abetting, as an aggravating circumstance under the pre-revised law was 
eliminated altogether. All burglary other than that described above is of the 
second degree. loo7 
h. Sentencing Options. Burglary in the First Degree is a class B fel-
ony, 1008 whereas Burglary in the Second Degree is a class C felony,,008 Thus, 
one is a twenty-five year maximum offense whereas the other is only a ten 
year maximum offense. This amounts to a fifteen-year add-on penalty for 
burglary while armed (even though the firearm does not need to be used or 
even displayedlOlO or for causing (albeit intentionally or recklessly)1011 a 
physical personal injury of any nature during a burglary. Thus, a simple 
Burglary (ten years) plus a simple Assault (thirty days) equals twenty-five 
years. 
One flaw in' the pre-revised law was remedied, however. The former 
999. See id. § 101A.1 and note 918 supra. 
1000. See 1978 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1183 (67th G.A.), amending IOWA CODE § 702.21 
(Supp. 1978), by adding that "[a]n 'incendiary device' is a device, contrivance, or material 
causing or designed to cause destruction of property by fire." 
1001. IOWA CODE § 713.2 (1979). 
1002. [d. § 702.18. 
1003. [d. § 711.2. 
1004. [d. § 709.2. 
1005. See IOWA CODE § 708.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1006. IOWA CODE § 708.1 (1979). 
1007. [d. § 713.3. 
1008. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70-
102 supra. 
1009. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70-
102 supra. 
1010. All that is necessary for the five-year minimum sentence to be imposed under IOWA 
CODE § 902.7 (1979), is that the defendant or an accomplice "represented that he or she was in 
immediate possession and control of a firearm." [d. (emphasis added). 
1011. In contrast, the personal violence crimes of Willful Injury, Assault While Partici-
pating in a Felony, Assault With Intent to Inflict Serious Injury, and even simple Assault are 
strictly intentional crimes. See IOWA CODE §§ 708.4, 708.3, 708.2(1), 708.2(2) (1979) 
(respectively). 
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crime of Burglary With Aggravation was punishable, in the judicial discre-
tion of the individual sentencing court, by any term of years to life.lOl l That 
ridiculous legislative scheme, coupled with the supreme court's essentially 
hands off policy in "reviewing" abuse of judicial discretion in sentencing,I018 
led to some disparate sentences with supreme court approval.1014 Under the 
new Criminal Code, the scope of judicial discretion of the sentencing court 
has been sharply restricted. Now, an indeterminate term of twenty-five 
years and ten years is prescribed for Burglary in the FirstlO'1i and Second 
Degrees/ol8 respectively. Moreover, none of the ameliorative sentencing op-
tions (i.e., a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, or a suspended sen-
tence) is an available sentencing option for Burglary in the First Degree, 
because it is a "forcible felony."1017 In contrast, considerable judicial discre-
tion still reposes in the sentencing court in deciding on Burglary in the Sec-
ond Degree (a non-forcible felony) whether to defer entry of judgment at all 
or if so to impose and then suspend the sentence and place the defendant on 
probation (i.e., a bench parole). 
Unlike the pre-revised law/o,s the new Criminal Code provides for an 
alternative sentencing option of a fine-only with a maximum of $5000 for 
Burglary in the Second Degree.101S This ameliorative sentencing option is 
welcome in light of the wide ranging activity included within the definition 
of Burglary. As a class B felony,IOIO Burglary in the First Degree is not pun-
ishable by fine at all, whether in addition to or in lieu of a term of imprison-
ment or for a suspended sentence. 
i. Lesser Included Offenses. In light of the current standard, there do 
not appear to be any lesser included offenses of burglary, except, of course, 
1012. See IOWA CODE § 708.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1013. See, e.g., State v. Peckenschneider, 236 N.W.2d 344, 348 (Iowa 1975). "We have 
. demonstrated a growing reluctance to interfere with the trial court's discretion." [d. See also 
State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Iowa 1976). "[TJbia col,lrt has consistently held the sever-
ity of punishment must be 'carefully considered' but when it does not exceed the statutory 
maximum we will interfere only where abuse of discretion is shown," with life term for second-
degree murder upheld. [d. But see IOWA R. CRIM.P. 22(3)(d) ("court shall state on the record its 
reason for selecting the particular sentence") State v. Luedtke, 279 N.W.2d 7, 8 (Iowa 1979) 
(Rule 22(3)(d) is mandatory). 
1014. See, e.g., State v. Kendall, 167 N.W.2d 909, 911-12 (Iowa 1969) (upholding life term 
for Burglary with Aggravation). 
1015. IOWA CODE § 713.2 (1979). 
1016. [d. § 713.3. 
1017. See id. §§ 702.11, 907.3 and text accompanying notes 180-203 supra. 
1018. See IOWA CODE §§ 708.2-.3 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1019. See IOWA CODE §§ 713.3 (1979) (Burglary in the Second Degree); id. § 902.9(3) (pen-
alty for class C felony); id. § 909.1 (fine without imprisonment); and text accompanying notes 
997-1007 supra. 
1020. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70-
102 supra. 
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for Burglary in the Second Degreel021 (being strictly a residual provision) 
being a lesser included offense that always must be submitted in a prosecu-
tion for Burglary in the First Degree.loll! Because of its inchoate naturelOll8 in 
not being a specific result crime (as to the objective of the unlawful entry), 
the crime of burglary, indeed even in aggravated forms, is complete upon 
the unlawful entry with the requisite intent. Thus, any crimes committed or 
attempted as part of the burglary (i.e., Assault or Theft) are not lesser in-
cluded offenses. Neither is Criminal Mischief for any property damage even 
though done incidental in gaining entry a lesser included offense, since this 
offense requires damage whereas Burglary does not. lOS. Similarly, Trespass 
is not a lesser included offense,lOll1l since the two crimes are not of the "same 
species" and the elements of Trespass are not entirely included in the of-
fense of Burglary. 
2. Possession of Burglar's Tools 
No substantive change was made in the elements of the crime of Posses-
sion of Burglar'S Tools.lose These elements remain: (1) possessing (2) any 
. burglar's tool (3) with the specific intent to use it in perpetration of a 
burglary.l027 
It is sufficient for possession that the burglar's tools be "within [defen-
dant's] dominion and subject to his control."101l8 Thus, it is not necessary 
that the tools be upon defendant's person. . 
It also is not necessary that the particular tools be designed for an un-
lawful purpose. Conversely, it is immaterial that the particular tools have 
legitimate uses. Presence of several tools in combination is to be considered 
in determining their burglarious character, rather than each individual tool 
being considered separately. 10119 
The requisite burglarious intent is only a general intent to commit a 
burglary on some occasion. Thus, the prosecution is not required to prove 
defendant's intent to commit "a specific burglary at any particular time or 
place. "IOSO Nevertheless, burglarious intent must be proved to have existed 
1021. IOWA CODE § 713.3 (1979). 
1022. Id. § 713.2. 
1023. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOOT, supra note 398, at 715. 
1024. See generally text accompanying notes 977-980 supra. 
1025. See State v. Furnald, 263 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1978), which is discussed in text ac-
companying note 1049 supra. 
1026. Compare IOWA CODE § 713.4 (1979) with IOWA CODE § 708.7 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 1315-19; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, 
supra note 3, § 297. 
1027. IOWA CODE § 713.4 (1979). 
1028. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1318. 
1029. See, e.g., State v. Knudtson, 195 N.W.2d 698 (Iowa 1972); Mahar v. Lainson, 247 
Iowa 297, 72 N.W.2d 516 (1955); UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1318. 
1030. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1319. See State v. Van 
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at the time defendant was found in the act of possessing burglar's tools.10Sl 
The only major statutory change concerning this crime occurred with 
the elimination of the pre-revised statutory presumptionlOSI of burglarious 
intent attributed to persons found in possession of burglar's tools. lOSS Pro-
fessor Yeager explains that "[i]t was felt that presuming intent from posses-
sion, when the possession would be innocent without the intent, is a form of 
bootstrapping which raises serious due process Questions. The intent can be 
proved from the circumstances of the possession."1084 
There is an interesting Quirk in the grading of this offense. Both the 
consummated offense of Burglary in the Second Degree and the "higly in-
choate offense"103& of Possession of Burglar's Tools are class C felonies, lOse 
and thus punishable identically. Neither is a "forcible felony."10s7 
D. Criminal Trespass 
The substantive content of the types of conduct constituting the crime 
of Criminal Trespassl038 essentially was left unchanged in the new Criminal 
Voltenburg, 260 Iowa 200, 147 N.W.2d 869 (1967). 
1031. See note 70 supra. 
1032. See IOWA CODE § 708.7 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1033. This unsurprisingly has been characterized by a defense attorney as "a needed 
change." J. ROEHRICK, supra note 620, at 145. 
1034. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 297. The impact of this statutory change 
is readily apparent in the evolution that the Uniform Jury Instructions have undergone. The 
applicable Uniform Jury Instruction (on intent to commit burglary) which was keyed to the 
former Code read: 
If the State has established beyond a reasonable doubt the first essential of the 
offense; namely, that the defendant in fact had burglar's tools or implements in his 
possession, such possession is presumptive evidence of intent to commit burglary. 
This presumptive evidence creates a permissible inference to be considered along 
with any and all other facts and circumstances shown by the evidence which have any 
bearing on the issue of the intent of the defendant, and the burden is upon the State 
to establish by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time the defen-
dant possessed burglar'S tools, if he did, the defendant then had the intent to commit 
the crime of burglary. 
The current, revised instruction reads: 
One of the elements which the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable 
. doubt is the intent of the defendant to commit burglary. Such intent must exist in 
the mind of the defendant at the time of possession of the burglar's tools. 
It is not necessary for the State to prove an intent to commit a specific burglary 
at any particular time or place. The intent of the defendant needs to be only a gen- . 
eral intent to commit the crime of burglary on some occasion of his choice. 
UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1319. 
1035. Schantz, supra note 2, at 454. 
1036. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70-
102 supra. 
1037. See text accompanying notes 180-203 supra. 
1038. IOWA CODE § 716.7 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 
1607-13; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 378-86. 
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Code. lo39 This crime has thus retained the following elements: (1) wrongful 
entry or wrongful remaining (2) on public or private property (3) without 
permission (4) and without justification (5) under anyone of the four follow-
ing circumstances: lo4o (a) after being notified or requested to not enter or to 
leave,lo41 or (b) with the intent to commit a public offense,.042 or (c) with the 
intent or effect of unduly interfering with the lawful use of such property by 
others,.o43 or (d) with the intent or effect of wrongfully using, removing 
therefrom, altering, damaging, harassing or placing thereon anything ani-
mate or inanimate. I044 
1. Privileged Entry 
The only significant substantive change made in the entire chapter on 
Criminal Trespass occurred with the addition of a provision defining privi-
leged entry onto public or private property under limited circumstances for 
retrieval of personal property.I040 For the defense to be applicable, all of the 
following are necessary: (1) the entry must be made for the sole purpose of 
retrieving an item of personal property; (2) the item must have accidentally 
or inadvertently ended up on the property of another; (3) the retriever must 
take the most direct and accessible route in retrieving; (4) the retriever must 
exit as quickly as possible and (5) the retriever must not unduly interfere 
with lawful use of the property entered upon. I04e Because of the conjunctive 
test, the 'state need only prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the negative of 
anyone of the five in order for the privilege to be inapplicable.1047 
2. Relationship With Burglary 
Both Burglaryl048 and Criminal Trespass are wrongful entry crimes. Never-
1039. C{. IOWA CODE § 729.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra 
note 3, § 378. 
1040. IOWA CODE § 716.7 (1979). 
1041. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1610; J. YEAGER & R. 
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 382. 
1042. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1609; J. YEAGER & R. 
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 381. "[Tlhe intentelement here is stated so broadly that it is unlikely 
that anyone can commit a civil trespass without the intent to do at least one of the listed acts . 
. . . " Id. 
1043. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1611; J. YEAGER & R. 
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 383. 
1044. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1612; J. YEAGER & R. 
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 384. 
1045. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, ,at No. 1613; J. YEAGER & R. 
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 385. This provision "is merely the civil justification for trespass and is 
not a change in the law, except for codification." J. ROEHRlCK, supra note 620, at 230. 
1046. IOWA CODE § 716.7 (1979). 
1047. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1613. 
1048. IOWA CODE § 713.1 (1979). 
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theless, Trespass has not been held to be a lesser included offense of Bur-
glary. In State v. Furnald,1049 the Iowa Supreme Court (interpreting the 
Burglary and Trespass statutes under the old code which were substantially 
similar to the new Criminal Code) reasoned that there were many ways in 
which one crime could be committed without the other also being commit-
ted, and thus the legal test for lesser included offenses was not met. The 
court also noted that Burglary under the former code was a crime solely 
against a building, whereas Trespass could occur on land. Because the new 
Criminal Code does not extend Burglary to land itself (i.e., open space sepa-
rate and apart from an enclosed area), the Furnald decision will be control-
ling. This prospect was enhanced by the supreme court's holdings in State v. 
Sanders, 1060 that the lesser included offense standard remains unchanged 
under the new Criminal Code101l1 and in State v. Holmes,lOIlI that Theft is 
not a lesser included offense of Robbery under the new Criminal Code since 
Theft requires a taking but Robbery does not. Because Robbery can be com-
mitted in the alternative - either by an actual taking or by an attempted 
taking - and Trespass can be upon many alternative types of property -
only two of which, an occupied structure and an enclosed space, can be sub-
jects of Burglary, it appears that the Sanders-Holmes rationale will require 
extension of Furnald to the new Criminal Code. 
3. Grading 
There are two grades of Trespass, with the distinguishing characteristic 
being whether either personal injury or property damage in excess of $100 
occurred. This aggravated form of Trespass is a serious misdemeanor, 
whereas the ordinary form of Trespass is a simple misdemeanor. A similar 
scheme of grading was included in the pre-revised law,t°lla except that the 
maximum penalty for the aggravated form was imprisonment for six months 
instead of the one year maximum, as a serious misdemeanor under new 
Code section 716.8(2). 
4. Merger 
The above-mentioned grading scheme raises questions on merger of of-
fenses in situations of Trespass in its aggravated form. Is a person who in-
jures another person by assaulting him or her during a trespass subject both 
to aggravated Trespass and to Assault? Similarly, is a trespasser who also 
concurrently causes property damage in excess of $100 subject both to ag-
1049. 263 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1978). 
1050. 280 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1979). 
1051. See IOWA R. CRlM. P. 6, 21. 
1052. 276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979). 
1053. IOWA CODE § 729.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
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gravated Trespassing and to Criminal Mischiefoll4 in the particular degree 
concomitant with the amount of damage caused? 
As a matter of fundamental fairness and because of the double jeopardy 
mandate, only one charge should lie in either of those two situations. Ion Be-
cause the physical injury or property damage would be the only basis for 
boot strapping an ordinary Trespass into an aggravated Trespass, neither 
circumstance should also be the basis for a separate charge of either Assault 
or Criminal Mischief. 
On the other hand, a prosecutor clearly should be free to make an elec-
tion of charges. lOllS Thus, a prosecutor could, in his basically non-reviewable 
discretion, decide to charge a "rowdy" trespasser with Willful InjurylOll7 (a 
class D felony) or with Assault With Intent to Inflict a Serious Injuryloll8 (an 
aggravated misdemeanor POll9 instead of aggravated Trespassing (a mere se-
rious misdemeanor).loso Of course, he cold then throw in the simple Tres-
pass charge as a separate count. 
1054. IOWA CODE §§ 716.1-.6 (1979). 
1055. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975); State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63 
(Iowa 1972). 
1056. "The fact that there was evidence tending to show more than was required by the 
statute and also an attempt to violate another statute did not invalidate the prosecution of the 
charge here involved." State v. Stanton, 214 N.W.2d 125, 126 (Iowa 1974). Accord, United 
States v. Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973). "[W]here 
criminal statutes overlap the government is entitled to choose among them provided it does not 
discriminate against any class of defendants" [d.; People v. Fowler, 516 P.2d 428, 429 (Colo. 
1973) "[A] single transaction that violates two criminal statutes may generally be prosecuted 
under either .... No constitutional proscription has been demonstrated which would prohibit 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in such a situation .... " [d. See United States v. Batch-
elder, _ U.S. _, 99 S. Ct. 2198 (1979) (defendant sentenced under section with harsher penalty 
where defendant's conduct falls within two sections of same criminal statute). 
1057. See IOWA CODE § 708.4 (1979). 
1058. The single grade of this offense is a class D felony. It is punishable by either an 
indeterminate term of imprisonment of five years or a maximum fine of $1,000 or both. Because 
this offense is a "forcible felony," none of the ameliorative sentencing alternatives (i.e., a de-
ferred judgment, a deferred sentence, or a suspended sentence of probation) is available, in lieu 
of the above mentioned imprisonment. Moreover, being a "forcible felony," this offense is also 
subject to the mandatory minimum five year sentence if a firearm is used or possessed during 
its commission. 
1059. See IOWA CODE § 708.2(1) (1979). 
1060. An aggravated misdemeanor is punishable by either a determinate term of confine-
ment not to exceed two years or a maximum fine of $5000 or both. Other sentencing alterna-
tives include a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a suspended sentence of probation, 
in lieu of the above-mentioned confinement or fine. 
A serious misdemeanor is punishable by either a determinate term of imprisonment of up 
to one year or a fine of up to $1000 or both. The various sentencing alternatives are: imprison-
ment only, imprisonment and fine, fine only, a suspended sentence of probation, a deferred 
sentence, or a deferred judgment. 
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5. Lesser Included Offenses 
There are, of course, no lesser included offenseslO6l of Trespassing. 
Moreover, Trespassing itself is not a lesser included offense of any other 
crime, including Burglary.lOGli 
V. THEFT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
A. Theft 
1. Generally 
The newly-constituted comprehensive crime of Theftl068 consolidates 
the pre-revised offenses of Larceny, Embezzlement, False Pretenses, Receiv-
ing and Concealing Stolen Property, False Drawing, and Uttering. However, 
several changes were made in these pre-revised offenses that resulted in ex-
panding the scope of these pre-revised offenses,lo64 as discussed below. Nev-
ertheless, like its predecessor offenses, Theft remains a specific result crime, 
thus not punishing attempted thefts. 10611 
a. "Property" Subject to Theft. The biggest change is in the much 
broader scope of "property"1066 that can be the subject of this crime, as op-
posed to under the pre-revised offenses. This has not only enlarged the 
scope of this crime but also has eliminated the need for individual statutes 
on particularized subjects. The "property" subject to Theft has been ex-
panded from the basic limitation of tangible personal property under the 
pre-revised offensesl067 to include "anything of value,"l068 that is, all real 
and personal property. The major areas of expansion include intangible 
property, real property, labor, and services. 
b. Defense of Claim of Right. A modified version of the common law 
defense of claim of rightl069 has been codified in Iowa Code section 714.4.1070 
By terms of that provision, wrongful appropriation of another's "property" 
does not constitute Theft if the offender "reasonably believes that he or she 
1061. See text accompanying notes 619-723 supra. 
1062. State v. Furnald, 263 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1978). 
1063. IOWA CODE §§ 714.1-.7 (1979). See generally UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra 
note 136, at Nos. 1401.51; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 311-28. 
1064. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 311. 
1065. Regarding the theft-related crime of Fraudulent Practices being in the nature of an 
attempted theft offense, see text accompanying notes 1217-1225 infra. 
1066. IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 
1441; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 41. 
1067. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 312. 
1068. IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979) (emphasis added). 
1069. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCO'M', supra note 398, § 88. R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 
322. 
1070. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1440; J. YEAGER & R. 
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 325. 
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has a right, privilege or license to do so, or if [her or she] does in fact have 
such right, privilege or license."'071 Contrastingly, the common law defense 
was attached to a bona fide claim of title or right to possession.'07• This 
change could make the defense less restrictive in light of being tied to only a 
"reasonable belief' instead of a "bona fide" claim being required. This puts 
the matter in the hands of layman jurors to determine what "reasonable" 
persons like themselves would feel under the circumstances. Nevertheless, 
an actual belief for so acting is required by this provision, as is a reasonable 
factual basis for so believing. 
Whenever a "claim of right" is raised by the defense, an additional ele-
ment is added to the marshaling instruction in the Uniform Jury Instruc-
tions,,078 as follows: "That at the time the defendant (acquired, used, etc.) 
the property, he did so with no claim of right." This has the effect of requir-
ing the prosecution to disprove the alleged "claim of right." This is because 
appropriating another's property under a "claim of right" does not involve 
criminal intent. ,074 
c. Grading. There are five degrees of Theft,I0711 with the classification 
of offenses ranging from a simple misdemeanor to a class C felony. Neither 
of the two felonies is.a "forcible felony.",078 
The basic point of differentiation is the valuel077 of the "property" sto-
len. Theft in the Fifth Degree/078 a simple misdemeanor,'07' involves fifty 
dollars or less. Theft in the Fourth Degree/08o a serious misdemeanor/081 
involves fifty dollars plus to $100; Theft in the Third Degree,I081 an aggra-
1071. The phrase "right, privilege, or license" is defined in the Uniform Jury Instructions, 
as follows: 
'[RJight' means an interest or title in the property or a legal claim to hold, use or 
enjoy it. 'Privilege' means a particular permission or authority given to a particular 
person(s) to hold, use, or enjoy the property as opposed to a general permission. 'Li-
cense' means that the owner gave either express or implied permission or authority to 
hold, use or enjoy the property. 
UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 3, at No. 1440. 
1072. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 325. 
1073. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 3, at No. 1440. 
1074. See, e.g., Richardson v. United States, 403 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1968); W. LAFAVE & 
A. SCOTT, supra note 398, § 88. 
1075. IOWA CODE § 714.2 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 
1451; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 320-23. 
1076. IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979). See text accompanying notes 180-203 supra. 
1077. See id. § 714.3; UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1442; J. YE-
AGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 324. 
1078. IOWA CODE § 714.2(5) (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 323. 
1079. For a discussion of the sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 107-111 
supra. 
1080. IOWA CODE § 714.2(4) (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 323. 
1081. For a discussion of the sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 106, 108-
111 supra. 
1082. IOWA CODE § 714.2(3) (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 323. 
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vated misdemeanor,los8 involves $100-plus to $500; Theft in the Second De-
gree/os. a Hnon-forcible"losD class D felony,IOS8 involves $5OO-plus to $5000 as 
well as thefts of motor vehicles irrespective of their value. Theft in the First 
Degree/os7 a Hnon-forcible"loss class C felony/osB involves in excess of $500 
in addition to all thefts from a person and all lootings in conjunction with a 
disaster or a riot (the latter two circumstances being irrespective of the 
amount of property stolen). These five value-dichotomy schedules apply to 
all types of Theft (i.e., wrongful takings, misappropriations, deceptions, ex-
ercising control over stolen property, false drawing and uttering of checks 
and share drafts, and misuse of secured property). Nevertheless, several spe-
cific theft statutes have a single penalty schedule irrespective of the value of 
the property stolen. 1090 
The special attention given to thefts of motor vehiclesl091 is anomolous. 
Whereas it fills a potential gap at the lower end of the spectrum in effec-
tively protecting used cars with Hspeculative" retail values, it nevertheless 
does not realistically take inflation into account at the upper (or even the 
middle) end of the spectrum. A logical explanation for this unrealistic place-
ment is that this provision first appeared in the report by the Criminal Code 
Revision Study Committee. lOBI That committee's work was done over a four-
year period 1969 to 1973, during which time a $5000 automobile certainly 
was not as commonplace as it is now. Unfortunately, no legislative attempt 
was made to revise the classification and make all thefts of motor vehicles a 
Theft in the First Degree. The General Assembly should take care of this 
during its next dession. 
1083. For a discussion of the sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 101-105, 
108-111 supra. 
1084. IOWA CODE § 714.2(2) (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 322. 
1085. See text accompanying notes 180-203 supra, regarding "forcible felonies." See also 
text accompanying notes 84-92 supra, regarding the probable availability of a fine-only sanction 
under IOWA CODE § 909.1 (1979). 
1086. For a discussion of the sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 71-83 
supra. 
1087. IOWA CODE § 714.2(1) (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 321. 
1088. See note 21 supra. 
1089. For a discussion of the sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 71-83 
supra. Regarding the probable availability of a fine-only sanction under IOWA CODE § 909.1 
(1979), see text accompanying notes 84-92 supra. 
1090. In addition to the aforementioned thefts of a motor vehicle, from a person, and 
during a looting in conjunction with a disaster or a riot (see text accompanying notes 27-33 and 
42-46 infra), the other specific theft or theft-related offenses are: Operating a Vehicle Without 
the Owner's Consent (an aggravated misdemeanor); Consumer Frauds (apparently a simple 
misdemeanor); Unlawful Advertising and Selling of Courses of Instruction (a serious misde-
meanor); Sale of More Than One Lifetime Contract Per Person (a serious misdemeanor). IOWA 
CODE §§ 714.7, .16, .17, .20 (1979), repectively. See text accompanying notes 128-142 infra. 
1091. IOWA CODE § 714.2(2) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at 
Nos. 1443-44; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 322. 
1092. STUDY COMMITTEE REpORT, ·supra note 3, § 1402(2). 
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The special new provision on looting in disaster areaslOea was undoubt-
edly an outgrowth of the turbulent sixties, although the pre-revised Code 
included an offense of larceny from a building on fire. loH It seems a little 
harsh to bootstrap an otherwise simple misdemeanor petty theft (involving a 
trifling fifty dollars or less) into a class C felony merely because of the cir-
cumstances of the taking. As a class C felony, lOBI! this offense can be punish-
able by an indeterminate term of imprisonment of five years. 10M The real 
anomoly of this severly high classification is that this non-violent conduct is 
equally punishable with Robbery in the Second Degree,lCI8'7 which is also a 
class C felony. 
The inclusion of all thefts from the person,lOB8 irrespective of the value 
of the property stolen, in the first-degree category is justifiable because of 
the potential for violence. Nevertheless, the rather curious result is that 
Robbery in the Second Degree and Theft from the Person, both of which are 
class C felonies, can be punished equally. The incongruity is further high-
lighted by the fact that Robbery in the Second Degree is a "forcible fel-
ony"lOBB (and thus not subject to a deferred judgement or a suspended sen-
tence of probation) whereas Theft from the Person is not. Moreover, as a 
"non-forcible" class C felony, Theft from the Person can apparently be 
solely punished, in the sentencing court's judicial discretion pursuant to 
Code section 909.1, by a fine. lloo This "compares" to the fifteen-year term of 
imprisonment which either had to be imposed or suspended without benefit 
of an alternative sentencing option of a fine only under the pre-revised 
law.llol 
The common thief provisionlloa was incorporated as a special circum-
stance in determining even the most petty theft to be Theft in the Second 
Degree. 
The major interpretational issue is whether everyone started with a 
clean slate on January I, 1978, irrespective of pre-1978 convictions of lar-
1093. IOWA CODE § 714.2(1) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at 
No. 1434. 
1094. See IOWA CODE § 709.6 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1095. See text accompanying notes 71-83 supra. 
1096. Of course, this is not a mandatory term of confinement. See text accompanying 
notes 84-92 supra. 
1097. IOWA CODE § 711.3 (1979). Nevertheless, this penalty equalization is actually an im-
provement over the pre-revised law. Incredibly, simple Robbery was punishable by an indeter-
minate term of imprisonment of ten years whereas the lesser included offense of Larceny from 
a Person was punishable by a term of fifteen years. Compare IOWA CODE §§ 711.3 with 709.6 
(1977) (repealed 1978). See State v. Habhab, 209 N.W.2d 73, 74 (Iowa 1973). 
1098. IOWA CODE § 714.2(1) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at 
No. 1433. -
1099. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979) and text accompanying notes 180-203 supra. 
1100. See text accompanying notes 84-92 supra. 
1101. See IOWA CODS § 709.6 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1102. IOWA CODS § 714.2(2) (1979). 
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ceny, embezzlement, receiving and concealing stolen property, or false draw-
ing and uttering of checks - offenses which now constitute the newly-con-
solidated crime of Theft. In other words, has a person with at least two prior 
convictions for any of those forerunner offenses of Theft been previously 
convicted of "theft," in light of the crime known specifically as Theft not 
existing before 1978? The starting point in this analysis is the fact that two 
somewhat similar provisions were included in the pre-revised law.llos How-
ever, larceny and receiving plus concealing stolen property were the only 
pre-revisedllo4 offenses which were included. Moreover, these two pre-re-
vised provisions were separate, thus requiring either three convictions for 
larceny or two convictions for receiving and concealing stolen property, 
without permitting a combination of these offenses in order to constitute the 
status of "common thief." In contrast, the new provision can be satisfied by 
three convictions of any of the diverse types of offenses known collectively 
as Theft. Moreover, changes, albeit minor, were made in the pre-revised of-
fenses which now collectively constitute Theft. Consequently, starting with a 
clean slate appears to be constitiutionally mandated by ex post facto 
considerations. llol 
2. Theft by Takingl108 
The pre-revised law crime of Larcenyl107 essentially has been replaced 
by the newly-styled and restructured crime of Theft by Taking. The ele-
ments are: (1) "knowingly;"l108 (2) taking possession or control of; (3) "prop-
erty" belonging to another; (4) with intent to deprive the other thereof. 
a. Aggravated Thefts. As discussed in the section on grading, the basic 
element classification is the dollar value of the property stolen. These aggra-
vated thefts are punishable by a fixed schedule, regardless of the amount 
actually taken. Two of the special takings are carryovers from the pre-re-
vised offense of Larceny-Theft from a Personl108 and Theft of a Motor 
1103. See IOWA CODE § 709.19 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1104. See IOWA CODE §§ 709.19, 712.2 (1977) (repealed 1980). 
1105. See generally State v. Olson, 200 Iowa 660, 668, 204 N.W. 278, 280-81 (1925). 
1106. IOWA CODE § 714.(1) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at 
Nos. 1401-04; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 313. See also W. LAFAVE & A. SCO'IT, 
supra note 398, §§ 85-88 (Larceny); R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 234-79 (Larceny). 
1107. See IOWA CODE ch. 709 (1977) (repealed 1978), which contained several separate 
particularized larceny provisions. In addition to the basic common law offense of Larceny, these 
included Larceny from Building or From the Person; Larceny of Electric Current, Water, 
Steam or Gas; Larceny of Domestic Fowls and Animals; Taking Goods from Officer; Larceny of 
Logs or Lumber; Taking Property for Boat or Vessel; Shoplifting; and Larceny from a Parking 
Meter. See also id. § 321.82 (1977) (repealed 1978) (Larceny of Motor Vehicle). 
1108. See text accompanying notes 465-601 supra. 
1109. Compare IOWA CODE § 714.2(1) (1979) with IOWA CODE § 709.6 (1977) (repealed 
1978) (Larceny From the Person). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 
1433. 
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Vehicle.1110 Additionally, the pre-revised offense of Operating a Motor Vehi-
cle Without Owner's Consent,llll which appeared in the pre-revised Code 
chapter on highways, has been transferred with some minor changes to the 
new Code chapter on Theft.1112 One new type of aggravated theft-Theft 
from a building in conjunction with a physical disaster, riot, or bombing1ll8 
'has been added, apparently in response to the turbulent 1960's. On the 
other hand, conduct punishable under the pre-revised offenses of larceny in 
the Nighttime1ll4 and Larceny in the Daytimellu (neither of which was con-
cerned with the value of the property taken) must either fit within the re-
vised crime of Burglary1ll8 or be punishable merely as Theft (according to 
the value of the property actually taken).1117 Of course, the myriad number 
of particularized larceny statutes under the pre-revised law1118 was consoli-
dated within the new Theft statute by its broad, general definition of 
"property. "1118 
b. Taking Possession or Control. The old Code requirement11lO that 
the offender "take, steal, take, and carry away" the property was aban-
doned. The substitute requireIQ.ent,11I1 taking "possession or control" of an-
other's property, can be satisfied by proof of constructive possession or exer-
cise of control without proof of asportation.11I1 The significance of this 
change in the actus reus of the crime will be apparent in those areas of 
expanded coverage of the types of "property" subject to Theft. For example, 
a thief can wrongfully assume possession of or control over electric current 
through meter tampering, but can hardly carry it away.m8 
c. Intent to Deprive. Strangely, the mens rea of Theft by taking is an 
intent to deprive, as compared to an intent to permanently deprive under 
the forerunner offense of Larceny.11I4 This change in statutory language nat-
1110. Compare IOWA CODE § 714.2(2) (1979) with IOWA CODE § 321.82 (1977) (repealed 
1978) (Larceny of Motor Vehicle). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 
1443·44. 
1111. See IOWA CODE § 321.76 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1112. IOWA CODE § 714.7 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 
1445-46, J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 328. 
1113. [d. § 714.2(1). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1434. 
1114. See IOWA CODE § 709.4 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1115. [d. § 709.5. 
1116. IOWA CODE § 713.1 (1979). See note 957 supra. 
1117. [d. § 714.2 See text accompanying notes 1075-1090 supra. 
1118. See note 1107 supra. 
1119. IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979). See text accompanying notes 204-206 supra. 
1120. See IOWA CODE § 709.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1121. IOWA CODE § 714.1(1) (1979). 
1122. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 313. 
1123. See IOWA CODE § 709.7 (1977) (repealed 1978) (Larceny of Electric Current, Water, 
Steam or Gas). This particularized pre-revised larceny statute is uncessary under the less re-
strictive revised theft statute under the new Criminal Code. 
1124. Although the pre-revised larceny statute did not contain express language as to an 
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urally raises the question of whether a mere temporary deprivation is 
sufficient. 
The approach to this question taken in the Uniform Jury Instruc-
tions l12& is unambiguous and straightforward. "Depriving" the owner is de-
fined therein as 
[tlo permanently withhold, or cause it to be so withheld for an extended 
period of time, or under such circumstances, that its benefit or value is 
lost; or, the property is disposed of in such a manner, or under such cir-
cumstances, as to render it unlikely that the owner will recover the 
property. lUG 
This approach seems correct in light of the usual meaning of the word "de-
prive" as "something more than a mere temporary dispossessing of another, 
although a deprivation is not necessarily a permanent thing."1l~7 The Iowa 
Supreme Court has yet to rulelll8 on the parameters of "depriving" under 
either the pre-revised or revised law. Nevertheless, the court has strongly 
implied in a recent decision that it will support the definition contained in 
the Uniform Jury Instructions.lUe 
d. Lesser Included Offenses. Because of a change in the definition of 
the crime of Robbery,llaO the supreme court has interpretedlla1 the crime of 
Theft under the new Criminal Code as no longer being lesser included of-
fense1182 of Robbery (unlike under the pre-revised law).1188 On the other 
hand, the new Criminal Code118• codified the common law conceptlla& that 
the crime of Operating Another's Vehicle Without Owner's Consent may be 
intent to deprive, nevertheless it essentially was a codification of the common law crime of 
larceny (which essentially required an intent to permanently deprive). See W. LAFAVE & A. 
SCO'M', supra note 398, § 55 ("[Flor larceny, one must intend to deprive the owner of the pos-
session of his property either permanently or for an unreasonable length of time, or intend to 
use it in such a way that the owner will probably be thus deprived of his property."). See also 
State v. Marshall, 206 Iowa 373, 379-80, 220 N.W. 106, 108-09 (1928) (unathorized taking is not 
larceny if done so with the intent to preserve and return "stolen" property to its owner). 
1125. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1403. 
1126. Id. at No. 1403. 
1127. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 313. 
1128. State v. Fluhr, 287 N.W.2d 857 (Iowa 1980). 
1129. The court stated: "Although there is some uncertainty as to the meaning of 'intent 
to deprive' under the new statute, § 714.1(1), The Code 1979, see J. Yeager & R. Carlson, 4 
Iowa Practice, Criminal Law and Procedure § 313 (1979), II Iowa Uniform Jury Instructions 
No. 1403 provides some guidance which could be shared with defendants offering guilty pleas." 
Id. at 867. 
1130. See IOWA CODE § 711.1 (1979) and text accompanying notes 1302-11 infra. 
1131. State v. Holmes, 276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979). See text accompanying notes 1323-24 
infra. 
1132. See generally text accompanying notes 1323-24 supra. 
1133. See State v. Stewart, 223 N.W.2d 250 (Iowa 1974). 
1134. IOWA CODE § 714.7 (1979). 
1135. State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1973). 
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a lesser included offense on a charge of Theft of a vehicle (i.e., Theft in the 
Second Degree).1188 
This leaves as lesser included offenses in a prosecution for Theft in the 
fourth or a higher degree only those degrees of Theft that are lower than the 
degree charged and submitted to the fact-finder.u8? Moreover, there may 
not be any lesser included offenses in prosecutions for thefts in special cir-
cumstances which are not concerned with the value of the property 
taken.uss 
3. Theft by Misappropriation 1188 
The pre-revised crime of Embezzlement1140 essentially has been re-
placed by the crime of Theft by Misappropriation. The elements of this re-
vised offense are: (1) misapproprationj (2) of another's "property"1141 which 
is either held in trustU41 by defendant or is in defendant's possession or 
controlj (3) by using or disposing of the "property" in a manner inconsistent 
with the trust or of the owner's rights.1148 In addition, this comprehensive 
offense also includes a particularized type of missappropriation, that is, con-
cealment or appropri~tion of found property whose owner is known.1144 
a. Misappropriation. Misappropriation is not specifically defined in 
the Code itself, except for notation of the two ways in which it can occur 
(viz. "by using or disposing of [the property] in a manner which is inconsis-
tent with or a denial of the trust or of the owner's rights in such prop-
erty."1141i The definition is amplified in the Uniform Jury Instructionsu4' as 
1136. See IOWA CODE § 714.2(2) (1979). 
1137. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1451. 
1138. See text accompanying notes 619-714 supra. 
1139. IOWA CODE § 714.1(2) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at 
Nos. 1405-13; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 314. 
1140. See IOWA CODE ch. 710 (1977) (repealed 1978), which contained several separate 
particularized embezzlement provisions. These included: Embezzlement by Public Officers; Em-
bezzlement by Bailee; Embezzlement by Agents; Embezzlement by Bank Officers or Employees; 
Embezzlement by Carrier or Persons Entrusted; Embezzlement by Executor, Administrator or 
Guardian; and Leased and Rented Vehicle Offenses. See also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra 
note 398, § 89; R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 286-95. 
1141. See IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979) and text accompanying notes 204-206 supra. 
1142. A person is considered under the UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, to 
have property in his trust when: 
lilt is given to him by the owner or a third person to be held in safekeeping for the 
owner or another or for the owner's benefit. When the property is so given, a fiduciary 
relationship is then created with respect to the property, and the person who receives 
the property is known as a 'trustee,' whether he is called a 'trustee,' 'agent,' 'bailee,' 
'broker,' 'factor,' 'attorney,' or otherwise. 
[d. at No. 1407. 
1143. [d. at Nos. 1405-06. 
1144. See text accompanying notes 1150-56 infra. 
1145. IOWA CODE § 714.1(2) (1979). 
HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 376 1979-1980
376 Drake Law Review [Vol. 29 
follows: 
To 'misappropriate' means that a person, knowing he had no right or 
authority to do so, exercises control over the property and that by exer-
cising control over the property, the benefit or value of the property is 
lost to the owner. Misappropriation may also occur when a person know-
ingly disposes of the property for his own benefit or the benefit of a third 
person.'H7 
b. Inference from Untimely Return. A new provision1H8 establishes an 
inference of misappropriation of leased personal property or of a bailment 
when the property is not returned within seventy-two hours of the time 
specified in the written agreement of lease or bailment. In other words, a 
jury question can be generated solely on this provision, with the practical 
effect being "to compel the defendant to explain why he has not returned 
the property."lU9 
c. Found Property. Theft by misappropriation" I1O also includes the 
pre-revised offense of Appropriating Found Property."1l This type of Theft 
can be committed in either of two ways: by concealing found "property" or 
by appropriatingmS such "property" to his or her own use. In either of these 
situations, the owner of this property must be known" I1S to the offender. 
The Code thus places no affirmative duty on the finder of lost property to 
attempt to discover the owner, 11M which is questionable public policy. 
4. Theft by "Deception" 
The pre-revised offenses of obtaining money by false pretenses"l111 and 
swindlingl1116 were incorporated into a type of Theft by "deception.',m7 Its 
1146. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No 1408. 
1147. Id. at No. 1408. 
1148. IOWA CODE § 714.1(2) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at 
No. 1439; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 314. 
1149. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 314. 
1150. IOWA CODE § 714.1(2) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at 
Nos. 1410-13; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 314. 
1151. See IOWA CODE § 709.11 (1977) (repealed 1978). See also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, 
supra note 398, § 89; R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 248-53. 
1152. "Appropriates" is defined in the Uniform Jury Instructions to mean "to exercise 
control over the property, or to aid a third person to exercise control over it so as to acquire its 
value or benefit, or to dispose of the property for one's own benefit or use." UNIFORM JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1412. 
1153. For an instruction on proof of knowledge of the owner, see id. at No. 1413. 
1154. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 314. 
1155. See IOWA CODE ch. 713 (1977) (repealed 1978), which contained several particular-
ized false pretense provisions. These included: False Pretenses, Receiving Goods by False Per-
sonation, Suppression or Destruction of Will, Fraudulent Conveyances, Frauds Upon Hotel-
keepers, False Use of Credit Cards, Fraudulent Use of Wire Services and Simulated Legal 
Process. 
1156. See id. § 709.1 (Larceny by Trick). 
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elements are: (1) using "deception," either (2a) to obtain the labor or ser-
vices of another or (2b) to obtain a transfer of possession, control, or owner-
ship of another's "property" or (2c) to obtain beneficial use of another's 
"property."1l1l8 However, the extremely broad, albeit all-inclusive, definitions 
of "property"1U9 and "deception" make Theft by deception a broader crime 
than its forerunners. First, the general term "property" means anything of 
value. Next, the term "deception"1l80 is defined less restrictively than the 
traditional concept of criminal fraud which was basically limited to "a false 
statement of a material existing fact relied on by another to his 
detriment. "1181 
a. Acts of "Deception." Theft by deception can occur in six different 
ways: (1) "knowingly"1l82 creating or confirming a false belief (either by a 
statement or non-verbal conduct);1l83 (2) failing to correct a false belief pre-
viously created or confirmed by defendant;ll84 (3) preventing another from 
acquiring information pertinent to disposition of property;1l811 (4) transfer-
ring or incumbering property without disclosure of a lien or other legal im-
pediment therein;1l88 (5) promising either payment, delivery of goods, or 
other performance with either no intent or ability to perform;1187 . and (6) 
inserting unauthorized tokens into coin-operated machines dispensing goods 
or services. 1188 
b. Inference of "Deception." A new statutory inference of decep-
tion1l69 arises regarding goods or services for which payment ordinarily is 
1157. IOWA CODE § 714.1(3) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at 
Nos. 1414-22; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 315; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 
398, § 90 (False Pretenses); R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 296-319 (False Pretenses). 
1158. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 1415-21. 
1159. See IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979) and text accompanying notes 1066 and 204-06 
supra. 
1160. [d. § 702.9. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 1415-21; J. 
YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 30-36. 
1161. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 30. 
1162. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 230 and text accompany-
ing notes 437-601 supra. 
1163. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1416; J. YEAGER & R. 
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 31. 
1164. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1417; J. YEAGER & R. 
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 32. 
1165. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1418; J. YEAGER & R. 
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 33. 
1166. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1419; J. YEAGER & R. 
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 34. 
1167. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1420; J. YEAGER & R. 
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 35. 
1168. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1421; J. YEAGER & R. 
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 36. 
1169. IOWA CODE § 714.1(3) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at 
No. 1422; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 315. 
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made immediately when the customer "leave[s] the premises" without ei-
ther paying for goods or services received or making arrangements with the 
owner or operator to make later payment. This, of course, is only a permissi-
ble inference and by itself can generate a jury question on the question of 
deception. 
One troublesome question of interpretation remains as to the parame-
ters of the "premises." Are the premises of a restaurant confined to the in-
side of the building, such as inside the dining area itself, or has a customer 
who is in a lounge area "left" the premises since he has passed the cash 
register area without paying? It would seem not, since the premises should 
include the entire building itself. What, however, if the non-paying customer 
is accosted in a rest room which has an entry door from outside of the build-
ing? Is the parking lot to be considered part of the "premises?" This statu-
tory inference, which could very well be inclusive in nature, certainly dis-
courages a person from abortively returning to his automobile, without 
"permission" of the operator or presumably his agent, to shut off the lights, 
to get his checkbook out of the glove compartment, and so on. This latter 
example raises another practical question of when the act of leaving must 
occur. Presumably, the inference would not arise until the defendant had at 
least received the goods or services.l17O This is because payment ordinarily is 
not made in a restaurant until the meal is finished, and thus a customer 
"caught" in the parking lot after he has ordered but before he has received 
his order should not be subject to this inference. Moreover, he has not yet 
"obtained" anything of value, and Theft is a specific result, as opposed to an 
inchoate crime. It thus appears that this inference arises at an earlier stage, 
and should be determined under the particular circumstances of the individ-
ual case. Of course, in most innocent circumstances there will be no prosecu-
tion, as the customer will return, finish his meal, and pay upon leaving per-
manently. The problem area will involve a wary merchant who has 
frequently been victimized and who is determined to "make an example" of 
any culprit "caught in the act." Such a situation will require the adoption of 
a "common sense" approach by the prosecution in making the charging de-
cision. Yet once the prosecutor has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the 
requisite underlying facts, the inference should automatically arise, rather 
than being discretionary with the trial court. The burden would then be on 
1170. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1422. The requisite facts 
for invoking the inference that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt are: 
[d. 
1.) The defendant obtained goods or services for which payment is ordinarily paid 
immediately upon receipt of the goods or services. 
2.) The defendant (refused to pay) left the premises without payment (or an offer to 
pay). 
3.) That when he (refused to pay) (left the premises) he had not obtained from the 
owner or operator the right to pay at a later time. 
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the defendant to convince the jury not to draw the inference in his particu-
lar case. 
5. Theft by Exercising Control Over Stolen Propertyl171 
The pre-revised crime of Receiving and Concealing Stolen Property1l78 
was a separate offense, but was made part of Theft in the new Criminal 
Code. The elements of the revised crime are: (1) exercising controlj1171 (2) 
over stolen1174 propertyj (3) with either knowledge117& or a reasonable belief 
that the property was stolen.1178 The constitutionality of permitting a con-
viction in the absence of actual knowledge by defendant that the property in 
question was stolen was upheld in State v. Jones.1177 
a. Inference of "Knowledge." There has already been a major Iowa 
Supreme Court decision which has strengthened this statute in two ways. In 
State v. Post,1178 the court upheld the constitutionality of the new statutory 
inference1179 that a person found in possession of property that had been 
stolen from two or more persons on separate occasions knew or believed the 
property had been stolen.1180 
b. Aggregation Value. Concerning aggregating the value of all the sto-
len property found under defendant's control,lI81 the court also stated in 
Post: "At the time of arrest a person ... is exercising control over all that 
property which is in his or her possession, and the total value of that prop-
erty should be used to determine the degree of guilt. "1181 
c. Defense of Intended Restoration. A new statutory defensell88 con-
cerning intended restoration is included in the new Criminal Code. This re-
quires for exculpation that a person found in possession of stolen property 
must have the purpose "to promptly restore it to the owner or to deliver it 
1171. IOWA CODE § 714.1(4) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at 
Nos. 1423-30; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 316. 
1172. See IOWA CODE § 712.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1173. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1425. 
1174. The revised IOWA CODE thus retained the common law principle that the property 
must remain in a stolen status at the time of the defendant's act of exercising control. See 
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 398, § 88. 
1175. See id. at No. 230 and text accompanying notes 437-601 supra. 
1176. See id. at No. 1426. 
1177. 289 N.W.2d 597 (Iowa 1980). 
1178. 286 N.W.2d 195 (Iowa 1979). 
1179. IOWA CODE § 714.1(4) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at 
No. 1430; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 316. 
1180. See also UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1429 (inference from 
defendant's possession of recently stolen property that defendant stole it). 
1181. See generally IOWA CODE § 714.3 (1979). 
1182. 286 N.W.2d at 202. 
1183. IOWA CODE § 714.1(4) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at 
No. 1427. 
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to an appropriate public officer."1184 This essentially becomes an element of 
the crime when properly raised by the defendant, with the prosecution re-
quired to disprove it. If the prosecution does not carry its burden then the 
defendant will be acquitted since in effect criminal intent is lacking. Factors 
to be considered as bearing on this alleged intent to restore are amplified in 
the Uniform Jury Instructions11811 as follows: "the nature of the property, its 
ease of transfer, the location of the defendant and the property in regard to 
the owner (appropriate authorities), the knowledge of who is the owner, the 
length of time the property was in the possession of the defendant, together 
with all other facts and circumstances shown by the evidence .... "1188 
6. Theft by Bad Checks1187 
The pre-revised crime of False Drawing and Uttering1188 was trans-
ferred in unchanged form into the Theft chapter in the new Criminal Code, 
save for a 1979 amendment adding share drafts to the coverage of the of-
fense. The elements of this crime are: (1) making, uttering, drawing, deliv-
ering or giving; (2) to any person; (3) a check, draft, or written order; (4) 
knowing1188 that it will not be paid when presented to the drawee; and (5) 
obtaining "property" or service in exchange therefore.11eo 
The ten-day provision of the pre-revised law was retained.1l91 This pro-
vision permits an inference of the requisite culpable knowledge for the of-
fense when the defendant fails to redeem a bad check (and now, also a bad 
share draft) within ten days of receiving notice from the drawee that pay-
ment has been refused because of insufficient funds in the maker's account. 
Of course, this provision does not accord a ten-day grace period to make 
good a worthless check. Indeed, the defendant is not entitled to a ten-day 
notice; failure to afford a ten-day notice merely precludes the prosecution 
from invoking the evidentiary inference. Thus, failure to make good a 
worthless check after receiving a ten-day notice is not an element of this 
crime. lIes 
A second permissible statutory inference1l98 has been added to cover 
1184. IOWA CODE § 714.1(4) (1979). 
1185. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1427. 
1186. [d. at No. 1427. 
1187. IOWA CODE § 714.1(6) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at 
Nos. 1435-38; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 318; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 
389, § 92. 
1188. See IOWA CODE §§ 713.3-.4 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1189. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1437. 
1190. For an analysis of the interrelationship between the offenses of Theft by bad check 
and False Use of a Financial Instrument, see text accompanying notes 1294-1300 infra. 
1191. IOWA CODE § 714.1(7) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at 
No. 1438; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 318. 
1192. State v. Mason, 203 N.W.2d 292 (Iowa 1972). 
1193. IOWA CODE § 714.1(6) (1979). There is no Un~form Jury Instruction, supra note 136, 
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bad checks when the defendant-maker has no account with the drawee. No 
provision is made for a ten-day notice, but none really is necessary in light 
of the entire provision which states the obvious. 1194 
7. Theft by Misuse of Secured Property 1l96 
Theft by defrauding a secured party is a separate type of theft. Its ele-
ments are: (1) taking, destroying, concealing, or disposing; (2) of "prop-
erty;" (3) in which another person has a security interest; (4) with intent to 
defraud the secured party. The principal statutory change is that the crime 
under the new Code applies to any person whereas the pre-revised stat-
utellM was directed only to the debtor whose debts were the focus of the 
security interest.1197 
8. Theft-Related Offenses 
a. Operating a Vehicle Without the Owner's Consent.1I8e The pre-re-
vised theft-related crime of Operating a Motor Vehicle Without the Owner's 
Consent1l89 was changed in two respects: (1) the type of protected vehicle 
was expanded from motor vehicles exclusively to any type of self-propelled 
vehicle; and (2) the revised actus reus requires only the unauthorized taking 
of possession or control of another's vehicle rather than requiring operation 
of the appropriated vehicle.llIOo 
This crime consists of (1) taking possession and control; (2) of another's 
vehicle; (3) without the owner's consent; (4) but without the intent to per-
manently deprive the owner thereof. The fourth element which expressly 
sets out the mental aspect of the crime (but in the negative) thus differenti-
ates this crime from the greater offense of Theft of a Motor Vehicle.llol This 
lesser crime, then, remains as merely a general intent crime. 1101 
(1) Lesser Included Offense. lIoa As already noted in this Article, the 
new Criminal Code codified the common law concept that Operating a Vehi-
cle Without the Owner's Consent may be a lesser included offense on a 
embodying this permissible inference. 
1194. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 318. 
1195. IOWA CODE § 714.1(5) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at 
Nos. 1431-32; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 317. 
1196. See IOWA CODE § 710.12 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1197. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 317. 
1198. IOWA CODE § 714.7 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 
1445-46; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 328. 
1199. See IOWA CODE § 321.76 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1200. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 328. What constitutes taking posses-
sion and control is not defined in either the Criminal Code or the Uniform Jury Instructions. 
1201. IOWA CODE § 714.2(2) (1979). See text accompanying notes 1091-92 supra. 
1202. See text accompanying notes 437-601 supra. 
1203. See generally text accompanying notes 619-714 supra. 
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charge of Theft of a motor vehicle1204 (i.e., Theft in the Second Degree). The 
use of the permissive term "may" in the statute, coupled with the supreme 
court's first two interpretations of the general doctrine of lesser included 
offenses under the new Criminal Code,120I1 means that no change will be 
made in this area. Therefore, State v. Hawkins 1206 is still controlling in its 
determination that Operating a Vehicle Without the Owner's Consent is not 
automatically a lesser included offense of Theft of a vehicle. That is, even 
though the legal or element test is met, the trial judge may not submit a 
lesser included offense instruction unless the instruction is warranted by the 
evidence in the particular case. 
(a) Grading. The single grade of this offense has been downgraded to 
an aggravated misdemeanor after being a felony under the pre-revised 
law.llI07 This single grade approach corresponds to the fact that the grava-
men of this offense essentially is unauthorized use of another's property as 
opposed to stealing or damaging such property. Thus, the value of the prop-
erty unlawfully "borrowed" has little legal significance for penalty grading 
purposes. 
b. Unrepealed Theft-related Offenses.l208 Four Theft-related offenses 
were incorporated into Chapter 714 of the new Iowa Criminal Code. llDe All 
four crimes were unrepealed provisions of the pre-revised Code. These com-
mercial-fraud crimes relate to pirating of sound recordings through unau-
thorized reproduction,lZlo consumer frauds/Ill unlawful advertising and sell-
ing of courses of instruction,121l and selling more than one lifetime contract 
to the same person.12lS 
B. Fraudulent Practices 
The crime of Fraudulent PracticeslZl4 represents a consolidation of nu-
1204. IOWA CODE § 714.7 (1979). 
1205. See State v. Holmes, 276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979) and State v. Sanders, 280 N.W.2d 
375 (Iowa 1979) and text accompanying notes 619-38 supra. 
1206. 203 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1973). 
1207. Nevertheless, the maximum authorized penalty of confinement for two years under 
IOWA CODE § 714.7 (1979) is greater than the one-year maximum under IOWA CODE § 321.76 
(1977) (repealed 1978). 
1208. See also IOWA CODE § 714.1(8) (1979) (residual Theft provision extending uniform 
penalty schedule in § 714.2 to diverse Theft offenses outside the Criminal Code); J. YEAGER & 
R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 319. 
1209. There are no Uniform Jury Instructions, supra note 136, for any of these offenses. 
See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 340-44. 
1210. IOWA CODE § 714.15 (1979). 
1211. [d. § 714.16. 
1212. [d. § 714.17. 
1213. [d. § 714.20. 
1214. IOWA CODE §§ 714.8-.13 (1979); H.F. 685 (1980). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
supra note 136, at Nos. 1447-50; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 329-39. 
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merous fraud crimes contained in the pre-revised Code. InIl Specifically enu-
merated situations plus a residual provisionU18 constitute this crime which 
appears in the Code chapter on Theft and is to a large extent an attempted 
Theft offense.I117 The interrelationship between these two crimes is espe-
cially important in this regard in view of the fact that Theftll18 is a specific 
result crime requiring that the thief actually obtain something of value. 
1. Economic Underpinning 
Fraudulent Practices definitely has a economic underpinning, with the 
intent that the defendant perform the various proscribed acts in order to 
make an unauthorized economic gain. Although such an intent is not an ele-
ment of some of the proscribed Fraudulent Practices, nevertheless this eco-
nomic-oriented intent should deter charging someone with the crime of 
Fraudulent Practices when the circumstances do not suggest any pecuniary 
motivation. For example, one type of Fraudulent Practice consists of 
"mak[ing] any entry in or alteration of any public records, or any records of 
any ... business enterprise ... , knowing the same to be false."1119 On its 
face, this provision is not limited to, nor indeed does even mention, financial 
records. Yet a practical reading of this statute in both its historical and con-
temporary contexts compels the conclusion that this crime is limited. After 
all, its forerunner statutes were economic fraud crimes and the crime of 
Fraudulent Practices appears in the Code chapter entitled "Theft." More-
over, to a large extent, it is basically an attempted Theft crime which fills 
the void created by categorizing Theft as a specific result crime. 
2. Particularized States of Mind 
All but two of the various acts constituting Fraudulent Practices must 
be expressly accompanied by one of two particularized states of mind. Some 
of these acts must have been done merely with knowledge of their falsity; 
others with the more specific intent to defraud. 
These following "fraudulent" acts must have been done with . the of-
fender "knowing them to be false":12lO 
(1) making, tendering, or keeping for sale knowingly false bills of lading 
or warehouse receipts; (2) knowingly attaching or altering labels on goods 
1215. See IOWA CODE §§ 321.80; 709.7; 713.11-.16, .22, .26, .28, .35-.37, .43; 714.12-13; 
718.3-4, .6, .19 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1216. The residual provision brings within the realm of the uniform grading scheme of 
sections 714.9-.13 of the Criminal Code any other act expressly declared to be a Fraudlent 
Practice by any other section of the Iowa Code. See IOWA CODE § 714.8(10) (1979). 
1217. But see text accompanying notes 1226-43 infra. 
1218. IOWA CODE § 714.1 (1979). See text accompanying note 1216 supra. 
1219. [d. § 714.8(4). 
1220. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1448. 
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kept for sale so as to materially misrepresent as to such goods either 
their quantity, quality, maker, or source; (3) knowingly executing or 
tendering any false affidavit-or certificate which either is required by law 
or is given in support of a claim for payment; and (4) making either a 
knowingly false entry or a knowingly false alteration in any public or 
business record. '1I1 
The following "fraudulent" acts essentially are specific intent crimes 
which must have been done with the intent to defraud. UlII 
(1) manufacturing or keeping for sale any device usuable as a coin-ma-
chine slug, either with the intent that the device be so used or with the 
representation that it may be so used; (2) manufacturing or possessing 
any false or counterfeit label, either with the intent that it will be used 
fraudulently or with the representation that it may be so used; (3) tam-
pering with meters used in determining the value of property, with the 
intent to defraud any person; and (4) soliciting contributions or other 
assistance by falsely representing to be a veteran or a representative of 
any fraternal, religious, charitable, or veterans organization;usa and (5) 
knowingly participating in the transfer or assignment of a property inter-
est with the intent to obtain public assistance for which a person is not 
elgible.1224 
The two remaining types of Fraudulent Practices do not on their face 
contain any requirement of either (1) knowledge of the falsity of the prac-
tice or (2) an intent to defraud. One consists of removing, altering, or defac-
ing any identification number or mark from another's property, without any 
mention of a fraudulent intent. Certainly such an intent is implied by the 
entire thrust of the chapter which is entitled "Theft." After all, mere re-
moval, alteration, or defacement--without more-would constitute the 
crime of Criminal Mischief.'m The latter is a crime of vandalism whereas 
Fraudulent Practices is a crime of intended economic gain. The other type 
of Fraudulent Practice in this category consists of removing or tampering 
with any vehicle component part .number or vehicle identification number 
"for the purpose of concealing or misrepresenting the identity of the compo-
nent part or vehicle." This offense, too, seemingly has an underpinning of 
intended economic gain. Otherwise, the crime again should be merely la-
beled Criminal Mischief. 
3. "Involved" 
As noted in this article, me Fraudulent Practices is to a large extent, an 
1221. Id. 
1222. Id. 
1223. Id. 
1224. H.F. 685 (1980). 
1225. IOWA CODE §§ 716.1-.6 (1979). See text accompanying notes 937-56 supra. 
1226. See text accompanying note 1217 supra. 
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attempted Theft crime. The legislative intent was obvious, at least origi-
nally. This crime is included in the same chapter of the Code as Theft and 
Theft-related offenses, all of which require an actual obtaining of another's 
property. 1227 Requiring the same for the crime of Fraudulent Practices 
would lead to considerable overlapping, as many - if not practically all -
consummated Fraudulent Practices would constitute Theft (by Decep-
tion}.1228 Moreover, there is not any language concerned with obtaining any-
thing in the entire provision which sets forth the proscribed Fraudulent 
Practices. This contrasts with the terminology used in the various Theft 
provision,1128 viz. "takes possession or control;" "misappropriates;" "ob-
tains" property by deception; "exercises control over stolen property;" 
"takes, destroys, conceals or disposes" of secured property; and utters any 
check and "obtains" property in exchange therefore. If the General Assem-
bly had wanted to likewise make Fraudulent Practices a specific result 
crime, it certainly could have followed its own lead from the Theft statutes 
and employed some of the aforementioned terminology in the Fraudulent 
Practice provisions. 
The inescapable conclusion should be that Fraudulent Practices is not a 
specific result crime, and thus covers certain attempted Theft situations. 
However, Professor Yeager1280 has concluded that Fraudulent Practices is 
indeed a specific result crime, and thus the actual obtaining of something of 
value is required. He bases this conclusion on the legislative history of an 
amendment to the Code in 1977 . lIS 1 As originally passed in 1976,1282 this 
crime had a single grade; all types of Fraudulent Practices were punishable 
as aggravated misdemeanors irrespective of the value of the property in-
volved. In 1977, however, the Fraudulent Practices section of the new Crimi-
nal Code was amended to establish a five-degree crime tracking the grading 
and penalty schedules for Theft.lIS8 
Professor Yeager's cause for concern arises in the explanation accompa-
nying the house file version of the bill which became the 1977 amend-
ment.12M The pertinent portion therein stated: "The degree of crime and 
severity of penalty are primarily determined by the amount of money or 
value of property or services obtained by committing a fraudulent 
practice. "12811 
The significance of this explanation and most particularly the reference 
1227. See text accompanying note 1065 supra. 
1228. See text accompanying notes 1240-41 infra. 
1229. IOWA CODE § 714.1(1)-(6) (1979). 
1230. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 330. 
1231. H.F. 237, 67th G.A. (1977). 
1232. S.F. 85, 1976 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1245, § 1409 (66th G.A.). 
1233. See text accompanying notes 1242 infra. 
1234. See note 1090 supra. 
1235. H.F. 237, 67th G.A. (1977) (emphasis added). 
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therein to "obtained" lies in ascertaining the meaning of the word "in-
volved" which is used in determining the grading of the offense.1I8e The ba-
sic point of differentiation is "the amount of money or value of property 
involved,"1237 with the same schedules as apply to Theft (which, of course, is 
a specific result crime). No statutory definition of "involved" appears in the 
Code itself. This is a defect of constitutional dimensions, in Professor Ye-
ager's estimation.12ss He explains: "This is ambiguous language, in that rea-
sonable minds may differ as to what is meant by the word 'involved' in this 
context. This ambiguity would very probably have made these sections un-
constitutionally vague,"1289 except for resorting to the abovementioned ex-
planatory comment which defines "involved" as "obtained." Therefore, he 
concludes that Fraudulent Practices does not encompass attempted appro-
priations (i.e., Attempted Thefts). 
He concedes that this offense "was initially conceived as an attempted 
theft provision. "1240 He also points out that each Fraudulent Practice act 
"can also be prosecuted as a violation of section 714.1(3)," thus creating "an 
unnecessary duplication" with the offense of Theft by Deception."ll41 
I disagree with Professor Yeager's ultimate conclusion. As an initial 
matter, the original legislative intent seems unambiguous. If the crimes of 
Fraudulent Practices and Theft by Deception are in fact duplications, which 
they appear to be, then the entire provision of Fraudulent Practices is ren-
dered meaningless, which certainly was not the legislative intent. Moreover, 
such a position flies in the face of the maxim of statutory construction that 
each word (let alone each provision) is to be given effect. It also stretches 
credulity to believe that the General Assembly would have changed posi-
tions so diametrically from the 1976 legislative session to the 1977 session. 
Moreover, one would hope, if not expect, that such a fundamental change 
would appear within the purview of the statute itself instead of being found 
in the explanation portion of the bill (which is not an official part of the 
statute itself). And, of course, the statute controls and any unofficial intrin-
sic parts of the statute such as the explanation can be taken into account 
only when the meaning of the law is unclear. 
The dispositive issue here is whether the statute is clear. I maintain 
that it is, and thus further resort to the explanation is unwarranted. The 
word "involved" certainly is not a word of art, and should be generally un-
derstood in its dictionary meaning as "[i]mplicated; affected or concerned in 
some degree. "uu A taking is not suggested from the definitional context nor 
1236. See IOWA CODE §§ 714.9-.13 (1979). 
1237. Id. 
1238. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 330. 
1239. Id. 
1240. Id. § 329. 
1241. Id. 
1242. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 666 (3d ed. 1969). 
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is it implied from a comtemporaneous context. As already pointed out, these 
provisions appear in the Theft chapter and would be an unnecessary dupli-
cation of the offense of Theft by Deception if a taking was also required for 
the offense of Fraudulent Practices. It bears repeating that it is evident that 
the latter offense does not require a taking when the terminology of the 
various acti rei of the two offenses is compared. If a taking was intended to 
be required for Fraudulent Practices, the General Assembly should have 
used terminology such as "take," "misappropriates," or "obtains" (as it did 
in the Theft provisions) instead of the word "involved" (as it did in the 
Fraudulent Practices provisions).ll148 
A reasonable interpretation of the Fraudulent Practices provision is 
that the value of the amount of money or value of property "involved" can 
be reasonably determined and thus fair notice is given as to what constitutes 
the crime. Under section 714.8(1), the value involved would be that of the 
non-existent goods falsely represented in the warehouse receipt or bill of 
lading. The value of a false affidavit or certificate under section 714.8(3) 
would be the total amount of the claim if the claim is totally false but only 
the excess of the fraudulent claim over the value of any rightful claim. This 
same potential value differential would apply to falsification of public or 
business records under section 714.8(4). The value of the property tampered 
with by falsification of serial numbers and component part or vehicle identi-
fication numbers under sections 714.8(5) and 714.8(11), respectively, would 
control in these related situations. "Value" for purposes of the false Solicita-
tion of contributions provision in section 714.8(6) would depend upon 
whether a specific amount (either in money or specific property) was im-
properly solicited or whether an open-ended or general request was made. 
The former situation would be punishable according to the dollar "value," 
and the latter would be punishable in the third degree under the indeter-
minable-value provision in section 714.11(3). The degree of this offense 
which occurs through manufacturing, selling, or keeping for sale coin ma-
chine slugs would quite logically correspond to the total amount of money 
for which the total amount of slugs confiscated were intended to substitute. 
Constrastingly, because of difficulty in determining the intended use or the 
value of the property ultimately obtained or obtainable under sections 
714.8(2), (8), and (9), the fraudulent practices involving falsely attaching or 
altering labels on merchandise kept for sale, manufacturing or possessing 
false or counterfeit labels and meter tampering, are expressly made punisha-
ble in the third degree under section 714.11(2). 
4. Grading 
There are five degrees of Fraudulent Practices/244 ranging from a sim-
1243. See text accompanying note 1229 supra. 
1244. IOWA CODE §§ 714.9-.13 (1979). 
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pIe misdemeanor to a class C felony. The basic point of differentiation is 
"the amount of money or value of property involved,,,uftl with the same dol-
lar-level schedules as applicable to Theft.llf. Whenever the amount involved 
cannot be determined, a Fraudulent Practice is deemed to be in the third 
degree.12., Other types of Fraudulent Practices expressly declared in the 
statute1U8 to be in the Third Degree which do not depend upon the amount 
involved are attachment or alteration of false labels on goods kept for sale; 
manufacturing, possessing, or selling false or counterfeit labels; and fraudu-
lently tampering with meters. In addition, a Fraudulent Practice in the Sec-
ond Degree12f9 occurs when the amount involved does not involve more than 
$500 but the defendant has twice before been convicted of a Fraudulent 
Practice. This latter provision can only have prospective application in light 
of the fact that no comparable habitual offender provision in the pre-revised 
law.l2tIo Finally, an amendment in 1980 made it a serious misdemeanor 
fraudlent practice to knowingly participate in the transfer or assignment of 
a property interest with the intent to obtain public assistance for which a 
person is not elgible.12t11 
C. False Use of a Financial Instrument 
The newly-styled crime of False Use of a Financial Instrumentlltll con-
solidates a number of pre-revised crimes, litiS the principal ones II" being 
Forgery,UtItI Uttering a Forged Instrument,lItIS Possession of Forged Instru-
ment, Utl7 and False Use of a Credit Card. liN The elements of this new 
crimel2tl9 are: (1) falsely using, (2) a "financial instrument,"IISO (3) with 
1245. ld. 
1246. ld. § 714.2. See also text accomppnying notes 1229-41 supra. 
1247. Id. § 714.11(3). 
1248. ld. § 714.11(2). 
1249. ld. § 714.10(2). 
1250. Regarding the carryover application of the common thief provision during the stat-
utory revision process, see text accompanying note 1104 supra. 
1251. H.F. 685 (1980). 
1252. IOWA CODE §§ 715.1-.7 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at 
Nos. 1501-09. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 351-66. 
1253. For an extensive discU88ion of the pre-revised law through the changes proposed in 
the 1974 bill, see Note, False Use of a Financiallnstrument, 60 IOWA L. REv. 548 (1975) [here-
inafter cited as False Use Note). 
1254. The other consolidated pre-revised offenses included Gross Fraud or Cheat (re-
pealed IOWA CODE § 713.40); Making or Uttering False Public Instruments (repealed IOWA CODE 
§ 718.3); and the several counterfeiting offenses (repealed IOWA CODE §§ 718.4-.21). See False 
Use Note, supra note 1253, at 548 n.6. 
1255. See IOWA CODE § 718.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1256. See id. § 718.2. 
1257. See id. § 718.5. 
1258. See id. § 713.39. 
1259. IOWA CODE § 715.6 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 
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fraudulent intent, and (4) with knowledge of either the falsity of the instru-
ment or the lack of a legal right to use a genuine instrument. 
1. False Use 
The proscribed false use1l8l of a "financial instrument" (together with 
special attendant circumstances) can consist of any of the following: (1) 
making or executing such an instrumentjlllli (2) endorsing such an instru-
mentj1l88 (3) altering such an instrument so as to materially change its na-
ture or its attendant obligationjllll4 (4) tendering or merely offering such an . 
instrument, together with making false representationsjllllll or (5) possessing 
such an instrument, knowing it to be false or knowing there was no right to 
possession thereof. II118 The gravamen of this offense is making false use of a 
"financial instrument" rather than actually obtaining anything. Hence this 
is a specific result offense. 
The false use can arise through using either a false instrument or a gen-
uine instrument with no right to do so, provided that either type of instru-
ment is used with a fraudulent intent.118'1 An instrument need only appear 
to be genuine on its face in order to be covered under this statute.llH 
2. "Financial Instrument" 
A "financial instrument" is defined comprehensively in Code section 
715.1 to include diverse instruments and devices1l811 in these four broad cate-
gories: (1) commercial instruments or "writings" evidencing either an obliga-
tion or release of an obligationjUl'lO (2) title instruments (e.g., a deed or a 
motor vehicle certificate of title)jll'1l (3) testamentary documents (e.g., a 
will);l271 and (4) credit devices (e.g., a credit card).lI'11 Additionally, the stat-
1501-05; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 365. 
1260. [d. § 715.1. See text accompanying notes 1269-76 infra. 
1261. [d. § 715.2. 
1262. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1501; J. YEAGER & R. 
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 359. 
1263. [d. 
1264. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1502; J. YEAGER & R. 
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 359. 
1265. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 1503-04; J. YEAGER & R. 
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 360. 
1266. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 1506-06; J. YEAGER & R. 
CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 361, 363. 
1267. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 365. 
1268. See id., § 357, which states that if the instrument "does not appear to be genuine 
on its face, it has no legal tendency to effect.a fraud" (citing State v. Pierce, 8 Iowa 231 (1859». 
1269. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 352. 
1270. [d. § 353. 
1271. [d. § 354. 
1272. [d. 
HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 390 1979-1980
390 Drake Law Review [Vol. 29 
utory definition includes certain ancillary writings (e.g., an endorsement of a 
codicil) which purport to affect any of these "financial instruments. "1274 
Whether a particular instrument or device is a "financial instrument" 
is, of course, a question of lawl2711 to be decided on the face of the statute. 
Whether or not a particular instrument or device not enumerated in the 
statute is nevertheless included within the statute will depend upon statu-
tory interpretation of the several catch-all phrases under the canon of ejus-
dem generis. 
3. Knowlege of False Use 
A scienter requirement is expressly included in the False Use stat-
ute.1I78 This limits the criminality to a person who knows of the falsity of 
the instrument or knows that he has no legal right to use a valid "financial" 
instrument." This scienter requirement can be satisfied either by actual 
knowledge or by failure to make "a reasonable inquiry" although having "in-
formation which would put a reasonable person upon inquiry."1lI77 
4. Fraudulent Intent 
A particularized mens rea of a fraudulent intentU7S is an element of this 
crime. mil This specific intent "to obtain fraudulently anything of value" is 
defined simplistically in the Uniform Jury Instructions as "an intent to 
wrongfully obtain .... "IIiSO 
The lack of limiting or qualifying language in the statute signifies that 
the prosecution need not prove an intent to defraud "any particular per-
son," as noted in the Uniform Jury Instructions.IlIS1 Moreover, this is not a 
specific result crime, as no actual loss need be sustained by anyone. IIISIi 
Proof of the fraudulent intent must be independent of the mere act of 
possessing either a falsified "financial instrument" or a valid instrument 
which the possessor has no right to use.US8 Moreover, there is no statutory 
inference as to intent. Indeed, other evidence must affirmatively show that 
the offender possessed the instrument with the intent to fraudulently obtain 
anything of value. One commentator has suggested that such proof "will 
1273. [d. § 355. 
1274. [d. § 356. 
1275. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1507. 
1276. IOWA CODE § 715.3 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 
1509; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 362. 
1277. [d. 
1278. See note 1268 supra. 
1279. IOWA CODE § 715.6 (1979). 
1280. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1508. 
1281. [d. 
1282. [d. 
1283. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 363. 
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usually be found in some act of the possessor, something that he says, or in 
the circumstances of the possession. "1284 
An expansive statutory provision expressly includes within the fraudu-
lent intent phrase "the intent to deliver a financial instrument to another, 
knowing that the other person intends to use the instrument to obtain 
fraudulently something of value."11811 This covers a person in possession of 
falsified or stolen "financial instruments" who intends to sell them to 
others. 1288 
5. Grading 
There is only one degree of this offense, unlike the related offenses of 
Theft and Fraudulent Practices which are graded into five different degrees 
depending upon the value of the property involved.1I87 The probable expla-
nation for this unusual treatment is that a broad range of "financial instru-
ments" is included, many of which have little intrinsic value in and of 
themselves.1288 
This offense is a class C felony,1I811 and obviously is not a "forcible fel-
ony."mo Although the new penalty schedule (i.e., an indeterminate term of 
ten years) is the same as for the two major pre-revised offenses,lllli the new 
Criminal Code does not provide for an alternative sentencing option of a 
one-year jail term to be imposed in the sentencing court's judicial discretion, 
unlike under the pre-revised law. Nevertheless, a sentencing judge can ac-
complish approximately the same type of alternative "short" term under the 
new Criminal Code by exercising his right under Code section 902.4 to re-
consider the sentence to imprisonment within ninety days (and thus grant 
"delayed" probation). Of course, a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, 
and a suspended sentence are available options in all cases. lItIl Moreover, as 
a "non-forcible" class C felony, this offense also is punishable by a fine -
either in addition to or in lieu of a term of imprisonmentll1l8 (whether sus-· 
pended or not). The raising of the maximum fine to $5000 under the new 
offense will facilitate a harsh penalty in those situations when neither a 
prison term nor a suspended sentence is warranted. This compares under 
1284. Id. at 95. 
1285. IOWA CODE § 715.3 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 
1508; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON; supra note 3, § 362. 
1286. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 362. 
1287. See IOWA CODE §§ 714.1-.2 and 714.8-.13 and text accompanying notes 1075-90 and 
1244-51 respectively supra. 
1288. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 351. 
1289. For the sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 71-83 supra. 
1290. See text accompanying notes 180-203 supra. Concerning the availability of a fine-
only penalty, see text accompanying notes 84-92 supra. 
1291. See IOWA CODE § 718.1-2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1292. See text accompanying notes 69 supra. 
1293. See text accompanying notes 75-102 supra. 
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the pre-revised law to the maximum fine of only $1000 as an additional pen-
alty accompanying the one-year jail term and to no authorized fine at all 
when the ten-year prison sentence was imposed. 
6. Interrelationship with Theft by Bad Check 
Both Theft1294 and False Use of a Financial Instrument relate to wrong-
ful uses of checks. In some respects these two crimes overlap while in others 
they do not.1291i The main difference lies in the comparative penalty 
schedules.129B 
The starting point in the analysis should focus on the effect of success 
in at least initially obtaining anything of value with a bad check. An at-
tempted, but· unsuccessful, passing of a bad check does not constitute Theft. 
This is because Theft is a specific result crime.1297 Indeed, a particular ele-
ment of Theft by bad checks is to "obtain" property or service in exchange 
therefor. On the other hand,' False Use of a Financial Instrument is not a 
specific result crime, as evidenced by its comparable element being merely 
"with the intent to obtain fraudulently anything of value .... "1298 Thus, a 
bad check that otherwise qualifies as making a "false use" of a "financial 
instrument" could fit within this latter offense even though the bad check 
was not successfully "passed." 
A defendant-maker of a worthless check commits Theft when he signs 
his own name on a check for which he either has insufficient funds or no 
account at all. The worthless check constitutes Theft, provided that defen-
dant knows at the time of utterance that the check will not be paid when 
presented. In this same set of circumstances, however, the crime of False 
Use of a Financial Instrument does not occur. This is because the latter 
basically is a crime of alteration, as evidenced by "false use" being defined 
alternatively in terms of the financial instrument not being "what it pur-
ports to be" or of the defendant-user not being "the person authorized to 
use" it.1299 So, defined, a worthless check signed by the defendant (in his 
true name) is still what it purports to be, that is, a promise to pay by the 
defendant. 
The crime of False Use of a Financial Instrument would occur in these' 
situations: the defendant forges X's name as the drawer on a check made 
payable either to the defendant or to bearer; the defendant alters an other-
1294. IOWA CODE § 714.1(6) (1979). See text accompanying notes 117-24 supra. 
1295. Regarding the scope of prosecutional discretion in selecting a change from overlap-
ping offenses, see note 1050 supra. 
1296. The only degree of the crime of False Use of a Financial Instrument is a class D 
felony. Comparatively, the three lowest degrees of Theft are misdemeanors and the highest 
degree is a class C felony. See generally text accompanying notes 1075-1105 supra. 
1297. See text accompanying notes 71-111 supra. 
1298. IOWA CODE § 715.6 (1979) (emphasis added). 
1299. [d. 
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wise valid check made payable by X to the defendant or to bearer (by in-
creasing the amount payable); the defendant impersonates Y and endorses· 
and cashes a check made payable to Y which the defendant had either sto-
len or found. 
Attempted, but unsuccessful, passing of an insufficient funds check may 
not constitute any crime at all. This certainly would not constitute Theft 
which is a specific result crime requiring the thief to actually obtain some-
thing of value. Moreover, a check is not included at all in the subject matter 
of the crime of Fraudulent Practices. lSoo Finally, the crime of False Use of a 
Financial Instrument would not occur in light of the check being signed by 
the defendant (in his true name). Contrastingly, attempted but unsuccessful 
passing of a forged check would be punishable as False Use of a Financial 
Instrument, which is not a specific result crime .• 
VI. VIOLENT PROPERTY APPROPRIATION OFFENSES 
A. Introduction 
Robbery and Extortion constitute the two forms of aggravated property 
appropriation offenses. Unlike the totally "non-violent" property appropria-
tion offenses of Theft, Fraudulent Practices, and False Use of a Financial 
Instrument which merely consist of stealing as discussed above in part V, 
Robbery and Extortion require, either actual or threatened violence, certain 
other types of threats, or being armed with a dangerous weapon. Robbery 
and Extortion also differ from the other property appropriation offenses by 
not being specific result crimes, requiring instead only an intent to steal or 
to make some other wrongful gain. Because no actual taking is necessary for 
Robbery or Extortion, the grading of these offenses is not keyed to the dol-
lar value of anything either taken or attempted to be taken, unlike for Theft 
and Fraudulent Practices. The differences between Robbery and Extortion 
are summarized at the end of this part of the' article,1801 following a detailed 
individual discussion of these two offenses. 
B. Robbery 
The revised crime of Robberyl8Os "consists of an assault or threat of 
physical violence made in aid of an intended theft"1808 or the offender's es-
cape from the scene thereof. Combining the pre-revised crimes of Rob-
bery1804 and Assault with Intent to Rob,180I1 the revised Code expressly has 
1300. [d. § 714.8. See text accompanying notes 1214-51 supra. 
1301. See text accompanying notes 1362-67 infra. 
1302. IOWA CODE § 711.1 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 
1101-07. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 251-54; W. LAFAVE & A. 
SCOTT, supra note 398, § 94; R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 279-85. 
1303. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 251. 
1304. IOWA CODE § 711.1-.3 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
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omitted the traditional requirement that something of value be actually 
taken,1806 requiring instead only a specific intent1807 to commit a theft.180s 
The apparent rationale for this change is that the gravamen of the offense is 
"the use of violence or threat of violence as a means of accomplishing [or 
attempting] a theft,"18oe rather than the degree of property appropriation. 
The revised definition of Robbery has survived a constitutional two 
prong attack based on due process grounds. Concluding that the Robbery 
statute was not vague, the supreme court in State v. Pierce,1810 held it was 
within the legislative perogative to eliminate "taking" as an element of the 
revised crime of Robbery and the robbery statute "[was] no less clear merely 
because the conduct proscribed overlap conduct which [was] also proscribed 
under a separate statute"l811 (referring to Assault While Participating in a 
Felonyl812 as it relates to·an unsuccessful or attempted Robbery). 
Under the new Criminal Code, common law robbery has been enlarged 
in several other ways. The time span in which the required assault or threat 
of physical violence must occur now extends from the theft scene through 
defendant's escape. Thus, force or intimidation can now occur after the tak-
ing of property rather than having to precede or be coterminous with the 
taking. For example, a thief who secretly rifles the cash register at a filling 
station and starts to flee, but is accosted by the manager and then pulls a 
gun to effectuate his escape, now commits a Robbery under the new Crimi-
nal Code, but not under the common law nor under the pre-revised stat-
ute. l818 The revised Code more adequately characterizes the overall actions 
of the offender who has used violence at some time during the theft. 
Another revision is that the new offense refers to Theft181' as a broader 
offense than the pre-revised crime of Larceny18111 with the former offense of 
Robbery being considered as Larceny from the person by force or intimida-
tion. Under the new Criminal Code, the use or threat of violence during the 
attempted commisaion of any type of Theft (which incorporates and consoli-
1305. [d. § 694.7 (Assault With Intent to Commit Certain Crimes). 
1306. "It is immaterial to the question of guilt or innocence of robbery that property was 
or was not actually stolen." IOWA CODE § 711.1 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra 
note 136, at No. 1106. 
1307. For a discussion of specific intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes 
437-601 supra. 
1308. See State v. Campbell, 214. N.W.2d 195 (Iowa 1974) (no intent to steal to support 
Robbery conviction where defendant "took" gun away during an altercation). 
1309. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 252. For a discussion of robbery of a 
business entity via threatened violence directed against an employee, see State v. Matlock, 289 
N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 1980). 
1310. 287 N.W.2d 570 (Iowa 1980). 
1311. [d. at 573-74. 
1312. See IOWA CODE § 708.3 (1979). 
1313. See State v. Lewis, 173 Iowa 643, 154 N.W. 432 (1915). 
1314. See IOWA CODE § 714.1 (1979). 
1315. See IOWA CODE ch. 709 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
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dates the former offenses of Larceny,1318 Embezzlement,1811 False Pre-
tenses,1318 Receiving and Concealing Stolen Property,131e and False Drawing 
and Uttering)lSIO will constitute Robbery. Thus, a person attempting to pass 
a bad check who draws a gun, or even merely shoves the sales clerk, to effec-
tuate his escape apparently commits Robbery. 
1. Felony Murder Rule 
The principle that Robbery is an underlying felony for purposes of ap-
plication of the felony murder rule to Murder in the First Degree has not 
been changed.lslil The revision occurred because the revised crime includes 
both the consummated substantive offense and the inchoate attempted of-
fense, whereas the pre-revised "first-degree" felony murder rule also applied 
to both Robbery and Attempted Robbery.lSlIli 
2. Lesser Included Offenses 
The aforementioned statutory changes in the revised crime of Robbery 
have caused several accompanying changes as to the lesser included offenses 
of Robbery. Specifically, Theft has already been held not to be a lesser in-
cluded offense of Robbery, unlike Larceny under the pre-revised law.lSl8 
Similarly, Assault no longer appears to be a lesser included offense of the 
newly-constituted offense of Robbery, unlike under the prior law. Addition-
ally, it has been held that an instruction on Accessory After the Fact should 
not be given in a Robbery prosecution.1814 These cases are discussed in de-
tail in part II (D) of this Article. 
3. Grading 
Robbery is graded into two degrees, "[varying] with the risk to which 
the robbery victim or others are exposed."lSl6 The three situations constitut-
ing Robbery in the First Degreel8ll8 are: purposely inflicting "serious in-
jury,"IS1I1 purposely attempting to inflict "serious injury," and being armed 
with a "dangerous weapon .... 8118 All other robbery is of the second degree.ule 
1316. [d. 
1317. [d., § 710. 
1318. [d., § 713. 
1319. [d., § 712. 
1320. [d., §§ 713.3-04. 
1321. See IOWA CODE § 707.2(2) (1979). 
1322. See IOWA CODE § 690.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1323. See State v. Holmes, 276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979). 
1324. See State v. Sanders, 280 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1979). 
1325. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 251. 
1326. IOWA CODE § 711.2 (1979). 
1327. See definitional clause at IOWA CODE § 702.18 (1979). 
1328. See definitional clause at IOWA CODE § 702.7 (1979). 
HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 396 1979-1980
396 Drake Law Review [Vol. 29 
The new grading is an improvement over the pre-revised grading.1880 
Aggravating circumstances under the latter included having an armed con-
federate present or merely striking the victim or wounding him with a 
weapon. The revised focus upon "serious injury" is much more realistic. 
Moreover, the cumbersome pre-revised requirement (for Robbery With Ag-
gravation) that an armed robber be shown to have the intent to kill or 
maim, if resisted, was eliminated.1881 
Nevertheless, the revised grading has some defects. How is infliction of 
serious injury to be equated with attempted infliction of serious injury? 
Likewise, considerably more harm is done by infliction of "serious injury" 
than merely by having a "dangerous weapon" in the robber's possession. 
The weapon does not even need to be loadedl832 nor does it need to be 
pointed at anyone. Three degrees of Robbery would have been more realis-
tic, with the infliction of "serious injury" being reserved solely for the first 
degree level. 
Another questionable aspect of the grading system is that negligent in-
fliction of "serious injury" is not of a first-degree nature, whereas intentional 
attempted (i.e., unconsummated infliction of) "serious injury" is. First de-
gree robbery should include infliction of "serious injury," whether pur-
poseful or not. Sexual Abuse is of the first degree1888 whenever "serious in-
jury" to another is caused whether intentional or not, and no rational 
explanation for this distinction between Robbery and Sexual Abuse is 
apparent. 
4. Sentencing Options 
Because both degrees of robbery are "forcible felonies,"1884 none of the 
ameliorative sentencing alternatives (i.e., a deferred judgment, a deferred 
sentence, or a suspended sentence) are available. This means that the 
twenty-five year prison term for Robbery in the First Degree must be im-
posed and is not subject to being suspended (i.e., a bench parole or proba-
tion) under any circumstances. BecaUse Robbery in the Second Degree is a 
class C felony, there is uncertainty as to whether any prison term must be 
1329. IOWA CODE § 711.3 (1979). 
1330. See IOWA CODE §§ 711.2-.3 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1331. Robbery With Aggravation required not only that the offender be armed with a 
dangerous weapon, but that he intended while so armed, if resisted, to kill or maim the person 
robbed. IOWA CODE § 711.2 (1977) (repealed 1978); State v. Ashland, 259 Iowa 728, 732, 145 
N.W.2d 910, 912 (1966). See also State v. Buhr, 243 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Iowa 1976) (intent to 
commit larceny is necessary for robbery but is not the intent, if resisted, to kill or maim re-
quired in robbery with aggravation). 
1332. See State v. Nichols, 276 N.W.2d 416 (Iowa 1979). 
1333. See IOWA CODE § 709.2 (1979). 
1334. See id. § 702.11 (1979). 
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imposed, in light of Code § 909.1.18811 One alternative reading of the latter 
provision would permit a sentencing judge to impose a fine of up to $5000. 
Such an approach, however, contradicts the mandatory imprisonment con-
cept for persons convicted of "forcible felonies." 
The hard-nosed approach in the new Criminal Code compares unfavor-
ably to the pre-revised law.usli A suspended sentence was an available alter-
native for both of the former offenses (of Robbery and Robbery with Aggra-
vation) under all circumstances. On the other hand, either a deferred 
judgment or a deferred sentence was an available alternative only in the 
absence of violence (i.e., serious injury inflicted or attempted, or dangerous 
weapon involved). The pre-revised approach was better in light of the dis-
tinct possibility that a nonviolent purse snatcher could be convicted of 
Robbery. 
C. Extortion 
The revised crime of Extortion1887 has been expanded in the new Crimi-
nal Code to include four additional types of threats not previously criminal 
under Iowa law.1sss These include threats: (1) to expose another to hatred, 
contempt, or ridicule; (2) to harm another's credit, or one's business or pro-
fessional reputation; (3) to misuse one's public position to take or withhold 
action in order to injure another, or to use one's influence with a public 
servant to cause taking or withholding of action to injure another and (4) to 
give or withhold information concerning another's legal claim or defense. me 
The four pre-revised types of Extortion, retained in the new Criminal Code, 
include threats; (1) to inflict physical injury on another; (2) to commit any 
public offense against another; (3) to accuse another of a public offense, and 
(4) to injure another's property.llUO Of course, anyone of these eight threats 
must be coupled with a specific intentl841 to obtain something of value for 
oneself or another from another, without any reasonable belief of a right to 
make such threats, in order to constitute Extortion.I841 
1335. Section 909.1 authorizes a court to impose a fine upon a conviction "of any public 
offense for which a fine is authorized." A maximum fine of $5000 is authorized for a class 0 
felony, in addition to an indeterminate 10-year term of imprisonment. See IOWA CODE § 902.9 
(3) (1979). 
1336. See IOWA CODE § 789A.l (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1337. IOWA CODE § 711.4 (1979). See UNIPORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 
1107-09; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 255-56; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTI', supra note 
398, § 95, at 704·07; R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 367-75. 
1338. See IOWA CODE §§ 720.1, 740.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). 
1339. IOWA CODE § 711.4 (1979). None of these threatened activities would necessarily 
otherwise be criminal in nature, except possibly for number three which "is on the periphery of 
criminal activity." J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 255. 
1340. IOWA CODE § 711.4 (1979). 
1341. Regarding specific intent as a mens rea, see text accompanying notes 453-92 supra. 
1342. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTJONS, supra note 136, at No. 1107. 
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1. Nature of Requisite Threat 
The crime of Extortion requires only a threat of some type of injury to 
another, and thus no actual injury is needed for an extortion conviction. 
Obviously, the Extortion1848 offense is not dependant upon a specific result 
(injury) occurring. For the same reason, it is not necessary for the intended 
victim to actually respond to the threat, such as relinquishing extorted 
money. An extortionist can be seeking to obtain from the victim "for oneself 
or another anything of value, tangible or intangible, including labor or ser-
vices."lM4 As Robbery, Extortion is not graded by the value of any property 
involved. 
Judicial interpretations of the nature and form of the prohibited threat, 
necessary under the pre-revised code to constitute Extortion, should remain 
viable under the new Criminal Code. "[AJ threat ... to be within the stat-
ute need not be made personally to the one threatened. In order to be a 
'threat,' it must be so made, and under such circumstances, as to operate, to 
some extent at least, on the mind of the one whom it is expected to infIu-
ence."lMIi There must be sufficient evidence, however, to show that defen-
dant intended his communication to be relayed to the party threatened. 1 ... 
Moreover, a threat "need not ... be in any particular form or in any partic-
ular words, and it may be made by innuendo or suggestion. All that is neces-
sary is that it be definite and understandable to a mind of ordinary intelli-
gence .... "11147 Thus, "[tJhreats of physical harm need not be directly 
expressed, but may be contained in veiled statements, nontheless implying 
injury to the recipient when viewed in all of the surrounding circumstances. 
What is controlling is whether a recipient of the communication would in-
terpret it as a threat of injury."lM8 
The requisite threat need not be of a physical injury, however, as evi-
denced by the seven other types of threats provided for in the statutory 
crime of Extortion. Also, the truth of the extortionist's claim or allegation is 
immaterial. For example, the crime of Extortion may be committed by a 
person who unlawfully threatens to accuse another of a public offense, 11 .. 
even though the threatened party is guilty of the public offense. The 
1343. Iow~ CODE § 711.4 (1979). See State v. Harrington, 260 A.2d 692, 699 (Vt. 1969) (a 
lawyer's demand for settlement of a civil action accompanied by a malicious threat to expose 
the other party's criminal conduct, if made with intent to extort payment, constitutes 
Extortion). 
1344. IOWA CODE § 711.1-.3 (1979). 
1345. State v. Brownlee, 84 Iowa 473, 478, 51 N.W. 25, 27 (1892). 
1346. [d. See also State v. McGinnis, 243 N.W.2d 583, 589 (Iowa 1976). 
1347. State v. McGinnis, 243 N.W.2d 583, 589 (Iowa 1976), citing, State v. Wilbourn, 219 
Iowa 120, 125, 257 N.W. 571, 574 (1934). 
1348. State v. McGinnis, 243 N.W.2d 583, 589 (Iowa 1976) (citations omitted). 
1349. IOWA CODE § 711.4(2) (1979). 
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threatened party's guilt is wholly immaterial to the crime.18110 Similarly, a 
policeman can commit Extortion even though he had the right, albeit the 
duty, to arrest those persons he extorted from rather than arrested. lalll "It is 
[the] misuse of these powers for malicious purposes and with intent to ex-
tort money which [the crime of extortion] is aimed at."lalll 
2. Grading 
There is only one grade of Extortion, a class D felony.18l1a At first blush, 
the fact that Extortion is not considered a "forcible felony" is somewhat 
surprising in light of the fact that the related offense of Robbery in the 
Second Degree is a "forcible felony."18114 The gravamen of both offenses can 
be, in the alternative, a threat of violence, the only difference being that 
immediate violence must be threatened for Robbery whereas Extortion in-
volves threats of future violence.l8IIl1 The crux of the matter, however, is that 
threats of physical injury or threats to commit any public offense are only 
two of the eight types of threats which can constitute Extortion. Obviously, 
the other six types of threats should not be the basis for making Extortion a 
"forcible felony." Nevertheless, this leaves the similar offenses of Robbery in 
the Second Degree and Extortion by threats of violence being treated dis-
similarly for purposes of sentencing options. A practical solution would be to 
eliminate Robbery in the Second Degree from the listing of "forcible 
felonies. " 
.3. Special Defense Based Upon Reasonable Belief of Right to Property 
A special statutory defense to a charge of extortion arises when the ac-
cused person "reasonably believed" he had "a right to make such threats in 
order to recover property, or to receive compensation for property or ser-
vices, or to recover a debt to which the person has a good faith claim. "laN 
However, this defense is unavailable in a situation where there is a threat to 
commit a public offense, because no one can be privileged to make such a 
threat.lSlI7 
The Uniform Jury Instructions correctly place the burden of disproving 
1350. Hall v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 252 N.W.2d 421, 424 (Iowa 1977). 
1351. State v. Browning, 153 Iowa 37, 133 N.W. 330 (1911). 
1352. [d. at 41, 133 N.W. at 333. 
1353. A Class D felony is punishable by either an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 
five years or a maximum fine of $1,000 or both. Because it is not a "forcible felony," a full range 
of ameliorative sentencing alternatives, (i.e., a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a 
suspended sentence of probation) is also available. See IOWA CODE §§ 711.3, 907.3 (1979). 
1354. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979) and text accompanying notes 180-203 supra. 
1355. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 251. 
1356. IOWA CODE § 711.4 (1979). See UNlJI'ORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 
1109; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 256. 
1357. IOWA CODE § 711.4 (1979). 
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this defense upon the state.ISGS The state must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt either of the following: (1) that when the defendant made the threat 
he was not entitled to recover property or other items of value from the 
victim, or (2) "[t]hat he did not reasonably believe he had a right to make 
such a threat."18G8 The standard appears faulty in that the first alternative is 
directed toward a retrospective factual and legal determination, without 
consideration of defendant's reasonable belief. Under the disjunctive test, as 
set out above, all that the state need prove is that the accused actually had 
no such right to make the threat, thus rendering nugatory the second alter-
native, even though the second alternative is the only standard actually des-
ignated in the statute. This author submits that the first alternative should 
be eliminated altogether from the above instruction. 
Under the second alternative described above, the reasonableness of the 
defendant's belief is to be determined at the time of the threat. A defendant 
is "not required to act with infallible judgment," but only, under the cir-
cumstances, as a reasonable man.IS80 It is sufficient if the defendant believed 
he had a right to make the threat and such belief would be so viewed by a 
reasonable person in the same light."1881 
4. Robbery and Extortion Distinguished 
Extortion differs from Robbery in several ways.18SS The most important 
difference is that, unlike Robbery, the threat constituting Extortion "need 
not be one of violence."1888 In fact, the Extortion crime was created "in or-
der to plug a loophole in the robbery law by covering sundry threats which 
will not do for robbery."18fU Moreover, an extortionist threatens only future 
injury, whereas a robber threatens immediate injury or other violence.18811 
Additionally, an extortion victim "consents to part with his money or prop-
erty, although his consent is induced by the unlawful threat, whereas in rob-
bery the intimidation is so extreme as to overcome the will of the victim and 
cause him to part with his money or property without consent."18811 Finally, 
"robbery requires that the property be taken from the person or presence of 
the victim, while extortion ... has no such limitation."1887 
1358. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1109. 
1359. Id. 
1360. Id. 
1361. Id. 
1362. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 251. 
1363. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 43, at 56. 
1364. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOT!', supra note 398, at 707. 
1365. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 43, at 56. 
1366. R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 375. 
1367. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOT!', supra note 398, at 707. 
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5. Relationship of Extortion to Other Offenses 
In addition to Robbery, Extortion relates to several other offenses.18ea 
a. Theft by Deception. As offenses involving wrongful appropriation of 
another's property, Extortion and Theft by Deception1888 are closely related, 
with the difference being that an extortionist operates through threats 
whereas as thief lies or practices some other type of deceit to obtain success 
peacefully. Moreover, a thief must succeed, whereas as extortionist is pun-
ishable with or without a taking. 
b. Assault. Extortion by way of threatening to inflict physical injury 
on another1870 overlaps considerably with the simple misdemeanor offense of 
simple Assault,1871 the difference being that an Assault must involve an act 
intended to cause pain, injury, or offensive touching of the victim as op-
posed to a mere verbal threat by an extortionist. That is, a threat standing 
alone does not constitute an Assault. Moreover, an Assault requires appar-
ent ability of execution whereas Extortion does not. Of course, an extortion-
ist's threat must have been made with the intent of obtaining wrongful gain. 
c. Terrorism. Extortion by way of threatening to commit a public of-
fense1872 overlaps considerably with Terrorism by way of threatening to 
commit a forcible felony.1878 Again, no intended wrongful gain is necessary 
for Terrorism but it is necessary for Extortion. Terrorism is a crime of vio-
lence requiring an intent "to injure or provoke fear or anger in another,"1874 
whereas this type of Extortion is not necessarily a crime of violence or even 
of threatened violence (but more of a blackmailing nature). The difference 
in violence contemplated in the two crimes is readily apparent on the face of 
the statutes themselves. Only threats of a "forcible felony,"18711 by nature a 
violent crime, are punishable for Terrorism. In contrast, wrongful threats to 
commit any "public offense"1878 suffice for Extortion. Neither of these types 
of Terrorism nor Extortion require any act beyond the making of the requi-
site threat. The threat for Extortion additionally requiies that it be made 
"under circumstances raising a reasonable expectation that the threat will 
be carried out,"1877 whereas there is no express comparable limitation con-
cerning Terrorism. 
d. Compounding a Felony. Extortion by way of threatening to accuse 
1368. See generally, J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 255. 
1369. See IOWA CODE § 714.1(3) (1979). 
1370. [d. § 711.4(1). 
1371. See id. § 708.2. 
1372. IOWA CODE § 711.4(1) (1979). 
1373. See id. § 708.6(2). 
1374. [d. § 708.6. 
1375. See id. § 702.11 and text accompanying notes 180-203 supra. 
1376. See id. § 701.2. 
1377. See id. § 708.6(2). 
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another of a public offense1878 relates to the crime of Compounding a Fel-
ony.lS7e The latter is a specific result crime, however, unlike Extortion which 
is punishable merely for making the threat irrespective of success. Moreover, 
Compounding a Felony is a more passive crime, punishing the mere act of 
receiving a wrongful gain, without requiring a threat nor even that the de-
fendant initiate the matter. 
e. Criminal Mishchief. Extortion by way of threatening to wrongfully 
injure another's propertylS80 fills a gap left in the related offense of Criminal 
Mischief. ls81 The latter is a specific result crime, with actual damage caused. 
In other words, Criminal Mischief doos not encompass a mere threat to in-
jure another's property, nor even an attempt to injure. On the other hand, 
the mental states of the two crimes are quite dissimilar, one being to dam-
age another's property (whether for the intangible benefits of revenge or for 
a lark) and the other being to extract some wrongful tangible gain (e.g., 
money). 
f. Malicious Prosecution. Extortion by way of threatening to accuse 
another of a public offensel881 overlaps with the crime of Malicious Prosecu-
tion. ls8s Again, there are many significant differences. The offense of Mali-
cious Prosecution requires that the perpetrator go beyond a mere threat for 
Extortion and actually attempt to cause a prosecution. Moreover, there 
must be no legitimate basis for the prosecution maliciously caused or at-
tempted by a person charged with Malicious Prosecution, unlike Extortion 
which punishes a person for threatening to accuse another of a public of-
fense irrespective of the legitimacy of the accusation. The difference is that 
an extortionist's claim must be coupled with the intent to make a wrongful 
tangible gain. 
g. Felonious Misconduct in Office. Extortion by way of misusing one's 
public position, or by wrongfully influencing a public servant to injure an-
otherls84 can be compared with the offense of Felonious Misconduct in Of-
fice. 1886 The gravamen of the latter offense, however, is falsification of public 
records or documents. Contrastingly, Extortion can occur without any falsi-
fication, as the essence of Extortion is to threaten another in order to obtain 
a wrongful gain, even when the extortionist's claim is true. Additionally, Fe-
lonious Misconduct requires success, instead of punishing the essentially in-
choate activity of a threat by an extortionist. Moreover, Felonious Miscon-
duct can occur irrespective of the public officer's or employee's intention in 
1378. [d. § 711.4(2). 
1379. See id. § 720.1. 
1380. [d. § 711.4(7). 
1381. See id. § 716.1. 
1382. [d. § 711.4(2). 
1383. See id. § 720.6. 
1384. [d. § 711.4(5). 
1385. See id. § 721.1. 
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doing any of the enumerated acts, provided only that he did so knowingly, 
whether or not intended for personal wrongful gain. Contrastingly, the ex-
tortionist wrongfully seeks personal gain. 
h. Bribery and Accepting a Bribe. Extortion by way of threatening to 
give or withhold information concerning another's legal claim or defensel88e 
relates somewhat to the offenses of Bribery1887 and Accepting a Bribe.l888 
The latter offenses, unlike Extortion, are not tied to an intended wrongful 
personal gain and do not require a threat by the offender. 
1386. [d. § 711.4(6). 
1387. [d. § 722.1. 
1388. [d. § 722.2. 
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